Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How can elections be unfair if no one stole my vote?
Elections can be deeply unfair even when each box is counted correctly. The advantage can be made months or years earlier: by controlling the most viewed media, using public money and official campaign events, pressing employees and donors, making it difficult to run or selectively applying the law.
The voter then formally chooses, but does not choose between competitors who had approximately equal opportunity to present the program, organize supporters and protect themselves from punishment. A fair count cannot subsequently equal such a game. However, not every irregularity is proof that the entire outcome was staged; it is necessary to determine how widespread, planned, repeated and capable of changing the behavior of voters or opponents of the government.
Elections can be unfair even when the polling-station record adds up the ballots correctly. In Serbia, observers in 2023 recorded months-long media dominance by the authorities, campaigning by public officials, pressure on voters, misuse of public resources, and ineffective resolution of disputes. This means that freedom of choice can be narrowed before a voter picks up a pen and after the ballot box is closed.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
ODIHR and CRTA distinguish the technical conduct of voting from the overall fairness of the campaign and document serious problems in both phases. YIHR and the Human Rights Committee Bujanovac additionally document that the passivisation of Albanian residence addresses can lead to removal from the voter register and loss of voting rights before election day itself.
Fair election process includes informing, running, financing, freedom from pressure, voting, counting and effective appeal failure on any link can change the real competition.
Yes the Serbian example is very direct proof that proper counting is not enough.
Documented inequality does not make it possible to calculate reliably how each citizen would have voted under ideal conditions. The integrity of the process is therefore assessed, not an imagined result.
A single irregularity does not prove that it determined the result. It is necessary to show how widespread it was, whether it was planned, and whom it harmed.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
cross-country or cross-case comparison
Schedler, A. (2013), The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Schedler shows that electoral injustice doesn’t just start with counting votes: the government can limit the media, opposition, resources, candidacy and competition rules much earlier. The choice can be seriously unfair and without stealing a concrete vote at the polling station.
cross-country or cross-case comparison
Levitsky, S. i Way, L. A. (2010), Competitive Authoritarianism, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Levitsky and Way describe a “nervous terrain” in which the opposition is formally allowed to compete, but the government systematically uses the state, media and other resources to have a huge advantage before the vote.
explanation of how the system works
Greene, K. F. (2007), Why Dominant Parties Lose, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greene on Mexico shows how the dominant party builds a long-term advantage by controlling state resources and organization. The opposition can therefore enter the elections, and yet compete against the system that has made it difficult for it to become an equal rival for years.
cross-country or cross-case comparison
Howard, M. M. i Roessler, P. G. (2006), „Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes“, American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 365–381.
- Contribution to this answer
- "Howard and Roessler show that elections under authoritarianism involve different combinations of coercion and manipulation, but also that the opposition coalition can open up space for an unexpectedly liberalizing outcome.
Serbia case study
Petrović, V. (2026), „Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia“, Democratization.
Petrović, V. (2026), “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia”, Democratization.
- Contribution to this answer
- Petrović shows how political pressure and dependence on work or public resources can change the behavior of voters and activists even before the election day. Injustice can therefore arise through everyday addiction, and not just through fraud when counting.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
official election monitoring - Verified 21 August 2026
OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The observation mission recorded a genuine choice among political alternatives, but also the president's decisive involvement, systemic advantages for the authorities, media bias, pressure, and misuse of public resources.
- Claim it supports
- The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
- Source limitation
- It establishes the quality of one electoral process, not by itself the country's entire regime type or every event after February 2024.
Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21 August 2026
CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.
CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report 2023. Belgrade: CRTA Election Observation Mission.
- What the source records
- CRTA assesses that the elections were not free and fair and records serious irregularities at 13% of observed polling stations in the parliamentary elections and 21% in the Belgrade elections, alongside documented pressure, institutional passivity, and organised voter migration.
- Claim it supports
- The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
- Source limitation
- The finding concerns one electoral cycle and is the expert assessment of a domestic observation mission, not a court judgment or an independent classification of the entire regime.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21 August 2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The monitoring finds that more than half of the airtime allocated to political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television appearances and received almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
- Claim it supports
- The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
- Source limitation
- The sample covers the main news programmes of five national television channels, but does not measure all media, their full programming, audiences, or the direct effect of such reporting on voting.
Domestic NGO campaign financing monitoring - Verified 21 August 2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Povećanje nesrazmere među akterima, procena ukupne vrednosti kampanje i preliminarni izveštaji: monitoring izbora 2023. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija.
