Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why does an authoritarian government need a constitution, courts, and parliament?
Authoritarian authorities need a constitution, courts and assembly because they cannot make every decision personally and by force. These institutions resolve everyday disputes, regulate business and inheritance, turn political agreements into general rules and give citizens and companies some predictability.
Parliament can include important groups in the division of benefits, and the court can enforce contracts and discipline lower officials. At the same time, the formal procedure of the government gives the appearance of order and legality. Therefore, the institution in the authoritarian system is not necessarily empty, but its real limit becomes visible when the case hits the top of the government. The question is not only whether the court or assembly works, but whether they can make and implement a decision that the authorities do not seriously answer.
Authoritarian authorities in Serbia need the Constitution, the courts and the assembly because through them decisions get the appearance of a general rule, not personal orders. The Assembly adopts budgets and appointments, the courts resolve disputes and punish, and the Constitution confirms the legitimacy of the order. When these institutions mostly follow the executive power, they do not disappear they become channels through which political decision gets legal force and international acceptability.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
The Constitution formally divides power, while studies on parliament and the Constitutional Court record presidentialization, poor government control, and the caution of courts in key political disputes.
Institutions are more useful than open arbitrariness because they enable predictable management, distribution of jobs and the claim that everything is done according to the law.
Yes the gap between the constitutional text and the practice is well supported.
Institutions are not completely empty: sometimes they make decisions against the authorities and citizens can use them. The claim refers to a dominant pattern and limited control power, not every judgment or session.
The very existence of a court or assembly does not say what they really serve. One should look at when the authorities help, when they resolve the conflict, and when they really stop it.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Gandhi, J. (2008), Political Institutions under Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gandhi shows that authoritarian institutions serve the practical needs of the regime: through parliaments, parties and other channels, the government receives information, negotiates with groups and shares concessions that it cannot completely ignore.
comparing several countries or cases
Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gandhi and Przeworski show that dictators use political institutions to co-opt the opposition and make controlled agreements. The institution can therefore be useful to the regime even when it does not restrict power in a democratic way.
Historical data and comparison
Moustafa, T. (2007), The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Moustafa in Egypt shows why the authoritarian regime can want courts with real but limited autonomy: it needs them for economy, administrative disputes and legitimacy, even when it doesn’t want to let the courts jeopardize the political leadership.
comparing several countries or cases
Ginsburg, T. i Moustafa, T. (ur.) (2008), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ginsburg and Moustafa show that autocracy courts can resolve real disputes at the same time, support governance and legitimacy, and sometimes open up a space for legal resistance that the regime has not fully controlled.
comparing several countries or cases
Ginsburg, T. i Simpser, A. (ur.) (2014), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ginsburg and Simpser show that constitutions in autocracy can coordinate elites, signal rules, organize power and provide legitimacy. The constitution can therefore be politically useful and a government that does not respect it democratically.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Primary legal source - Verified 21.08.2026
Republika Srbija. 2006. Ustav Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS 98/2006, engleski prevod Narodne skupštine.
Republic of Serbia. 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of RS 98/2006, English translation of the National Assembly.
- What the source records
- The Constitution bases the system on balance and mutual control of power; the President expresses state unity, while the Government exercises executive and the Assembly exercises constitutional and legislative power.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
- Source limitation
- The Constitution says that power should be distributed, but it does not show how powers are used in practice.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
- What the source records
- "The paper links presidencialization with the immediate election of the president, weaknesses in constitutional design, proportional elections and oligarchic parties.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
- Source limitation
- It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 954–979. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 95479. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
- What the source records
- The paper finds that the Court often chose caution and formalism in key disputes, so it did not become a strong defence of political power, even though it was formally independent.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
- Source limitation
- The analysis ends before the latest judicial reforms and relates primarily to the Constitutional Court, not to all courts and prosecutions.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
Open Parliament. 2025. Annual Report on the work of the XIV Assembly of the National Assembly, February 2024 April 2025. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the constitution, courts and assembly give legal force and legitimacy to decisions, even when their ability to limit executive power is weak.
- Source limitation
- It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346
- What the source records
- It shows how a legislative institution can keep form and make rules while being caught by a dominant presidential leadership.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the claim that institutions are not empty: they turn political decisions into generally applicable legal form and give them procedural authority.
- Source limitation
- The focus is on legislative capture, not on all day-to-day functions of courts and administration.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Ugarković, Uroš. 2023. “What Is Parliamentarism to Populists? The Populist Redefinition of the Concept of Parliamentarism in Parliamentary Debates in Post-Milošević Serbia.” Redescriptions 26(2): 160–175. https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.403
Ugarković, Uros. 2023. “What Is Parliamentarism to Populists? The Populist Redefinition of the Concept of Parliamentarism in Parliamentary Debates in Post-Milosevic Serbia.” Redescriptions 26(2): 1605. https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.403
- What the source records
- Monitor how the government and the opposition use parliamentary debates and the idea of parliamentarism to legitimize their positions.
- Claim it supports
- It supports the legitimacy and communication function of parliament even when its control power is weakened.
- Source limitation
- Discursive analysis does not measure the effectiveness of every parliamentary procedure.
International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- What the source records
- The wider stability of the regime is associated with formal institutions, elections and rules that continue to organize political and social action.
- Claim it supports
- Adds an independent systematic assessment that the constitution, courts and assembly continue to perform real functions in a weakened democratic order.
- Source limitation
- A broad expert assessment does not show exactly what each individual item or session is for.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations
European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.
- What the source records
- In the same chapter, it assesses the judiciary, parliament, anti-corruption and independent bodies, including their real capacities and weaknesses.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that formal institutions handle affairs and produce decisions, but that their borders are seen in the supervision of politically sensitive issues.
- Source limitation
- EU monitoring does not prove the internal intention of the authorities and is the same manufacturer as previous EC reports.
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