Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How do acting directors, funding, and ignored decisions bring an institution under control?
The interim manager knows that his survival depends on the next decision of the authorities, so he has a reason to guess in advance what is expected of him. Such a position produces obedience without an open order: the risky object is not initiated, the report is mitigated, and the disobedient employee is removed so that the appointment is not called into question. Control of money acts similarly.
An institution without enough professional people, equipment or access to data cannot use the powers it has on paper. If its decisions are not yet implemented, the public learns that addressing is futile. No small budget or acting person in itself does not prove political control; it is an important pattern in which an uncertain mandate and denied resources change behavior precisely in matters important to the government.
Control does not have to start with an open shift. In Serbia, the acting directors are re-appointed for months or years, the competition for directors of public companies is postponed or bypassed, budgets and projects create financial dependence, and the recommendations of the supervisory bodies can be left without consequences. The manager then formally manages the institution, but knows that his mandate, money and execution of the decision depend on the political center.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
CEP documents mass enforcement practices, Transparency Serbia weakens competition and transparency of public companies, while EU and prEUgovor reports limit the impact of supervisory authorities.
The most quiet control is constant uncertainty: the institution does not receive an open ban, but is shown that without political consent it does not have stable leadership, resources or execution.
Yes three separate channels of control have solid domestic documentation.
Lack of money or a dispute can have an administrative reason. The political form is determined only through duration, selectivity, repetition and benefit for the same actors.
A small budget or a delay in the decision does not in itself prove political control. They should be associated with the behavior of the institution and the concrete consequences.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows that an institution does not need to be formally abolished in order to reduce its autonomy: by changing the appointment, jurisdiction, procedures and organization, it can keep the same name and lose some of its actual ability to control the government.
review more research
Moustafa, T. (2014), „Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 281–299.
- Contribution to this answer
- Moustafa shows that formal powers and daily functioning are not the same as real independence: the institution can operate normally in most cases, and schedule just when it needs to apply the rule to a politically powerful actor.
Investigation of the conduct of civil servants
Gilad, S., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. i Levi-Faur, D. (2025), „A Taste for Government Employment Also Rests on Its Political Flavor“, Public Administration Review 85(5): 1412–1425.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gilad, Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Levi-Faur are studying political self-selection in the civil service, not acting appointments, budget control or ignoring decisions. The work is therefore very indirect here.
comparing several countries or cases
Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), „Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention“, Public Money & Management 46(4).
Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), “Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention”, Public Money & Management 46(4).
- Contribution to this answer
- Staroová, Ryb and Spáč show that career officials who expect the arrival of an illiberal government can start thinking about leaving even before the change, especially when they expect a conflict over professional integrity. The paper does not study acting mandates or budgetary dependence.
comparing several countries or cases
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.
- Contribution to this answer
- Alon-Barkat and the co-authors show that the expected politicization and democratic backsliding increase the officials’ intention to leave and reduce additional engagement and willingness to resist. This shows how political control changes the composition of the institution, but does not test the acting directors or financial suffocation in particular.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.
- What the source records
- At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that temporary management, financial dependence and ignoring the findings can subordinate the institution without an open order.
- Source limitation
- Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- The analysis describes the long-term circumvention of competition for directors, political ties in governance, poor transparency and risks of using public resources for party needs.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that temporary management, financial dependence and ignoring the findings can subordinate the institution without an open order.
- Source limitation
- Anti-corruption analysis identifies risks and documented irregularities, but does not prove the criminal responsibility of every manager or company.
Local NGO Local monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Indeks transparentnosti lokalne samouprave LTI 2024. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija.
Transparency Serbia. 2024. Transparency index of local self-government LTI 2024. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- The average score was 52 out of 100, half of the local authorities were regressed, and public companies and institutions remained among the least transparent areas.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that temporary management, financial dependence and ignoring the findings can subordinate the institution without an open order.
- Source limitation
- The index measures the availability of predefined information and procedures; it does not in itself prove corruption or political control behind any deficiency.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that temporary management, financial dependence and ignoring the findings can subordinate the institution without an open order.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed
OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.
- What the source records
- Measures the executives, professionalization, personnel capacities, budgetary and management practices in public administration.
- Claim it supports
- Directly confirms that an insecure mandate and limited resources can change the behavior of the administration without an open order.
- Source limitation
- The SIGMA indicator shows a widespread pattern, but not the motive and outcome of each individual appointment.
peer-reviewed scientific paper comparative case studies - Viewed full text and bibliographic record
Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008
- What the source records
- Through case studies, he monitors political patronage in appointing executives at the top of the public sector.
- Claim it supports
- Link appointments to actual management control, instead of viewing the acting status only as a technical delay.
- Source limitation
- The selected cases do not represent every institution and do not prove that each interim manager is unskilled.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. 2026. Report on the work of the Commissioner for 2025.
- What the source records
- The annual report of the Commissioner records the implementation of the solution, access to information, resources and obstacles in work.
- Claim it supports
- It primarily shows that the strength of an independent body is also checked by whether others execute its decisions and provide data.
- Source limitation
- Our own annual report is not an independent assessment and different reasons can explain any failure.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2026. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2025. godinu.
Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia. 2026. Regular annual report of the Protector of Citizens for 2025.
- What the source records
- The Annual Report of the Protector of Citizens provides information on recommendations, procedures, capacities and response of administration bodies.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the connection between formal authority, resources and the actual consequences of the recommendation.
- Source limitation
- The Ombudsman’s recommendations are not as binding as court decisions and low turnout does not automatically prove a political order.
Official international legal opinion - Reviewed officially adopted opinion, findings and recommendations
Venice Commission. 2026. Urgent Opinion on the 28 January 2026 Amendments to Laws Governing the Judiciary and the Prosecution. CDL-AD(2026)016.
- What the source records
- Warns that temporary referrals to the judiciary can create a parallel path of progress, uncertainty and pressure.
- Claim it supports
- It adds an immediate legal mechanism through which the temporary can influence institutional behavior.
- Source limitation
- Risk assessment is not proof that all referrals are misused.
Official international report on compliance with anti-corruption recommendations - - Review of the official compliance report, evaluations by recommendations and conclusions
GRECO. 2026. Fifth Evaluation Round: Second Compliance Report on Serbia. GrecoRC5(2026)7. Adopted 12 June 2026; published 18 August 2026.
- What the source records
- Records insufficient human resources of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption, unresolved guarantees of operational autonomy of the police and the need for meritorious selection of managers.
- Claim it supports
- It connects money, personnel, appointments and autonomy with real supervisory capacity.
- Source limitation
- Evaluate selected recommendations and bodies, not all independent institutions in Serbia.
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