Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Can courts and parliament sometimes still stop an authoritarian government?
Yes, because authoritarian authorities rarely control every case, every judge and every MP alike. Courts and assemblies are easier to act independently in disputes that do not threaten the survival of the government, when the rules are clear, when there is public attention or when a part of the people in the government uses the institution to protect their own agreement.
Sometimes individuals take advantage of the remaining professional autonomy and make a decision against the interests of the top. Such moments can open up space to others, but one courageous verdict or a tumultuous session is not evidence that the system as a whole works independently. It is important whether the decision is repeated, whether it is really implemented and what happens to the people who made it. The institution limits power only when disagreement can survive the consequences.
The Serbian courts and the assembly are not always powerless. In 2012, the Constitutional Court overturned the decisions that left judges without a function in the reform in question, and certain courts and independent deputies can stop or correct a specific decision. But such successes do not change the system on their own: execution of the verdict, public support, professional networks and other institutions are needed, which will prevent the same pressure from returning to the other path.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
“Legal literature records an important intervention of the Constitutional Court in the re-election of judges, but wider research finds that the Court has remained vigilant on many politically sensitive issues and rarely became a permanent veto player.
An institution can win an individual dispute and lose a war if it does not have the capacity and allies to make a decision and turn it into a new rule of conduct.
This shows the possibility of resistance and its limits.
One courageous decision does not prove full independence, just as one bad decision does not prove complete control. A pattern through time and several types of objects is required.
One courageous decision does not prove full independence. It is important how often the court decides independently and what happens after such decisions.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
Historical data and comparison
Moustafa, T. (2007), The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Moustafa shows that courts under authoritarian rule can sometimes open up real space for legal resistance and limit certain regime moves, but also that power can retaliate when that space becomes politically dangerous.
comparing several countries or cases
Ginsburg, T. i Moustafa, T. (ur.) (2008), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ginsburg and Moustafa show that authoritarian courts are neither completely powerless nor completely independent: they can resolve disputes, create rights and sometimes increase the price of arbitrariness, but operate within the political boundaries of the regime.
comparing several countries or cases
Gandhi, J. (2008), Political Institutions under Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gandhi shows that parliaments in autocracy can be places of negotiation and concessions, because the government through them includes groups that might otherwise become opponents. This gives them some influence, but does not make them democratic control of the government.
comparing several countries or cases
Boix, C. i Svolik, M. W. (2013), „The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government“, Journal of Politics 75(2): 300–316.
- Contribution to this answer
- Boix and Svolik show that institutions can really limit a dictator when political allies have enough power to punish him if he violates a deal. Without such power, the formal rule alone is not enough.
review more research
Whiting, S. H. (2023), „Authoritarian Legality and State Capitalism in China“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 19: 357–373.
- Contribution to this answer
- Whiting shows how legal institutions can maintain professional functions and certain limits of government even in an undemocratic system, but their range is politically limited.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 954–979. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 95479. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
- What the source records
- The paper finds that the Court often chose caution and formalism in key disputes, so it did not become a strong defence of political power, even though it was formally independent.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that institutions can win a single dispute against the government, but that the lasting effect depends on the execution, support and wider independence.
- Source limitation
- The analysis ends before the latest judicial reforms and relates primarily to the Constitutional Court, not to all courts and prosecutions.
Primary legal source - Verified 21.08.2026
Republika Srbija. 2006. Ustav Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS 98/2006, engleski prevod Narodne skupštine.
Republic of Serbia. 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of RS 98/2006, English translation of the National Assembly.
- What the source records
- The Constitution bases the system on balance and mutual control of power; the President expresses state unity, while the Government exercises executive and the Assembly exercises constitutional and legislative power.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that institutions can win a single dispute against the government, but that the lasting effect depends on the execution, support and wider independence.
- Source limitation
- The Constitution says that power should be distributed, but it does not show how powers are used in practice.
