Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Is it better for the opposition to contest unfair elections or boycott them?
There is no decision that is always right. Going to unfair elections can help the opposition to preserve the organization, talk to voters, monitor the polls, document abuses and show how much support there really is. But it can also give the appearance of legitimacy to a procedure in which the result cannot be seriously disputed.
Boycott can clearly show that conditions are not acceptable, but it has political weight only if it is broad, understandable to citizens and associated with the post-election pressure plan; otherwise, the government fills the blanks and proceeds at no greater cost. Therefore, the decision should be tied to the goal: what the opposition gets the day after the exit or boycott, whether it can remain unique and whether there is a realistic way to expand the chosen tactics, and not to narrow the space for future change.
Part of the opposition boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2020 due to poor conditions. The boycott showed the depth of the crisis, but the SNS won 188 of 250 seats, the parliament was almost without an actual opposition, and the government did not lose enough international legitimacy to have to change the rules. The return of the opposition in 2022 restored the representation, but in itself did not equalize the conditions. The Serbian experience therefore does not give a universal response, but a warning that both strategies have a price.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
The review paper on the boycott concludes that it did not threaten the legitimacy of the regime in the short term and that the election result strengthened the government; later elections returned the opposition to the assembly.
A boycott only makes sense if it can produce more pressure outside the institutions than the government gets from the mandates left; getting out makes sense if it preserves organization and space without concealing dishonesty.
“Yes, the case clearly shows the strategic dilemma, not the rule that one option is always right.
The outcome of 2020 depended on the pandemic, the relationship between the opposition, the media and international actors. It cannot be mechanically applied to every subsequent election.
No decision is always the best. The choice depends on how closed the system is, what the rules are and what the opposition can do after the exit or boycott.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Howard, M. M. i Roessler, P. G. (2006), „Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes“, American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 365–381.
- Contribution to this answer
- Howard and Roessler show that the opposition coalition can dramatically change the outcome of authoritarian elections. Participation can therefore open up a real opportunity when the opposition manages to overcome fragmentation.
comparing several countries or cases
Bunce, V. J. i Wolchik, S. L. (2011), Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Bounce and Wolchik show how coordinated opposition, civil society, voter work and election monitoring can turn unfair elections into a moment of real challenge to an authoritarian leader.
comparing several countries or cases
Gamboa, L. (2022), Resisting Backsliding: Opposition Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gamboa shows that the price of an opposition strategy should be calculated in the long run: a move may seem strong in the short term, yet isolate the opposition, spend legitimacy, or make it easier for the authorities to close the remaining institutional space.
comparing several countries or cases
Ong, E. (2022), Opposing Power: Building Opposition Alliances in Electoral Autocracies, University of Michigan Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ong shows why opposition cooperation is expensive and when it becomes possible: parties are easier to come together when they believe that the government is vulnerable and that they cannot win without each other.
comparing several countries or cases
Schedler, A. (2013), The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- “Schedler shows that even a boycott is not automatic without political effect: it can delegitimize or destabilize electoral autocracy, but destabilization does not in itself guarantee democratization.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Bursać, Dejan, i Dušan Vučićević. 2021. “Election Boycott in a Hybrid Regime: The Case of 2020 Parliamentary Elections in Serbia.” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 35(2): 437–460. https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X211009106
Bursać, Dejan, and Dušan Vučićević. 2021. “Election Boycott in a Hybrid Regime: The Case of 2020 Parliamentary Elections in Serbia.” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 35(2): 437–460. https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X211009106
- What the source records
- The authors find that the boycott without strong external support did not compromise the legitimacy of the government and that the election result further strengthened the ruling party.
- Claim it supports
- The conclusion that both exit and boycott have a price and that their impact depends on the organization, legitimacy and pressure that the opposition can produce.
- Source limitation
- The work assesses the short-term consequences of a boycott; it does not prove that going out or boycotting is always a better strategy.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Laštro, Claudia, i Florian Bieber. 2021. “The Performance of Opposition Parties in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Three Case Studies from the Western Balkans.” European Political Science 20(4): 617–629. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-021-00326-w
Laštro, Claudia, and Florian Bieber. 2021. “The Performance of Opposition Parties in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Three Case Studies from the Western Balkans.” European Political Science 20(4): 61729. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-021-0326-w
- What the source records
- The authors describe Serbia as a case with real opposition and elections, but with the terrain that is structurally tilted in favor of the authorities.
