Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why do 'temporary' emergency measures often remain after the crisis?
“Temporary” measure often remains because after the crisis there are already a service, a budget, a database, equipment and people whose position depends on its continuation. The government gets used to faster decision-making without control, the service to the wider powers, and the public can long accept the rationale that the danger has not completely passed.
Measures do not have to be extended by the same name: they can be moved to a regular law or a new institution. Therefore, the expiration date is not enough if the government can routinely move it. The exception becomes a more difficult rule when the continuation requires a new public explanation and vote, when the court can check the necessity, when the data on the application is published and when the collected data and temporary services are indeed extinguished after the end of the crisis.
Serbia abolished the formal state of emergency in May 2020, so it is not a pure example of a country in which the same package of emergency powers remained permanently in force. Nevertheless, the crisis has strengthened the already existing habit of deciding from the executive top, suppressing parliament and frequently changing the rules without a full discussion. This shows an important nuance: sometimes the emergency regulation disappears, but it remains the political mode that has made the crisis more normal.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
The formal regime is over, but legal and monitoring studies record a weak parliamentary role during the crisis and the continuation of a wider pattern of executive dominance in later years.
“Temporary” can remain as a law, institution or habit. In Serbia, the strongest evidence for habit and power ratio is weaker for permanent validity of identical measure.
Partially formal measures generally do not remain the same, but the already existing model of centralized decision-making has been strengthened.
Not every subsequent centralization should be attributed to a pandemic. The crisis was an accelerant and a test of existing weaknesses, not necessarily their sole cause.
The deadline can be constantly extended or bypassed by the new law. Protection is only valid if someone has the data and enough power to implement it.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Gross, O. i Ní Aoláin, F. (2006), Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gross and N Aoláin show how difficult it is to make an emergency regime that is strong enough during the danger and then really disappears. Once institutionalized, the exception can change the law and practice of the executive power even after the crisis.
review more research
Scheuerman, W. E. (2006), „Emergency Powers“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2: 257–277.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheuerman is the most direct here: the executive power has the incentive to extend and use extraordinary powers even after the initial danger, so protective procedures must be made against these incentives.
review more research
Ginsburg, T. i Huq, A. Z. (2018), How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, University of Chicago Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ginsburg and Huq show how temporary or special measures can become part of a broader democratic erosion if they weaken the limits of executive power, rights or shiftability.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows how the exception can be normalized through regular laws, procedures and institutions. What is introduced as a temporary can thus become part of the ordinary way of management.
comparison of different combinations of conditions
Panzano, G. i Tomini, L. (2026), „Unity Makes Strength: Patterns of Democratic Resistance against Autocratization“, European Journal of Political Research, First View: 1–26.
- Contribution to this answer
- Panzano and Tomini do not study the duration of emergency measures, but give an important counter-mechanism: combined institutional, political, and social resistance can stop autocratization and prevent the temporary extension of power from becoming permanent.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Legal study of the country - Verified 21.08.2026
Krstić, Ivana, i Marko Davinić. 2021. “Serbia: Legal Response to Covid-19.” U: The Oxford Compendium of National Legal Responses to Covid-19. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e7
Krstić, Ivana, and Marko Davinić. 2021. “Serbia: Legal Response to Covid-19.” In: The Oxford Compendium of National Legal Responses to Covid-19. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/law-occ19/law-occ19-e7
- What the source records
- The study shows that urgent decisions in Serbia were made with a weak parliamentary role and more contentious issues of legality and proportionality.
- Claim it supports
- Fence that the formal state of emergency is over, but also the claim that the crisis has intensified the already existing pattern of centralized decision-making.
- Source limitation
- Legal analysis assesses norms and procedures, but does not measure their social and political consequences.
Local NGO coalition extraordinary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Koalicija prEUgovor. 2020. Alarm izveštaj: napredak Srbije u poglavljima 23 i 24, sa posebnim osvrtom na vanredno stanje. Beograd: prEUgovor.
Coalition prEUgovor. 2020. Alarm report: Serbia’s progress in chapters 23 and 24, with special reference to the state of emergency. Belgrade: prEUgovor.
- What the source records
- The report deals with the declaration of a state of emergency without a parliamentary session, the rapid change of rules and limited control of the executive power.
- Claim it supports
- Fence that the formal state of emergency is over, but also the claim that the crisis has intensified the already existing pattern of centralized decision-making.
- Source limitation
- It was created in the middle of the crisis, so some consequences and later court outcomes were not yet known.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
Open Parliament. 2025. Annual Report on the work of the XIV Assembly of the National Assembly, February 2024 April 2025. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
- Claim it supports
- Fence that the formal state of emergency is over, but also the claim that the crisis has intensified the already existing pattern of centralized decision-making.
- Source limitation
- It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
The Official International Legal Standard - Verified 21.08.2026
Venice Commission. 2020. Interim Report on the Measures Taken in the EU Member States as a Result of the COVID-19 Crisis and Their Impact on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. CDL-AD(2020)018.
- What the source records
- The Commission underlines the necessity, proportionality, temporaryity and effective parliamentary and judicial supervision of extraordinary powers.
- Claim it supports
- Fence that the formal state of emergency is over, but also the claim that the crisis has intensified the already existing pattern of centralized decision-making.
- Source limitation
- The report sets a comparative standard and is not a special investigation of Serbia or an assessment of every Serbian measure.
Reviewed comparative legal work - Reviewed full peer-reviewed work, method, Serbian subjects and conclusions
Beretka, Katinka, and Áron Ősze. 2025. ‘Constitutional Court Attitudes and the COVID-19 Pandemic—Case Studies of Hungary, Serbia, and Croatia.’ Frontiers in Political Science 7: 1540881. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1540881
- What the source records
- Compare the duration and judicial control of pandemic measures and show that institutional restraint can continue even when the formal regime is changing.
- Claim it supports
- It supports the risk that a crisis control pattern will become a precedent, but not that all the same measures necessarily remain in place.
- Source limitation
- Comparative legal analysis; does not establish a causal link between the pandemic and all subsequent practices in Serbia.
Primary legal source Constitutional Court decision - Reviewed official decision, statement and explanation
Ustavni sud Republike Srbije. 2020. Rešenje IУо-42/2020 od 21. maja 2020. godine.
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia. 2020 Decision IUo-42/2020 of 21 May 2020.
- What the source records
- The decision noted that the formal state of emergency was lifted on 6 May 2020.
- Claim it supports
- It is important to counter-check: Serbia is not a pure example in which an identical formal emergency regime has remained permanently in force.
- Source limitation
- It does not speak for itself that all the consequences, regulations or institutional habits created during the crisis have disappeared.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- Later annual monitoring records persistent weaknesses in parliamentary control, the rule of law and independent institutions.
- Claim it supports
- It allows to check whether concentrated decision-making and poor control are visible even after the formal end of the pandemic regime.
- Source limitation
- The timeline does not prove that the pandemic caused any later weakness; the same tendencies have existed before.
The International Longitudinal Democratic Index - Viewed official website, methodological framework and Serbia profile
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Last updated: September 2025.
- What the source records
- Longitudinal democratic indicators monitor the state of representative power, rights and control after the pandemic.
- Claim it supports
- Complements individual reports with a long-term check that institutional centralisation is not assessed at a single crisis point.
- Source limitation
- The index and expert data do not identify a specific pandemic regulation that has produced any subsequent change.
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