Domestic NGOs annual report of legal aid - Verified 21.08.2026
Komitet pravnika za ljudska prava — YUCOM. 2024. YUCOM 2022–2024, godišnji izveštaj br. 11–12. Beograd: YUCOM.
Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights YUCOM. 2024. YUCOM 202224, annual report No. 11. Belgrade: YUCOM.
- What the source records
- The report documents the gap between judicial reforms and citizens’ experience, the pressure on independence and the obstacles for vulnerable groups to receive effective legal protection.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that institutions can win a single dispute against the government, but that the lasting effect depends on the execution, support and wider independence.
- Source limitation
- It is the report of the organization that provides legal aid and advocates reforms; the choice of cases is not representative for all courts and all disputes.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that institutions can win a single dispute against the government, but that the lasting effect depends on the execution, support and wider independence.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Primary source official statement on the Constitutional Court decision - Reviewed official statement, object and ordered consequence
Ustavni sud Republike Srbije. 2012. Ustavni sud usvojio više od 120 žalbi neizabranih sudija. 12. jul 2012, predmet VIIIU-534/2011.
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia. 2012. Constitutional Court adopted more than 120 appeals of unelected judges. July 12, 2012, Case VIIIU-534/2011.
- What the source records
- It documents that the Constitutional Court has adopted more than 120 appeals of unelected judges, annulled decisions and ordered the election to a permanent office.
- Claim it supports
- Gives a concrete Serbian example in which the court decision stopped or reversed a politically important part of judicial reform.
- Source limitation
- One group of decisions from 2012 does not prove today’s or general independence of the Constitutional Court.
Reviewed comparative legal work - Reviewed full peer-reviewed work, method, Serbian subjects and conclusions
Beretka, Katinka, and Áron Ősze. 2025. ‘Constitutional Court Attitudes and the COVID-19 Pandemic—Case Studies of Hungary, Serbia, and Croatia.’ Frontiers in Political Science 7: 1540881. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1540881
- What the source records
- Compares the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Serbia during the pandemic with Hungary and Croatia and finds a predominantly restrained approach to the control of emergency measures.
- Claim it supports
- Gives a counterweight to a positive example: the court can formally rule, and yet rarely limit executive power in the most sensitive crisis.
- Source limitation
- Comparative legal analysis; does not claim that the court is never autonomous in other types of disputes.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations
European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.
- What the source records
- Monitors rare institutional reactions and at the same time long-term political pressure, weak parliamentary control and problems of implementation of recommendations.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the criterion that an individual decision is not enough; it is important to repeat, implement and survive the institutional disagreement.
- Source limitation
- Wide annual monitoring, not a study of the outcome of a specific judgment.
Official international legal opinion - Reviewed officially adopted opinion, findings and recommendations
Venice Commission. 2026. Urgent Opinion on the 28 January 2026 Amendments to Laws Governing the Judiciary and the Prosecution. CDL-AD(2026)016.
- What the source records
- It notes that institutions and professional actors challenged the January judicial changes and that some recommendations were then incorporated into corrective steps.
- Claim it supports
- It shows a limited but real channel in which institutional criticism can change the original solution.
- Source limitation
- It does not prove that the system as a whole is independent; corrections have not removed all objections.
Primary source official statement of the Judicial Council - Viewed original statement of the High Judicial Council
Visoki savet sudstva. 2026. Saopštenje povodom Predloga izmena pravosudnih zakona. 15. januar 2026.
High Judicial Council. 2026. Statement on the Proposal for Amendments to Judicial Laws. 15 January 2026.
- What the source records
- The High Judicial Council has publicly requested the withdrawal of the proposal and pointed out that it does not respect its legal role.
- Claim it supports
- “Primarily it confirms that the formal body can use the remaining autonomy to challenge a politically important procedure.
- Source limitation
- “The statement shows an attempt, but it does not prove that the institution has finally stopped the law or been protected from consequences.
Is a relevant source missing? Send it to us.
Suggest a source or report an error in this answer →