Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How do those in power decide who receives a job, assistance, or privilege and who pays the price?
The government often directs the distribution of jobs, assistance and privileges to the political value of groups. It can give more to those whose votes, money or organization are important, to those who might cross the opponent or groups whose protest it fears the most. The cost is more easily transferred to poorly organized people, distant environments or citizens who do not have access to decision-making.
Such a distribution does not always have to be open: the rule may seem general, while the criteria are set for certain users. However, any social or development policy is not a political purchase. In order to distinguish the public goal from the maintenance of power, one should look at whether the needs of the measure are consistently, who receives benefits in relation to similar groups, whether decisions are changed before the elections and whether there is a right to a reasoned appeal.
In Serbia, rewards and costs are distributed through budget, employment, subsidies, social assistance, permits and selective application of the rules. Politically related actors can get faster access to work or decision, while the critic bears the cost of inspection, lost contract, public smear or long procedure. The system is strongest when the criterion is not written: people themselves assess what they have to do to be on the safe side.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Surveys of clientelism and corruption, as well as reports on social protection, public enterprises and political pressures, document multiple channels of selective distribution of benefits and burdens. New sources now provide four measurable distribution channels: general public tenders, contests for gender equality, local state advertising and project financing of the media, with a documented Linglong case.
The government does not have to reward every supporter or punish every critic; a few visible examples and great discretion are enough to influence the behavior of a much wider circle of people.
Yes the pattern is supported in several areas, but the range of each channel is not the same.
Different treatment is not automatically political. It is necessary to compare similar cases, criteria, time of decision and links of actors, with the right of the other party to offer a lawful explanation.
The survival of power is not the only reason for any economic decision. The distribution is also influenced by ideas, development goals, war, real needs and the ability of administration.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
data from a large number of countries
Albertus, M. (2015), Autocracy and Redistribution, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Albertus shows that authoritarian redistribution is not simply “giving to the poor”: the government chooses who gets the resources and against whom the redistribution will be directed towards the political relations of the forces. Land reform, for example, can simultaneously reward one group and weaken the elite that pose a threat to the regime.
data from a large number of countries
Morrison, K. M. (2009), „Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability“, International Organization 63(1): 107–138.
- Contribution to this answer
- Morrison shows that the additional non-tax income of the government gives more room to choose who to relieve and to whom to increase spending: in dictatorships, such income is associated with higher social spending, while the regime at the same time becomes more stable. Money therefore changes the political distribution of possible rewards.
review more research
Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wintrobe sees power as a constant balance between reward and fear: the regime shares the rents and privileges to produce loyalty, and it uses repression to increase the price of resistance. Who gets the benefit and who takes the risk is therefore not a separate issue both decisions serve to maintain political support.
Explain how the system works
Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M. i Brusco, V. (2013), Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Stokes and co-authors show how such distribution goes down to individual citizens: local mediators have information about people and decide to whom they will direct their work, help or other targeted benefit. That is why the distribution can depend on the political relationship, and not only on the formal right or need.
comparing several countries or cases
Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2016), Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Haggard and Kaufman give a broader picture: political changes and regime stability depend on conflicts between social groups over resources, on who can organize and on how the elites estimate the price of concessions. For this issue, work is more a framework that explains why distribution produces political allies and opponents, rather than a study of individual job allocation or assistance.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vuković, Danilo, i Bojan Spaić. 2022. “Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia.” Sociologija 64(4): 519–542. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC2204519V
Vuković, Danilo, and Bojan Spaić. 2022. “Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia.” Sociology 64(4): 519542. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC2204519V
- What the source records
- The authors find sufficient evidence for a parallel informal order in which formal rules are violated, while the rules of the loyalty network are maintained.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that benefits and costs are selectively distributed through work, assistance, permission, inspection and protection, even when the political criteria are not written.
- Source limitation
- The finding describes corruption and clientelism; it does not in itself determine the type of regime or show that any illegality is centrally driven.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vuković, Danilo, i Marija Stefanović. 2024. “Leaving No One Behind: Party Clientelism in Social Welfare in Serbia.” Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade 72(4): 697–722. https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24404A
Vuković, Danilo, and Marija Stefanović. 2024. “Leaving No One Behind: Party Clientelism in Social Welfare in Serbia.” Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade 72(4): 69722. https://doi.org/10.51204/Anali_PFBU_24404A
- What the source records
- Qualitative research shows how party employment and loyalty networks can redirect public service work and create fear and passivity among employees.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that benefits and costs are selectively distributed through work, assistance, permission, inspection and protection, even when the political criteria are not written.
- Source limitation
- Research is in-depth, but sectoral; conclusions cannot be automatically transferred to every public institution.
