Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why do employees find it harder to say 'no' when their job or term continually depends on a new government decision?
Employees tend to say “no” when their contract, position or mandate soon expires and the extension is decided by the person whose decision they should control. He does not have to get a direct order; it is enough to know how the predecessors who objected have passed. Then he begins to adjust reports in advance, postpone sensitive items and choose a safer interpretation of the rules.
Temporary status thus turns personal existential risk into a mechanism of institutional control. Not every contract on a certain political pressure and temporary work can have a justified reason. A sign of the problem is when the temporary lasts for a long time in managerial and supervisory positions, when the renewal of the mandate does not have clear professional criteria and when it coincides with obedience in cases important to the government.
At the end of 2021, 213 of the 408 highest civil-service positions in Serbia were filled by acting officials. A person who knows that their position will soon depend once again on a political signature will find it harder to stop an unlawful order, insist on an unwelcome professional opinion, or leave a written record of disagreement. Temporary status thus becomes a silent command even though no one has uttered a threat.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
CEP calculated the share of acting officials and described the long-running circumvention of regular competitive recruitment; the European Commission and PAR Monitor confirm that the problem of politicisation persists.
A permanent term does not guarantee courage, but it reduces the personal cost of a professional 'no'. Repeated short-term renewal turns a lawful career into a series of political loyalty checks.
Yes this is one of the most concretely measurable Serbian mechanisms of dependence of the administration.
It cannot be concluded that every acting official is obedient or unqualified. The evidence concerns the institutional incentive and the violation of the purpose of a temporary exception.
Recent research often measures what employees say they would do, not their actual decisions. The finding is therefore an important indication, but not definitive evidence of behaviour.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
surveys in multiple countries
Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.
- Contribution to this answer
- Schuster and co-authors show that officials are not automatically obedient when they consider that a political order harms the public interest: many are trying to persuade the leadership to give up, and some would rather leave or oppose. The paper, however, does not investigate whether an uncertain mandate or the possibility of an easy shift reduces the willingness to say “no”.
cross-country or cross-case comparison
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.
- Contribution to this answer
- It shows that the expected politicization and the feeling that officials will have less influence increase the desire to leave and reduce the willingness to speak out and make additional efforts. This is close to our question, but the authors do not test specifically the effect of the temporary contract, acting status or mandate that the government can constantly renew or terminate.
research on public-servant behaviour
Gilad, S., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. i Levi-Faur, D. (2025), „A Taste for Government Employment Also Rests on Its Political Flavor“, Public Administration Review 85(5): 1412–1425.
- Contribution to this answer
- This paper is very indirect for the question: it studies who wants to get a job in the state administration at a politically polarized moment. It does not study existing employees, their mandates or the decision whether to oppose the leadership.
cross-country or cross-case comparison
Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), „Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention“, Public Money & Management 46(4).
Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), “Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention”, Public Money & Management 46(4).
- Contribution to this answer
- Staroová, Ryb and Spáč show that officials who expect the arrival of illiberal authorities can start thinking about leaving even before the change occurs especially those with a strong motivation for public service and when they expect a conflict over integrity and values. But this work does not study uncertain mandates or temporary appointments either.
review of multiple studies
Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dahlstrm and Lapuente explain why the professional autonomy of bureaucracy can be important versus immediate political control. This gives a theoretical logic to the question but the review does not test specifically whether the person whose re-appointment depends on the authorities therefore says “no” less often.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21 August 2026
European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.
- What the source records
- At the end of 2021, acting officials occupied 52% of the highest civil-service positions, making temporary appointment a customary way of retaining political control.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
- Source limitation
- It follows the top of the state administration through 2021 and does not show that every acting official is unqualified or politically obedient.
regional NGO public-administration monitoring - Verified 21 August 2026
WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkan PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.
WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkans PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.
- What the source records
- For Serbia, it records persistent gaps between formal reform and the experience of citizens and civil servants, especially in recruitment, transparency, and accountability.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
- Source limitation
- The regional methodology enables comparison, but does not explain every institution or every poor outcome through political pressure.
official international monitoring - Verified 21 August 2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report records weak electoral conditions, limited parliamentary oversight, strong political pressure on the judiciary, and concern that in practice the president directs decision-making beyond the constitutional design.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
- Source limitation
- The report is tied to the EU accession process and describes a specific period; it is neither a scientific causal study nor a single assessment of regime type.
peer-reviewed research article - Verified 21 August 2026
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 1939. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
- What the source records
- The article links democratic decline to rules and economic incentives that allow the authorities to turn public resources into political advantage.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that short and continually renewed terms increase the personal cost of professional refusal and a manager's dependence on a political signature.
- Source limitation
- This is one causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments after 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
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