- Claim it supports
- The conclusion that both exit and boycott have a price and that their impact depends on the organization, legitimacy and pressure that the opposition can produce.
- Source limitation
- The emphasis is on opposition strategies and regional comparison, not on all parts of the state apparatus.
Official election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The monitoring mission noted the real choice of political alternatives, but also the decisive participation of the president, the systemic advantages of the government, media bias, pressures and misuse of public resources.
- Claim it supports
- The conclusion that both exit and boycott have a price and that their impact depends on the organization, legitimacy and pressure that the opposition can produce.
- Source limitation
- Proves the quality of one electoral process, not independently the entire type of regime or all the events after February 2024.
Domestic NGO ten-year monitoring synthesis - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2026. A Decade of Election Observation: Is Everything the Same, Worse, or Better? Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- “The synthesis concludes that the key electoral problems have not been solved and that many have deepened, with a ten-year deletion of the border between the state and the ruling party.
- Claim it supports
- The conclusion that both exit and boycott have a price and that their impact depends on the organization, legitimacy and pressure that the opposition can produce.
- Source limitation
- It is a short institutional retrospective, not a new methodological report; the claims should be checked in the individual election reports on which the synthesis is based.
Reviewed scientific paper analysis of election strategies - Viewed full open work, method, findings and bibliographic record
Bursać, Dejan, and Dušan Vučićević. 2025. “Electioneering Strategies in the Hybrid Regime: Another Regular Snap Election in Serbia.” New Perspectives 33(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X241308429
- What the source records
- It follows the return of the opposition in 2022 and a new division around the boycott of the local elections in 2024, with different concessions and unequal conditions.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that dating and boycotting have different gains and costs even in neighboring cycles.
- Source limitation
- The work does not give counterfactual evidence of what would have happened if the entire opposition had chosen a different strategy.
Reviewed academic election analysis - Full paper, bibliography, election data and conclusion
Ilić, Vujo, and Gazela Pudar Draško. 2022. “2022 Elections in Serbia: The Return of the Opposition?” Contemporary Southeastern Europe 9(2): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.25364/02.9:2022.2.1
Ilić, Vujo, and Gazela Pudar Draško. 2022. “2022 Elections in Serbia: The Return of the Opposition?” Contemporary Southeastern Europe 9(2): 1. https://doi.org/10.25364/02.9:2022.2.1
- What the source records
- It compares parliament with almost no opposition after the 2020 boycott with the return of opposition, funding and visibility in 2022.
- Claim it supports
- “It most directly shows the institutional cost of the boycott and the benefits of returning, with permanently unequal conditions.
- Source limitation
- It does not prove that going out is always better; the outcome depends on unity, goal and conditions.
Domestic NGOs multi-cycle election monitoring and dispute analysis - Reviewed full report, method, dispute tables and recommendations
CeSID. 2024. Oko izbora 24. Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju.
CeSID. 2024. Around the elections 24. Belgrade: Centre for Free Elections and Democracy.
- What the source records
- Analyse the elections of 2023 and 2024, disputes and divided responses of the opposition to poor conditions.
- Claim it supports
- It adds domestic records that the strategy must include a plan for legal protection, mobilisation and the post-election period.
- Source limitation
- Monitoring cannot calculate the political outcome of an unelected alternative.
Official International Special Election Assessment - Review of the final report, method and political context
OSCE/ODIHR. 2020. Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary Elections, 21 June 2020 — Special Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- What the source records
- Document the boycott in 2020 and the effect on the composition of the parliament.
- Claim it supports
- Provides independent confirmation of the immediate institutional outcome of the boycott.
- Source limitation
- Pandemic and specific relationship of opposition actors limit comparison with other cycles; same ODIHR manufacturer.
Official international monitoring of local elections - Review of the official final report and recommendations
OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Local Elections, 2 June 2024 — Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- What the source records
- Monitor the local elections in 2024 in which part of the opposition participated and part boycotted.
- Claim it supports
- It shows that a divided boycott can narrow down joint mobilization and make it difficult to clearly interpret the results.
- Source limitation
- The local cycle and the same ODIHR manufacturer; does not prove what a single opposition would do.
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