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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLASExplore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.

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AVtokratija›How law, courts, and parliament are used
35
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How does a law that does not apply equally to everyone force people to comply?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources9
Period201226

Selective application of the law creates obedience because citizens do not know who and when they will become a target. If the regulation is broad or unclear, and the government strictly applies it only to critics, many people begin to avoid completely legal activities in advance so as not to attract attention.

It is not necessary to punish thousands: several visible procedures show that almost everyone can be found a violation, while allies for similar behavior remain protected. Uncertainty is part of the mechanism, because the government retains the opportunity to present pressure as an ordinary application of rights. To prove selectivity, it is necessary to compare similar cases who is reported, how quickly the procedure is initiated, what the punishment is and whether political affiliation predicts different treatment.

Example from SerbiaChecked 9 sources; 7 manufacturers
9 related sources; 7 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 4

When the same law is strictly applied to the critic, and ignored by a political ally, citizens learn that formal law is not the main rule it is more important to assess relations with the government. In Serbia, such a signal is given by different reactions to campaign pressures, attacks on journalists, management of public enterprises and anti-corruption cases. People then not only comply with the law, but also try to avoid selective punishment and find protection.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01Established fact

Transparency Serbia and prEUgovor document a broad legal framework with weak or selective application, and NUNS and BCHR report uneven protection in politically sensitive cases. YIHR reports on the passivation of addresses and the “Croatia II File” give two concrete examples of how broad administrative and security discretion can affect minorities and foreign nationals differently.

02Our interpretation

Selectivity is powerful because it retains the appearance of a general rule, and leaves the authorities the opportunity to choose the moment and the target.

03Does it show the same process?

To a significant extent the risk of selective application is well documented, but it must be proven by area and case.

04Important caveat or alternative explanation

Different outcome may have a legitimate reason: different facts, evidence or jurisdiction. The claim requires comparison of similar cases and a reasoned verification, not just political impression.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

Unequal application should be shown by comparing similar cases. A small number of procedures or the right of the official to choose a priority may have other explanations.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

review more research

Moustafa, T. (2014), „Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10: 281–299.

Contribution to this answer
Moustafa shows how selective limits of legal protection can make the law formally valid, and that politically sensitive people and cases still have different treatment. Such inequality changes expectations about where it is safe to insist on rights.
Open source ↗
A02

review more research

Scheuerman, W. E. (2006), „Emergency Powers“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2: 257–277.

Contribution to this answer
Scheuerman shows that the executive power has the incentive to extend and extend extraordinary powers and thus normalize unequal legal treatment and wider discretion of the state.
Open source ↗
A03

review more research

Whiting, S. H. (2023), „Authoritarian Legality and State Capitalism in China“, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 19: 357–373.

Contribution to this answer
Whiting shows how formal legal procedure can coexist with the politically directed priorities of the state. This helps to understand why people are not only assessing the text of the law but also the way they expect it to be applied.
Open source ↗
A04

review more research

Earl, J. (2003), „Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression“, Sociological Theory 21(1): 44–68.

Contribution to this answer
Earl shows that repression can come through legal and administrative measures, not only through police force. The very possibility of selective use of these instruments increases the cost of political action.
Open source ↗
A05

Explain how the system works

Ritter, E. H. i Conrad, C. R. (2016), „Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression“, American Political Science Review 110(1): 85–99.

Contribution to this answer
Ritter and Conrad show that repression can be preventative and that people adapt behavior to expected state responses. The work, however, does not directly study selective legal uncertainty as a source of daily obedience.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Domestic NGOs anti-corruption parallel report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đorđević, Miloš, i Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija i UNCAC Coalition.

orđević, Miloš, and Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia and UNCAC Coalition.

What the source records
Based on regulations, organ reports, eight requests for access to information, consultations and documented cases, the authors find a broad formal framework, but a significantly larger problem in the ineffective or selective application of the rules.
Claim it supports
The claim that selective application of the same right sends a signal that political closeness, not general rule, determines risk and protection.
Source limitation
The report is thematically related to UNCAC and ends in mid-2023, so it does not specify the type of regime or cover later development and all forms of political control.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026

Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.

Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparency Serbia and CINS.

What the source records
The study identifies seven mechanisms of political control and presents them through 12 detailed case studies from Serbia.
Claim it supports
The claim that selective application of the same right sends a signal that political closeness, not general rule, determines risk and protection.
Source limitation
Cases precede recent institutional changes and cannot prove that every action today is politically controlled, but they provide an important early point for monitoring continuity.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic journalistic association monitoring of attacks - Verified 21.08.2026

Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospektiva 2025: godina u kojoj je pritisak postao sistem. Beograd: NUNS.

Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospective 2025: the year in which pressure became a system. Belgrade: NUNS.

What the source records
NUNS recorded 371 cases, including 113 physical attacks and 165 threats, along with legal, economic and digital forms of pressure.
Claim it supports
The claim that selective application of the same right sends a signal that political closeness, not general rule, determines risk and protection.
Source limitation
The register depends on the reported and documented cases, it can overlap with other databases and does not measure the experience of every journalist.
Open source ↗
S04

Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.

