Why do people use connections even when they believe connections should not be necessary?
People use a relationship or “gift” when they believe that the regular procedure will not be fast enough, equal or safe enough for something that is important to them, such as treatment, work or document. The individual does not have to want to break the rule then; he can think that he is just trying to get what would definitely belong to him and that everyone else is doing the same.
His solution, however, confirms to employees and other citizens that the formal path is not the main one, so the next man has even less reason to trust him. Thus, a circle arises in which an unfair system encourages behavior that further makes it unfair. A relationship is not always an abuse it can help to find information. The problem arises when changing the order of the championship, asking for a favor or closing access to the same right to others.
A citizen uses a relationship or a gift not only because he wants an unfair advantage, but also because he believes that without it he will not get what belongs to him. In Serbia, surveys describe a parallel order in which personal service, intermediary and trust reciprocity often seem more reliable than a slow or selective institution. Each such move solves the problem for an individual, but together they confirm the system that forces the next man to do the same.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Sociological studies of corruption and clientelism and social protection research describe reciprocity, mediation and distrust of formal rules.
It is a trap of joint action: the individual pays the price if he refuses the informal rule, while everyone would benefit if the institution reliably applied the same right.
Yes the mechanism is strongly supported qualitatively, although the frequency depends on the area and location.
The explanation does not justify bribes or claim that all citizens use connections. Responsibility exists, but reform is incomplete if it punishes only the individual, and leaves discretion and unreliability that produce pressure.
A relationship sometimes only helps a man to find information or understand the procedure. The problem is when he bypasses the rule, seeks political support or closes the same path to others.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
Explain how the system works
Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. i Brusco, V. (2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Stokes and co-authors show why a “relationship” can become practically rational even for people who don’t consider such a system good: local intermediaries control information and access to specific jobs, services and benefits, so a direct relationship with them may be a safer path to something that should be formally obtained under general rules.
review more research
Hicken, A. (2011), „Clientelism“, Annual Review of Political Science 14: 289–310.
- Contribution to this answer
- Hicken shows that clientelism is not simply “people love relationships”, but a relationship in which the concrete benefit is conditioned by political support. When resources are really shared in this way, using a personal political connection can be an answer to the rules of the system even when people privately want a more impartial system.
critical review of more research
Hicken, A. i Nathan, N. L. (2020), „Clientelism’s Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 23: 277–294.
- Contribution to this answer
- Hicken and Nathan show that such relationships can survive even when a politician cannot reliably check how someone voted. This means that relationships do not have to function only through a direct threat: a personal relationship, expectation of reciprocity, and a repeat of the exchange can be enough for the system to survive.
Study of Serbia
Petrović, V. (2026), „Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia“, Democratization.
Petrović, V. (2026), “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia”, Democratization.
- Contribution to this answer
- Petrovic shows how in Serbia clientelistic benefits can be intertwined with pressure: if access to a job or other resource depends on the political network, one can use the “relationship” not because he believes it is good, but because he estimates that without it there is less chance or greater risk.
review more research
Miller, D. T. (2023), „A Century of Pluralistic Ignorance: What We Have Learned About Its Origins, Forms, and Consequences“, Frontiers in Social Psychology 1.
- Contribution to this answer
- Miller gives the second part of the explanation: people often systematically misjudge what others privately think. If everyone sees that others use connections, they can conclude that everyone else accepts them and continue to use them even though most privately would prefer the system to function differently.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vuković, Danilo, i Bojan Spaić. 2022. “Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia.” Sociologija 64(4): 519–542. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC2204519V
Vuković, Danilo, and Bojan Spaić. 2022. “Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia.” Sociology 64(4): 519542. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC2204519V
- What the source records
- The authors find sufficient evidence for a parallel informal order in which formal rules are violated, while the rules of the loyalty network are maintained.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that people use the connection and gift and as a defense against an unreliable institution, thus individually solving the problem, but jointly maintaining an informal order.
- Source limitation
- The finding describes corruption and clientelism; it does not in itself determine the type of regime or show that any illegality is centrally driven.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vuković, Danilo, i Marija Stefanović. 2024. “Leaving No One Behind: Party Clientelism in Social Welfare in Serbia.” Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade 72(4): 697–722. https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24404A
Vuković, Danilo, and Marija Stefanović. 2024. “Leaving No One Behind: Party Clientelism in Social Welfare in Serbia.” Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade 72(4): 69722. https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24404A
- What the source records
- Qualitative research shows how party employment and loyalty networks can redirect public service work and create fear and passivity among employees.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that people use the connection and gift and as a defense against an unreliable institution, thus individually solving the problem, but jointly maintaining an informal order.
- Source limitation
- Research is in-depth, but sectoral; conclusions cannot be automatically transferred to every public institution.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that people use the connection and gift and as a defense against an unreliable institution, thus individually solving the problem, but jointly maintaining an informal order.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Domestic NGOs qualitative field research - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2023. Mreža političkih pritisaka u centrima za socijalni rad. Beograd: CRTA.
CRTA. 2023. Network of political pressures in centers for social work. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Testimonials describe centers as points in a hierarchical network in which business, contract and assistance can be linked to political loyalty and electoral mobilization.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that people use the connection and gift and as a defense against an unreliable institution, thus individually solving the problem, but jointly maintaining an informal order.
- Source limitation
- The sample is qualitative and anonymous; the findings reveal mechanisms and patterns, but do not measure their frequency in all centers.
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