Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How does a court lose its independence while remaining independent on paper?
The court can remain constitutionally “independent”, and practically lose the freedom to decide. Control is built through the manner of selecting and advancing judges, temporary mandates, disciplinary procedures, salaries and budget, changing jurisdictions and assigning sensitive cases to appropriate councils.
An open phone call is often not necessary: judges from earlier examples learn which decisions close their careers, launch a media attack or lead to a transfer. This is how self-censorship occurs, while the authorities can argue that no one has ordered the outcome. One bad verdict does not prove the control of the entire court. A more reliable sign is the repeated pattern: politically important cases are delayed or ended predictably, allies and opponents are treated differently from the consequences.
The court can lose its independence even without abolishing the constitutional provision. In Serbia, the problem is political speeches on cases, the manner of choice and progress, caution in the most sensitive disputes, the dependence of the prosecution and the absence of consequences for undue influence. The judge still signs the verdict, but knows that public attack, career or institutional support can depend on whom the decision affects.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
The study of the Constitutional Court finds restraint in key political cases, while the YUCOM, prEUgovor and the European Commission record lasting undue influence and low confidence in the independence of the judiciary.
The most effective control is not a command in every subject, but an environment in which people assess in advance what is safe to decide.
Yes multiple sources confirm formal independence and practical pressure channels.
A bad or slow verdict is not evidence of political influence. For a specific case, a file, an explanation, a course of proceedings and proof of external pressure are required.
One wrongful verdict against the opposition does not prove that the entire court is controlled. A repeated pattern of pressure and different treatment is required.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Moustafa, T. (2014), „Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 281–299.
- Contribution to this answer
- Moustafa shows that the court does not have to be completely abolished in order to lose political independence: it can continue to resolve many ordinary disputes, while the limits of its autonomy appear precisely in the cases that are most dangerous to the government.
Historical data and comparison
Moustafa, T. (2007), The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- In Egypt, Moustafa shows how authoritarian authorities can first give courts space because they benefit from it, and then narrow it down when the judiciary begins to produce politically risky consequences.
comparing several countries or cases
Ginsburg, T. i Moustafa, T. (ur.) (2008), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- “The Assembly shows that courts in authoritarian regimes have real functions and limited autonomy, but their power depends on the political design and tolerance of the regime.
review more research
Whiting, S. H. (2023), „Authoritarian Legality and State Capitalism in China“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 19: 357–373.
- Contribution to this answer
- Whiting shows how the legal system can maintain formal procedure and professional institutions while being incorporated into the political priorities of the regime. Formal legality is therefore not the same as political independence.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows how the independence of the court can be weakened by changing the rules of appointment, jurisdiction and procedures, without any formal abolition of the institution.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 954–979. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 95479. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
- What the source records
- The paper finds that the Court often chose caution and formalism in key disputes, so it did not become a strong defence of political power, even though it was formally independent.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the court’s formal independence can survive with practical pressures throughout its career, public messages, institutional support and caution in sensitive cases.
- Source limitation
- The analysis ends before the latest judicial reforms and relates primarily to the Constitutional Court, not to all courts and prosecutions.
Domestic NGOs annual report of legal aid - Verified 21.08.2026
Komitet pravnika za ljudska prava — YUCOM. 2024. YUCOM 2022–2024, godišnji izveštaj br. 11–12. Beograd: YUCOM.
Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights YUCOM. 2024. YUCOM 202224, annual report No. 11. Belgrade: YUCOM.
- What the source records
- The report documents the gap between judicial reforms and citizens’ experience, the pressure on independence and the obstacles for vulnerable groups to receive effective legal protection.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the court’s formal independence can survive with practical pressures throughout its career, public messages, institutional support and caution in sensitive cases.
- Source limitation
- It is the report of the organization that provides legal aid and advocates reforms; the choice of cases is not representative for all courts and all disputes.
Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.
- What the source records
- The report documents the simultaneous concentration of power, institutional abuses, pressures on the judiciary, selective fight against corruption, media control and repression against critics, with very few reforms implemented.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the court’s formal independence can survive with practical pressures throughout its career, public messages, institutional support and caution in sensitive cases.
- Source limitation
- It is the semi-annual report of the coalition with a clear reform and advocacy role, so its evaluations should be checked through the above examples, documents and sources for each area.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the court’s formal independence can survive with practical pressures throughout its career, public messages, institutional support and caution in sensitive cases.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Official international legal opinion - Reviewed officially adopted opinion, findings and recommendations
Venice Commission. 2026. Urgent Opinion on the 28 January 2026 Amendments to Laws Governing the Judiciary and the Prosecution. CDL-AD(2026)016.
- What the source records
- Analyzes the rules of election, referral and administration in the judiciary and warns that an unsafe temporary position can become a pressure channel.
- Claim it supports
- It directly supports the mechanism in which the court remains formally independent, but career and status uncertainties change behavior.
- Source limitation
- The assessment of legal risk is not proof that any temporary timetable has been used for political punishment.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations
European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.
- What the source records
- “It records increased political attacks and pressure on judges and prosecutors, as well as limited progress in protecting independence.
- Claim it supports
- substantiates the repeated pressure pattern, more important than drawing a conclusion from a single judgment.
- Source limitation
- The same manufacturer as D03; combining years expands the time, but not the number of independent certificates.
Domestic NGOs institutional and judicial monitoring - Full report and methodology reviewed
Mandić, Sofija, i CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council: 2025.
Mandic, Sofia, and CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutory Council: 2025.
- What the source records
- Monitor the transparency and operation of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council during 2025.
- Claim it supports
- “It adds domestic institutional evidence that personnel and management procedures can narrow real independence without an open order from any judge.
- Source limitation
- The monitoring of the Council does not measure the decisions of all courts or the proven political origin of any failure.
Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparency Serbia and CINS.
- What the source records
- Through cases, it analyzes the capture of the judiciary, the prosecution and the police and the informal pressure behind formal rules.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the mechanism of selective treatment and self-censorship in politically sensitive cases.
- Source limitation
- An older case study and coalition product; does not give a national rate of all court decisions.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346
- What the source records
- Describes the legislative overhaul of institutions and the concentration of control without formally abolishing independence.
- Claim it supports
- Link individual rule changes to the cumulative loss of institutional counterbalances.
- Source limitation
- Broader institutional work, not an empirical analysis of the career of each judge.
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