Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
What happens to institutions when people are hired and promoted mainly for political loyalty?
When hiring and advancing primarily according to political suitability, the institution changes both composition and behavior. Employees learn that loyalty, silence and execution of orders are more important for the career than professional result, compliance with the procedure or warning of error.
People who know the job can stay, but have less space to use the knowledge if it leads to conflict with political interest. Over time, experience, institutional memory and willingness to take responsibility are lost, while bad news is embellished on the way to the top. Membership in the party does not in itself prove unskilledness. The problem is seen when the criteria of the competition are unclear, political activity predicts progress better than effect and when professional disagreement brings punishment, not discussion.
When an institution advances because someone is politically reliable, professional people receive the message that knowledge and results are not the main criteria. In Serbia, long-term officials, bypassing the competition and witnessing about party employment create an administration in which the manager is more suited to the one who extends his mandate than to the citizen and the law. In time, the lack of expertise and readiness to report a mistake.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
CEP and PAR Monitor document unfilled places through competitions and a large share of acting officials, while research of pressures and clientelism records political criteria in employment and advancement.
“Politization does not remove all professional people, but it changes the behavior of the entire institution: decisions are adjusted to the expectations of the political center, and failure is covered up so as not to jeopardize the career.
Yes formal channels of dependence and qualitative testimony complement each other.
Party membership does not prove inexpertise, and the law knows political functions. The claim refers to professional official positions where the competition, mandate and professional criteria must be real.
A loyal person can also be an expert. The claim of political employment requires proof of the criteria of choice and the consequences for work, not just data on membership.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Pepinsky, T. B., Pierskalla, J. H. i Sacks, A. (2017), „Bureaucracy and Service Delivery“, Annual Review of Political Science 20: 249–268.
- Contribution to this answer
- The survey shows how much the quality of public services depends on the way the bureaucracy is organized and on the professional relations within it and with the citizens. When the professional criteria are weakened, the problem is not just “bad staff” in one place the conditions under which the entire administration can work quality change.
review more research
Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dahlstrm and Lapuente show why the relationship between political control and professional autonomy is not just an internal human resources issue: different ways of organizing bureaucracy have consequences for corruption, economic development and the quality of public services.
surveys in several countries
Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.
- Contribution to this answer
- Schuster and co-authors show what happens when officials who see their work as serving the public interest receive a political order that they consider harmful: they often try to convince the leadership to give up, but at the same time they are more willing to leave or to oppose from the inside. Political pressure can therefore gradually change the composition of the institution.
comparing several countries or cases
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.
- Contribution to this answer
- At the Israeli state administration, the authors show that officials who see democratic backsliding as a serious threat more often want to leave the service, and less to speak and engage further at work. One reason is to expect future politicization and loss of professional influence so changing the political system changes who wants to stay in the institution.
Investigation of the conduct of civil servants
Gilad, S., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. i Levi-Faur, D. (2025), „A Taste for Government Employment Also Rests on Its Political Flavor“, Public Administration Review 85(5): 1412–1425.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gilad and co-authors show that political selection can start even before employment: in a polarized society people who are politically closer to the opposition are less interested in a job in the state administration. If this pattern is repeated, the institution can become more politically one-sided over time and without formal rule that only supporters of the government are employed.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.
- What the source records
- At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political employment and advancement suppress the professional criteria, encourage compliance and weaken the capacity of the institution over time.
- Source limitation
- Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Regional NGO monitoring of public administration - Verified 21.08.2026
WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkan PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.
WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkans PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.
- What the source records
- For Serbia, there are persistent gaps between formal reform and the experience of citizens and officials, especially in employment, transparency and accountability.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political employment and advancement suppress the professional criteria, encourage compliance and weaken the capacity of the institution over time.
- Source limitation
- The regional methodology gives a comparison, but does not explain every institution or every bad result with political pressure.
Domestic NGOs qualitative election research - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2022. Preliminarni izveštaj o izbornom nasilju i korupciji. Beograd: CRTA.
CRTA. 2022. Preliminary report on electoral violence and corruption. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes repeated patterns of reward and punishment towards fixed-term employees, party members, poor and other dependent groups.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political employment and advancement suppress the professional criteria, encourage compliance and weaken the capacity of the institution over time.
- Source limitation
- The deliberate and “snowball” pattern is not representative and the statements are not the same as the legally established facts in any case.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political employment and advancement suppress the professional criteria, encourage compliance and weaken the capacity of the institution over time.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
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