Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why do old party networks, policing habits, and unwritten rules remain after a change of government?
The change of government changes the top faster than the day-to-day work of the state. The same officers, police commanders, business intermediaries and local networks retain knowledge, contacts, documents and control over resources. Unwritten rules to whom it occurs, what is being denied and how loyalty is rewarded can continue to operate even when the new laws are democratic.
The new government sometimes uses the old networks because they are effective, because it has no substitute or because the same concentration of power suits it. That is why the electoral shift is not enough for institutional change. Nevertheless, the dismissal of all old personnel can destroy the knowledge needed by the state and become a new political purge. Reform must distinguish professional service from people and practices involved in abuse, with clear criteria and the right to appeal.
After October 5, it was not possible to simply replace all the people who know how to run the police, administration, public companies and local services. Part of the personnel remained because of knowledge, part because of political settlements, and part of the networks survived through business, security and party connections. If the top is changed, and no contests, supervision and responsibility change, the same habit of personal loyalty can be offered to the new master.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Studies of security sector reform, political economy and post-Milosevic transitions document the continuity of personnel, informal networks and unfinished institutionalization.
The legacy survives because it is built into careers, information and expectations, not just the ideology of the old government. That is why it is interrupted by changing rules and incentives, not by collective labeling.
Yes Serbia is a strong example of institutional and network continuity after a political break.
The continuity of employees is not a problem in itself and mass purges can destroy capacity and rights. Individual responsibility, verifiable criteria and professionalization are needed.
Not all retention of old experts and procedures is bad. Reform must preserve the knowledge required by the state, and remove the networks and rules that allow abuse.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Loxton, J. i Mainwaring, S. (ur.) (2018), Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Loxton and Mainwaring show how little democratization looks like a “new beginning”: the parties that emerged from the authoritarian regime very often continue to exist after the transition, and in more than half of the democracies of the third wave such parties have returned to power with elections. Old political actors, organizations and heritage can therefore become part of the new democratic game instead of disappearing with the old regime.
comparing several countries or cases
González, Y. M. (2020), Authoritarian Police in Democracy: Contested Security in Latin America, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- González shows the same problem within the police: democratization does not automatically erase the way the coercion apparatus worked before. Police organizations retain their own power and relations with politicians, and social inequality and political interests can prevent reform, so authoritarian police practices persist for decades after democratic elections.
comparing several countries or cases
Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2016), Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Haggard and Kaufman show why the initial conditions of the transition leave a long mark: a new democracy inherits existing institutions, organized elites and different social groups’ abilities to organize politically. That is why the way the old regime ended also affects the vulnerabilities of the new system but the book is not primarily a study of concrete authoritarian “habits”.
comparing several countries or cases
O’Donnell, G. i Schmitter, P. C. (1986), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- O’Donnell and Schmitter show that the transition is mostly not led by completely new actors on empty ground: it involves people and institutions from the old regime, the opposition and various groups negotiating under great uncertainty. This explains why changing the political regime is not the same as the immediate removal of all old relationships, although the book is not a direct study of long-term institutional heritage.
review more research
Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dahlstrm and Lapuente show how much the behavior of bureaucracy depends on the way in which employment, career, political control and professional autonomy are arranged. This helps us understand why changing people at the top in itself does not have to change the way the institution works but the work does not study the specific legacy of authoritarian bureaucracy after democratization.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Ejdus, Filip. 2010. Democratic Security Sector Governance in Serbia. PRIF Report No. 94. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. ISBN 978-3-942532-04-4.
- What the source records
- The report shows that formal reform after 2000 has progressed unevenly and that political influence, weak accountability and old networks remain important problems.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that personnel and informal networks survive change because they carry knowledge, access to information and incentives that the new government has not immediately changed.
- Source limitation
- The period ends before the SNS comes to power, so it is used for heritage and transition, not for assessing the current state of affairs.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 1939. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
- What the source records
- The work links the weakening of democracy with the rules and economic incentives that enable the authorities to turn public resources into a political advantage.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that personnel and informal networks survive change because they carry knowledge, access to information and incentives that the new government has not immediately changed.
- Source limitation
- It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that personnel and informal networks survive change because they carry knowledge, access to information and incentives that the new government has not immediately changed.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, and Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
- What the source records
- The report concludes that the structures in the police, services, military and surveillance system help to maintain the captured state and that the change requires more than one person to be replaced.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that personnel and informal networks survive change because they carry knowledge, access to information and incentives that the new government has not immediately changed.
- Source limitation
- The work starts from the concept of the captured state and is aimed at security and recommendations for reform, so its framework should be read together with wider and methodologically different sources.
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