Transparency Serbia. 2024. Increase of disproportion among stakeholders, estimate of total campaign value and preliminary reports: monitoring of elections 2023. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- The monitoring records promotion of the governing list through public resources, intensive campaigning by public officials, a lack of timely response by the competent authorities, and estimates that permitted direct campaign spending was no less than EUR 20 million.
- Claim it supports
- The distinction between orderly ballot counting and an unfair campaign, pressure, media advantage, and misuse of public resources.
- Source limitation
- This is a preliminary and narrowly focused report on one campaign; some conclusions are estimates and substantiated suspicions, not violations established by a final judgment.
Local NGO and local partner field research - Verified 21 August 2026
Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac. 2023. Pasivizacija adresa Albanaca u Preševskoj dolini kao diskriminatorna praksa. Beograd i Bujanovac: YIHR Srbija i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac.
Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the Committee for Human Rights of Bujanovac. 2023. Passivation of addresses of Albanians in the Presevo Valley as discriminatory practice. Belgrade and Bujanovac: YIHR Serbia and the Committee for Human Rights of Bujanovac.
- What the source records
- Links the passivisation of residence addresses to removal from the voter register and the loss of the ability to vote.
- Claim it supports
- Shows that an election can be impaired before election day by an administrative decision about who remains on the voter register.
- Source limitation
- The purposive sample and incomplete access to administrative data do not allow an assessment of all passivised addresses; the report documents affected cases and a pattern, not every individual procedure.
Reviewed scientific paper analysis of election strategies - Viewed full open work, method, findings and bibliographic record
Bursać, Dejan, and Dušan Vučićević. 2025. “Electioneering Strategies in the Hybrid Regime: Another Regular Snap Election in Serbia.” New Perspectives 33(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X241308429
- What the source records
- Document unequal access to media, public funds and institutions and interference of state and party activities before voting.
- Claim it supports
- Directly confirms that proper counting does not remove the advantage created before the election day.
- Source limitation
- Campaign analysis does not mean that every irregularity has changed the final result.
Reviewed academic election analysis - Full paper, bibliography, election data and conclusion
Ilić, Vujo, and Gazela Pudar Draško. 2022. “2022 Elections in Serbia: The Return of the Opposition?” Contemporary Southeastern Europe 9(2): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.25364/02.9:2022.2.1
Ilić, Vujo, and Gazela Pudar Draško. 2022. “2022 Elections in Serbia: The Return of the Opposition?” Contemporary Southeastern Europe 9(2): 1. https://doi.org/10.25364/02.9:2022.2.1
- What the source records
- For 2022, it separates a wide selection of candidates and the return of the opposition from the continued misuse of public resources, media imbalances and pressures.
- Claim it supports
- It shows how the choice can be really competitive, and yet not equal.
- Source limitation
- Relying in part on monitoring other organizations; not a new field rate of irregularity.
Domestic NGOs multi-cycle election monitoring and dispute analysis - Reviewed full report, method, dispute tables and recommendations
CeSID. 2024. Oko izbora 24. Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju.
CeSID. 2024. Around the elections 24. Belgrade: Centre for Free Elections and Democracy.
- What the source records
- Analyse the campaign, electoral list, election day and 165 legal proceedings with evidence, with different outcomes.
- Claim it supports
- Helps to separate allegations, documented irregularity, legal outcome and a wider assessment of fairness.
- Source limitation
- The rejected complaint does not prove that the wider political problem does not exist, just as the application itself does not prove an injury.
International Network of Election Observers Final Report - Reviewed full final report, method and recommendations
European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO). 2022. Presidential and Early Parliamentary Elections, 3 April 2022, Serbia — Final Report.
- What the source records
- ENEMO notes an unequal campaign, institutional advantage and allegations of pressure on employees and voters.
- Claim it supports
- Adds an independent international confirmation that freedom of choice can be narrowed before entering the polling station.
- Source limitation
- The allegations are not court rulings and the report does not measure how much of all voters have been subjected to pressure.
Official international election monitoring - Full official report reviewed
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 2024. Observation of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Serbia (17 December 2023). Doc. 15895.
- What the source records
- PACE for the 2023 elections considers the dominant position of the government, the media, the campaign and the reported problems with the electoral roll and the organized bringing of voters.
- Claim it supports
- Expands the fairness check from counting to equal campaigning and integrity of administrative conditions.
- Source limitation
- Some serious claims remain as allegations or suspicions, not definitively established facts.
Is a relevant source missing? Send it to us.
Suggest a source or report an error in this answer →