Domestic NGOs qualitative field research - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2023. Mreža političkih pritisaka u centrima za socijalni rad. Beograd: CRTA.
CRTA. 2023. Network of political pressures in centers for social work. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Testimonials describe centers as points in a hierarchical network in which business, contract and assistance can be linked to political loyalty and electoral mobilization.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that benefits and costs are selectively distributed through work, assistance, permission, inspection and protection, even when the political criteria are not written.
- Source limitation
- The sample is qualitative and anonymous; the findings reveal mechanisms and patterns, but do not measure their frequency in all centers.
Domestic NGOs analysis of political integrity - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparency Serbia. 2024. Assessing Political Integrity Rules in Serbia. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- Analysis finds important basic registers and rules, but also poor reporting, supervision and holes that leave room for favoritism and impunity.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that benefits and costs are selectively distributed through work, assistance, permission, inspection and protection, even when the political criteria are not written.
- Source limitation
- The assessment of the rules and their application determines the institutional risks, not the guilt of the person concerned without due process.
Domestic NGO and research media longitudinal analysis of the competition - Verified 21.08.2026
BIRN Srbija i Građanske inicijative. 2023. Javno o javnim konkursima: Pregled projektnog finansiranja u oblastima medija, civilnog društva, kulture i omladine u 2022. godini. Beograd: BIRN Srbija i Građanske inicijative.
BIRN Serbia and Civic Initiatives. 2023. Public about public competitions: Overview of project funding in the fields of media, civil society, culture and youth in 2022. Belgrade: BIRN Serbia and Civic Initiatives.
- What the source records
- Connects users, amounts, competition commissions and lack of evaluation, so you can see who gets the benefit and who is missing.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the claim that discretionary distribution of public money can be a reward, while criteria and results remain poorly verifiable.
- Source limitation
- The database and monitoring show patterns and risks; only the repetition of the user does not prove eligibility or abuse without an overview of the specific competition, decision and project results.
Domestic NGOs public finance analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
FemPlatz. 2024. Analiza javnih konkursa za podršku projektima udruženja usmerenih na promociju, zaštitu i unapređenje rodne ravnopravnosti i sprečavanje nasilja prema ženama objavljenih tokom 2023. Pančevo: FemPlatz.
FemPlatz. 2024. Analysis of public competitions for support to projects of associations aimed at promotion, protection and improvement of gender equality and prevention of violence against women published during 2023. Pančevo: FemPlatz.
- What the source records
- In one sector, it monitors who has been awarded 207,7 million dinars and what kind of trace of work users leave.
- Claim it supports
- Provides a measurable example that money can go to inactive or unskilled actors, while experienced service providers are left without support.
- Source limitation
- Desk analysis and four interviews accurately check the selected competitions, but do not prove that every funded association GONGO nor that every bad decision is politically motivated.
Local media network comparative analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
Lokal pres. 2026. State Advertising at the Local Level. Kragujevac: Lokal pres.
- What the source records
- Compares the amounts and users of state advertising in eight local self-governments and finds a strong concentration of funds.
- Claim it supports
- Gives local examples of who gets public income without a publicly defensible criterion.
- Source limitation
- The survey covers one year and eight local self-governments; EMFA standards used as a benchmark are not yet fully enshrined in domestic law.
Local NGOs comparative analysis of media financing - Verified 21.08.2026
Res Publika. 2026. Propaganda vs. javni interes: Analiza projektnog finansiranja i medijskog pluralizma u lokalnim zajednicama. Kragujevac: Res Publika.
Res Publika. 2026. Propaganda vs. Public Interest: Analysis of Project Financing and Media Pluralism in Local Communities. Kragujevac: Res Publika.
- What the source records
- In competitions in five cities, it monitors commissions, users, amounts and produced content.
- Claim it supports
- Provides cases in which public money funds promotional or repeated content instead of clearly defined public interest.
- Source limitation
- Comparing one competition year in five local self-governments and complementing it with journalistic texts; it shows the mechanism and cases well, but does not measure its frequency throughout Serbia.
Domestic NGOs documented case study - Verified 21.08.2026
ASTRA. 2024. Neispričana priča 11 radnika žrtava trgovine ljudima u Srbiji. Beograd: ASTRA.
ASTRA. 2024. Untold story of 11 victims of human trafficking in Serbia. Belgrade: ASTRA.
- What the source records
- Monitors who bears the price of the investment project: workers suffer threats and departure, while ASTRA finds the impression of privileged position of a large foreign company.
- Claim it supports
- Provides a case of selective distribution of benefits and burdens, with the fence that one case does not prove a general policy.
- Source limitation
- “It is a case collected in the short term before the departure of the workers; it shows what the privileged position of the investor may look like, but it does not prove the general state policy towards all investors.
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