Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How can an institution be captured if no one ordered every employee what to do?
The institution remains independent only on paper when it retains its name, office and legal powers, but does not have the freedom or strength to use them against the powerful. The government can choose its executives, keep them in temporary status, withhold money and people, control access to data or simply ignore decisions.
Employees then learn to solve harmless cases, and sensitive ones are delayed, narrowed or closed without a clear order. That is why statistics on the number of solved cases can be misleading: the institution can be effective towards ordinary citizens, and powerless towards the top of the government. Real independence is seen in politically difficult cases can the body only initiate proceedings, get information, publish the findings and ensure that someone implements the consequences.
In Serbia, numerous bodies have a law, an office and a mandate of an independent institution, but their real position depends on the choice of management, budget, access to data and the willingness of other authorities to carry out recommendations. REM is, for example, a formally independent regulator, while domestic and international monitoring has been recording for years that it has not effectively responded to the political imbalance in the media. Independence on paper can therefore survive along with practical impotence.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Media associations, CRTA, Civic Initiatives and the European Commission document problems with the choice, work, transparency and impact of REM.
The institution does not constitute an independent name, but the ability to collect data without the permission of the authorities, make an unpopular decision and ensure its execution.
Yes REM gives a very legible Serbian example of formal independence and contested practical independence.
The regulator cannot solve all the problems of the media market and politics on its own. Its effect must be assessed according to clear competencies, evidence and legal standards.
An institution can do ordinary work well, and withdraw only when the case hits the top of the government. That is why independence should be checked by the type of case.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
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Moustafa, T. (2014), „Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 281–299.
- Contribution to this answer
- Moustafa shows that the institution does not have to be completely abolished or turned into an obedient apparatus for the government to benefit from it: the courts can continue to resolve many real disputes, while the most politically sensitive cases face different boundaries. That is why the institution can look functional in everyday work, and yet be much weaker exactly where it should control the powerful.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows how the control of the institution can be built through a series of seemingly separate legal changes through the method of appointment, jurisdiction, procedure and organization so it is not necessary to issue a political order to every employee. When it is changed who decides on careers and what the institution can realistically do, people begin to adapt their behavior to new borders.
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Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dahlstrm and Lapuente show why it is important how the bureaucracy is organized, not just what the law formally mandates: the relationship between political control and professional autonomy affects who is making progress, how decisions are made, and how many officials can act on expert criteria when they conflict with the interest of the political leadership.
surveys in several countries
Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.
- Contribution to this answer
- Schuster and co-authors show that professionally motivated officials do not all respond to politically problematic orders: some try to change the decision, some obstruct it, and some think about leaving. An important consequence is that it is precisely those who want to protect the public interest that can leave the institution over time, so the government gets fewer and fewer internal obstacles and no mass purge.
Investigation of the conduct of civil servants
Gilad, S., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. i Levi-Faur, D. (2025), „A Taste for Government Employment Also Rests on Its Political Flavor“, Public Administration Review 85(5): 1412–1425.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gilad, Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Levi-Faur show something that happens even before entering the institution: in a politically polarized environment, people closer to the opposition are less inclined to choose a job in the state administration. If such selection is repeated, the political environment can change the composition of the bureaucracy over time and without orders from existing employees.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Monitoring finds that more than half of the time intended for political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television broadcasts and almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the name and legal mandate are not sufficient if the institution does not have independent leadership, resources and the ability to produce consequences for its decision.
- Source limitation
- The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Domestic media associations survey and qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026
Asocijacija medija, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Lokal pres i Slavko Ćuruvija fondacija. 2023. Strategija razvoja medijskog sistema Srbije (2020–2025) i njena implementacija: saznanja, stavovi i predlozi medijskih radnika. Beograd.
Media Association, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Local Press and Slavko Curuvija Foundation. 2023. Strategy of development of media system of Serbia (2020-2025) and its implementation: findings, attitudes and proposals of media workers. Belgrade.
- What the source records
- Respondents describe the gap between formal rules and implementation, political influence through financing and regulators, as well as low confidence in the institutions of protection of media freedom.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the name and legal mandate are not sufficient if the institution does not have independent leadership, resources and the ability to produce consequences for its decision.
- Source limitation
- The sample of media workers and interviews do not represent all the newsrooms or the entire audience; they find measures of experience and attitudes of the professional community.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the name and legal mandate are not sufficient if the institution does not have independent leadership, resources and the ability to produce consequences for its decision.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
- What the source records
- The report assesses Serbia as a transitional or hybrid regime and notes a simultaneous decline in electoral conditions, media, local democracy and judicial independence.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the name and legal mandate are not sufficient if the institution does not have independent leadership, resources and the ability to produce consequences for its decision.
- Source limitation
- The assessments are expert and based on the thresholds of the organization; individual claims should be verified by primary and additional sources.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed
European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.
- What the source records
- Monitors the formal independence and practical capacities of the judiciary, regulators, prosecutors and other control bodies.
- Claim it supports
- It supports the difference between the legal mandate and the real possibility of using it in politically difficult cases.
- Source limitation
- Same manufacturer as D03 and D33; time series, not three independent certificates.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations
European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.
- What the source records
- Documentes the period without a functional deciding body of REM, poor parliamentary review of the report and limited implementation of recommendations of independent bodies.
- Claim it supports
- Directly confirms that the institution can retain its name and powers, while losing its practical capacity and consequences.
- Source limitation
- EU monitoring unites multiple sectors and does not show that every employee has received an order.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Dragojlov, Aleksandra. 2026. “Influence of Political Clientelism on Media Freedom under Vučić and the Progressive Party.” Nationalities Papers 54(2): 391–407. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2025.25
Dragojlov, Aleksandra. 2026. “Influence of Political Clientelism on Media Freedom under Vucic and the Progressive Party.” Nationalities Papers 54(2): 39107. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2025.25
- What the source records
- Analyzes political clientelism in the media system of Serbia and the ways in which resources and institutional relations affect media autonomy.
- Claim it supports
- Adds an academic sector-specific capture mechanism without a central order to any journalist or regulatory official.
- Source limitation
- The focus is on the media; it cannot be automatically transferred to every independent institution.
Primary source official regulatory monitoring of media - Full official report, methodology and end tables
Regulatorno telo za elektronske medije (REM). 2025. Izbori 2023 — završni izveštaj monitoringa pružalaca medijskih usluga.
Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM). 2025. Elections 2023 final report of monitoring of media service providers.
- What the source records
- The official regulator publishes its own monitoring of electoral representation and shows what tasks it formally performs.
- Claim it supports
- The primary countersource allows to separate the existing operational capacities from the question of whether the regulator acts timely and independently in sensitive cases.
- Source limitation
- The regulator’s own report is not an independent assessment of its autonomy or proof of media equality.
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