Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How are state-owned companies, public procurement, and subsidies used for political control?
Government companies, public procurements and subsidies give the authorities great control over the business, money and survival of private enterprises. Management sites can be distributed to politically reliable people, contracts directed to related companies, and subsidies to give to the communities or investors who support the government.
The winners then finance campaigns, provide media support, hire activists or remain silent so as not to lose their next job. Thus, public money becomes the fuel of a political organization. State ownership or subsidy is not in itself an abuse and can serve a legitimate development policy. The problem is seen when the criteria are not clear, the decisions are not public, the same network repeatedly receives benefits, there is a conflict of interest and independent control cannot check the price and result.
Public companies, procurements and subsidies in Serbia manage big money and jobs, so they can also serve outside their public purpose. Reports record long-term executive appointments of directors, poor transparency, special benefits for individual projects and the use of vehicles or employed public institutions in party activities. When the manager and supplier depend on political decision, the public resource becomes a means of discipline and reward.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Transparency Serbia documents weak competition and management of public companies, CINS concrete cases of the use of state-owned vehicles, and the European Commission and prEUgovor risks in public procurement and state aid. Local press in eight local self-governments shows that public companies and institutions channel money to the media through state advertising without complete data, criteria and implementation reports.
Control is achieved through the decision of who manages the company, who gets the contract and who has access to the subsidy; political loyalty can then be more valuable than price, quality and public interest.
Yes the channels are well documented, but the political motive must be checked for each contract or appointment.
State firm, direct bargaining or subsidy is not in itself evidence of abuse. Transparent criteria, comparison of bidders, trace of decision-making and control of conflicts of interest are needed.
State firm or subsidy is not an abuse in itself. The problem shows repeated political advantage, conflict of interest or violation of public criteria.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Carothers, C. (2022), „Taking Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Reform Seriously“, Perspectives on Politics 20(1): 69–85.
- Contribution to this answer
- Carothers shows that the question is not just whether the state “tolerates corruption”, but who controls the allocation of resources and the implementation of rules. Authoritarian anti-corruption can even reduce some of the abuses, but at the same time concentrate even more discretion in the hands of the political leadership.
comparing several countries or cases
Carothers, C. (2023), „The Autocrat’s Corruption Dilemma“, Government and Opposition 58(1): 22–38.
Carothers, C. (2023), "The Autocrat's Corruption Dilemma", Government and Opposition 58(1): 22–38.
- Contribution to this answer
- Shows why access to money, privileges and rents can be an effective way to bind political allies to the regime: he who owes his position and wealth to the authorities has a lot to lose if the system changes. But it is precisely too much corruption that can turn this advantage into a political problem.
Explain how the system works
Greene, K. F. (2007), Why Dominant Parties Lose, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greene at the Mexican PRI shows how control of the state gives the ruling party an advantage that the opposition can hardly compensate for: public money, jobs and state institutions can feed the party organization for years, so the political game starts with very unequal resources.
Explain how the system works
Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. i Brusco, V. (2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Stokes and the co-authors show the micro-mechanism of such allocation: the resource gets a political function only when one can decide who to belong to and associate that decision with the expected political support. State business or subsidy are therefore not in itself clientelism the condition under which they are given is important.
review more research
Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dahlstrm and Lapuente show why the way of employment and advancement in the state apparatus changes political control over resources: when professional autonomy weakens, politicians gain more space to tie administrative decisions and careers to political interests.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- The analysis describes the long-term circumvention of competition for directors, political ties in governance, poor transparency and risks of using public resources for party needs.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political control of public companies, procurement and subsidies enables the distribution of money, jobs and contracts according to loyalty.
- Source limitation
- Anti-corruption analysis identifies risks and documented irregularities, but does not prove the criminal responsibility of every manager or company.
Domestic NGOs anti-corruption parallel report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đorđević, Miloš, i Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija i UNCAC Coalition.
orđević, Miloš, and Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia and UNCAC Coalition.
- What the source records
- Based on regulations, organ reports, eight requests for access to information, consultations and documented cases, the authors find a broad formal framework, but a significantly larger problem in the ineffective or selective application of the rules.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political control of public companies, procurement and subsidies enables the distribution of money, jobs and contracts according to loyalty.
- Source limitation
- The report is thematically related to UNCAC and ends in mid-2023, so it does not specify the type of regime or cover later development and all forms of political control.
Domestic investigative journalism a specific case - Verified 21.08.2026
Nikolić, Jovana, i Ivana Milosavljević. 2023. People Brought to SNS Rally by Vehicles of State Institutions. Beograd: CINS.
Nikolić, Jovana, and Ivana Milosavljević. 2023. People Brought to SNS Rally by Vehicles of State Institutions. Belgrade: CINS.
- What the source records
- CINS has documented at least eight vehicles owned by public institutions and collected conflicting or incomplete answers on the legal basis and payment of their use.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political control of public companies, procurement and subsidies enables the distribution of money, jobs and contracts according to loyalty.
- Source limitation
- It is a single gathering, and contracts and responsibility are not finally established in all cases, so the findings show the basis for control, not independently proof of the entire political system.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that political control of public companies, procurement and subsidies enables the distribution of money, jobs and contracts according to loyalty.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Local media network comparative analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
Lokal pres. 2026. State Advertising at the Local Level. Kragujevac: Lokal pres.
- What the source records
- Monitors contracts for advertising of public companies and institutions outside of project co-financing and shows the absence of clear criteria.
- Claim it supports
- Shows how public companies and institutions can channel money to the media outside of transparent and competitive rules.
- Source limitation
- The survey covers one year and eight local self-governments; EMFA standards used as a benchmark are not yet fully enshrined in domestic law.
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