Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How do propaganda, censorship, disinformation, and information flooding work together?
These actions have different roles and are the strongest when used together. Propaganda offers a story in which the government is capable, threatened or irreplaceable; censorship removes data that contradicts the story; fake news inserts wrong clues; backlog produces so many versions that the citizen gives up checking. The goal does not have to be that everyone believes the same message.
It is enough that people do not know who to trust, that they think that the truth cannot be established or that they cannot judge how many others share their suspicion. However, exposure to the message is not the same as conviction, and conviction is not the same as behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to separately check who saw the content, who believed it, how long the effect lasted and whether it really changed the decision or just public speaking.
In the Serbian media space, control does not rest on one technique. Pro-government media repeat a favorable image of the government, critics present themselves as enemies, some information is kept silent, incorrect claims and denials are mixed, and attention is constantly shifted to new crises. A citizen does not have to believe every message; it is enough to become tired, confused and unsure who he can trust at all.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Media monitoring measures imbalance and tone, analyses of populist speech and political cartoons describe divisions and personalization, and media associations record pressures and poor implementation of the strategy.
Propaganda builds a desirable story, censorship reduces the counter-evidence, misinformation spoils the common facts, and backfilling takes the time and attention needed to check.
Yes sources confirm the joint action of several methods, although their individual effect on each citizen is difficult to single out.
Error, bias or a large amount of news are not automatically coordinated propaganda. The claim is based on a permanent pattern, political asymmetry and related to ownership, financing and pressures.
The message does not automatically change the opinion and its effect often lasts for a short time. It is necessary to distinguish how many people have seen, remembered, believed and then done something.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
research that checks more closely what the cause is
Roberts, M. E. (2018), Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Roberts shows that the control of information can use several different obstacles at the same time: someone is distracted by fear, someone extra effort is needed to get information, and someone is swamped with other content. The system does not have to block every man or every news to strongly change what most people eventually see.
review more research
Roberts, M. E. (2020), „Resilience to Online Censorship“, Annual Review of Political Science 23: 401–419.
- Contribution to this answer
- Roberts also shows where the limits of such control are: people easily bypass censorship when they know that something is hidden, have a strong reason to seek that information and have the means to get it. That is why effective censorship often tries to be invisible enough that people do not even feel the need to bypass it.
checking of digital traces and content
King, G., Pan, J. i Roberts, M. E. (2017), „How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction“, American Political Science Review 111(3): 484–501.
- Contribution to this answer
- King, Pan and Roberts show that propaganda doesn’t have to try to convince you that the government is right. China’s factory posts have largely changed the subject and distracted from conversation with the potential for mobilization which shows how backlogs can work alongside selective censorship.
comparing several countries or cases
Guriev, S. i Treisman, D. (2019), „Informational Autocrats“, Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4): 100–127.
- Contribution to this answer
- Guriev and Treisman describe “information autocrats” who rely less on public terror and more on the image of their own ability: propaganda builds this image, censorship and co-optation silence people who might challenge it, and repression itself is often hidden instead of publicly demonstrated.
Explain how the system works
Schlumberger, O., Edel, M., Maati, A. i Saglam, K. (2024), „How Authoritarianism Transforms: A Framework for the Study of Digital Dictatorship“, Government and Opposition 59(3): 761–783.
- Contribution to this answer
- Schlumberger and co-authors warn that digital technology is not just a new tool for exactly the same old regimes: when digital surveillance, information control and other technologies sufficiently change the way government sees and intervenes in society, they can change the very structure of authoritarian governance.
research that checks more closely what the cause is
Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K., Doan, T. N. i Crockett, M. J. (2021), „How Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks“, Science Advances 7(33): eabe5641.
Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K., Doan, T. N. i Crockett, M. J. (2021), "How Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks", Science Advances 7(33): eabe5641.
- Contribution to this answer
- Brady and co-authors are useful here primarily as a counterweight: resentment and polarized content can be amplified through positive reactions from other users and norms within the network, without a state plan. That is why the very fact that public space is flooded with anger does not prove that everything was produced by propaganda.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Monitoring finds that more than half of the time intended for political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television broadcasts and almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that repetition, silence, misinformation, attack and suppression together can produce confusion and mistrust, even without full censorship.
- Source limitation
- The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Stojiljković, Zoran, i Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populistički Zeitgeist u ‘proevropskoj’ Srbiji.” Politička misao 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populist Zeitgeist in ‘Pro-European’ Serbia.” Political Thought 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
- What the source records
- The paper shows that populism in Serbia has several forms and can be merged with a broad, ideologically expansive party.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that repetition, silence, misinformation, attack and suppression together can produce confusion and mistrust, even without full censorship.
- Source limitation
- He studies populism and parties, and does not independently prove that the political system is authoritarian.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vladisavljević, Nebojša, i Aleksandra Krstić. 2023. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Populism in Serbia Under Vučić in Political Cartoons.” Europe-Asia Studies 75(9): 1429–1452. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2149700
Vladisavljević, Nebojša, and Aleksandra Krstić. 2023. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Populism in Serbia Under Vučić in Political Cartoons.” Europe-Asia Studies 75(9): 142952. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2149700
- What the source records
- The paper shows how unequal political match, media freedom and populist personalization are presented together in public criticism of the authorities.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that repetition, silence, misinformation, attack and suppression together can produce confusion and mistrust, even without full censorship.
- Source limitation
- Caricatures are a critical cultural source and cannot replace the direct measurement of institutions or attitudes of the entire population.
Domestic media associations survey and qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026
Asocijacija medija, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Lokal pres i Slavko Ćuruvija fondacija. 2023. Strategija razvoja medijskog sistema Srbije (2020–2025) i njena implementacija: saznanja, stavovi i predlozi medijskih radnika. Beograd.
Media Association, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Local Press and Slavko Curuvija Foundation. 2023. Strategy of development of media system of Serbia (2020-2025) and its implementation: findings, attitudes and proposals of media workers. Belgrade.
- What the source records
- Respondents describe the gap between formal rules and implementation, political influence through financing and regulators, as well as low confidence in the institutions of protection of media freedom.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that repetition, silence, misinformation, attack and suppression together can produce confusion and mistrust, even without full censorship.
- Source limitation
- The sample of media workers and interviews do not represent all the newsrooms or the entire audience; they find measures of experience and attitudes of the professional community.
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