What the source records
The report documents the simultaneous concentration of power, institutional abuses, pressures on the judiciary, selective fight against corruption, media control and repression against critics, with very few reforms implemented.
Claim it supports
The claim that selective application of the same right sends a signal that political closeness, not general rule, determines risk and protection.
Source limitation
It is the semi-annual report of the coalition with a clear reform and advocacy role, so its evaluations should be checked through the above examples, documents and sources for each area.
Open source ↗
S05

Domestic NGOs documented case study - Verified 21.08.2026

Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava. 2026. Dosije Hrvatska II: Proterivanje, targetiranje i drugi primeri kršenja ljudskih prava građana i građanki Hrvatske u Srbiji. Beograd: YIHR Srbija.

Youth Initiative for Human Rights. 2026. File Croatia II: Expulsion, targeting and other examples of violations of human rights of Croatian citizens in Serbia. Belgrade: YIHR Serbia.

What the source records
Monitors the cancellation of the stay with the indefinite label “unacceptable security risk” and the consequences that the affected persons can hardly effectively challenge.
Claim it supports
It shows how broad security discretion allows for the selective enforcement of formal rules.
Source limitation
It documents certain affected persons and the media pattern; it does not show that all foreign citizens are treated equally or that Serbia systematically persecutes its own critics abroad.
Open source ↗
S06

Local NGO and local partner field research - Verified 21.08.2026

Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac. 2023. Pasivizacija adresa Albanaca u Preševskoj dolini kao diskriminatorna praksa. Beograd i Bujanovac: YIHR Srbija i Odbor za ljudska prava Bujanovac.

Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the Committee for Human Rights of Bujanovac. 2023. Passivation of addresses of Albanians in the Presevo Valley as discriminatory practice. Belgrade and Bujanovac: YIHR Serbia and the Committee for Human Rights of Bujanovac.

What the source records
Compare the general legal procedure with its consequences for Albanians in the Presevo Valley and find discriminatory practice.
Claim it supports
Supports the claim that selective implementation of the general law encourages compliance and insecurity of the minority community.
Source limitation
The dedicated sample and incomplete administrative availability do not allow for the assessment of all passivated addresses; the report documents the affected cases and the pattern, not each individual procedure.
Open source ↗
S07

International Integrity and Anti-Corruption Practices Indicator - Viewed official Earth page and indicator data

OECD. 2026. Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Serbia.

What the source records
The OECD compares the formal anti-corruption framework and its real application, including differences between rules and results.
Claim it supports
substantiate that selectivity should be checked through similar cases, capacity and enforcement, not only through the existence of regulations.
Source limitation
Indicator assessment does not establish a political motive in each individual procedure.
Open source ↗
S08

Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - The official chapter for Serbia, findings, recommendations and methodological limitations

European Commission. 2026. 2026 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2026) 931 final.

What the source records
It records limited results in cases of high corruption, weak subsequent reactions and problems of equal and effective enforcement of the rules.
Claim it supports
Adds systemic evidence that formally equivalent standards can have an uneven effect when supervision and enforcement are weak.
Source limitation
It does not prove that every difference in treatment is politically selective; the same manufacturer as D03.
Open source ↗
S09

Official international report on compliance with anti-corruption recommendations - - Review of the official compliance report, evaluations by recommendations and conclusions

GRECO. 2026. Fifth Evaluation Round: Second Compliance Report on Serbia. GrecoRC5(2026)7. Adopted 12 June 2026; published 18 August 2026.

What the source records
“Most integrity recommendations for the top executive and the police have not yet been fully implemented and there are lack of checks and supervision.
Claim it supports
Supports an uneven amount of control between ordinary subjects and politically powerful functions.
Source limitation
Compliance with the recommendations is not a direct comparison of two identical investigations or evidence of political intent.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research findings into clear answers to the questions people ask when trying to understand elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life in an authoritarian system.

01

Based on academic research

The answers are based on relevant academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms. AUTLAS connects findings from scholarly articles, books, and comparative studies and presents them in language accessible to the wider public.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from civil society organizations, independent institutions, professional associations, investigative media, and other relevant sources. General findings and evidence from Serbia are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists the sources used. Visitors can check which research, data, and reports underpin the conclusions. The authors of the research and the organizations that collected the data remain clearly credited.

04

Why questions?

Knowledge about authoritarian systems is scattered across scholarly papers, books, databases, and reports. AUTLAS organizes it through 100 questions in 20 areas, so people can start with a phenomenon they recognize and understand the wider system to which it belongs.

05

Focus on the system, not on blaming people

Authoritarian systems change the rules, narrow the range of choices, raise the cost of refusal, and create the impression that nothing can change. AUTLAS therefore analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms - rather than blaming people trying to live and work within such a system.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are being developed by Civic Initiatives. Civic Initiatives is the author and editor of the website and is responsible for topic selection, treatment of sources, and presentation. The content is updated and corrected in line with new research and reliable data.

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