How do those in power shape what we consider fact, knowledge, and shared memory?
The government influences the common knowledge much wider than the daily news. It decides what is measured in the official statistics, what documents are opened, who receives professional titles and research money, what enters the textbooks and what events we mark or keep silent.
If the data are not collected, archives are closed, experts are punished, and one version of the past becomes a condition of belonging to the community, the society loses the language with which to recognize the problem. This does not mean that the state should be absent from education, culture or statistics. It is crucial whether there are public criteria, multiple sources and the possibility of professional challenge. The deepest control is not when one fact is forbidden, but when people no longer have institutions and procedures to establish in common.
The government in Serbia does not only influence today’s news, but also the framework through which the past is interpreted. State ceremonies, textbooks, museums, televisions and speeches can highlight heroic and national stories, suppress responsibility for war crimes or rearrange the meaning of the 1990s and October 5. When the same version is repeated through institutions, political choice begins to look like a defense of identity, not a discussion of verifiable facts.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Memory policy research documents the state rehabilitation of war narratives and the public visibility of convicted war criminals, while media monitoring shows how historical frameworks are used in contemporary politics.
Who determines what facts are remembered, who is the victim and who is the hero, also affects the limits of today’s criticism: the opponent may present himself as a traitor to the already known common story.
Yes the politics of memory in Serbia is well documented, but society does not have one single memory.
Historical interpretation is legitimately disputed and there is no state version. The limit is when verifiable facts are denied, institutions are used for political rehabilitation or critical research is punished.
Education and expertise can help both freedom and control. The content, the way of work, the independence of teachers and the reaction of students and the public should be looked at in particular.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
Explain how the system works
Wallace, J. (2022), Seeking Truth and Hiding Facts: Information, Ideology, and Authoritarianism in China, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wallace shows one paradox of authoritarian knowledge: the government desperately wants accurate data to be able to manage it, but when it punishes bad results, it creates a reason for lower levels to send it beautified figures. The system can thus produce more and more data, while at the same time corrupting the very information that is most needed to know what is real.
review more research
Paglayan, A. S. (2026), „Education as a Political Institution“, Annual Review of Political Science 29: 525–546.
- Contribution to this answer
- Paglayan shows why it is not enough to see the school as a neutral public service: the education system shapes political values, national identity and social order, creates jobs that can serve the patronage, and can even be used for political supervision. What society teaches is therefore also a political issue.
research that checks more closely what the cause is
Cantoni, D. i dr. (2017), „Curriculum and Ideology“, Journal of Political Economy 125(2): 338–392.
- Contribution to this answer
- Cantons and co-authors give very strong causal evidence that changing what is taught can change political attitudes: after the reform of Chinese textbooks, students had more positive attitudes towards Chinese governance, different attitudes towards democracy and greater skepticism towards the free market. The effects on real behavior were less clear.
data from a large number of countries
Neundorf, A., Nazrullaeva, E., Northmore-Ball, K., Tertytchnaya, K. i Kim, W. (2024), „Varieties of Indoctrination: The Politicization of Education and the Media around the World“, Perspectives on Politics 22(3): 771–798.
- Contribution to this answer
- Neundorf and co-authors create a global map of the political design of schools and media in 160 countries and show that “indoctrination” is not one technique: regimes differ in how they centralize education, change curricula, control teachers, and use the media for political messages.
long-term direct monitoring of political life
Wedeen, L. (1999), Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, University of Chicago Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wedeen shows perhaps the most important line between believing and acting like you do. The Syrian cult of Assad did not have to convince citizens that his apparently exaggerated claims were true; it was enough to teach them what words and rituals they had to repeat publicly. Such “like” behavior discipline people and make it difficult for them to know what others really think.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Đureinović, Jelena. 2023. “Marching the Victorious March: Populism and Memory Appropriation of the Yugoslav Partisans in Today’s Serbia.” Nationalities Papers 51(6): 1250–1262. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2022.50
ureinović, Jelena. 2023. “Marching the Victorious March: Populism and Memory Appropriation of the Yugoslav Partisans in Today’s Serbia.” Nationalities Papers 51(6): 125062. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2022.50
- What the source records
- The paper finds that since 2012, the government has been taking over and merging various historical symbols into a populist story of heroism and sacrifice that helps modern political legitimacy.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that power through media, ceremonies and institutions shapes the boundaries of common memory and binds today’s opponents to historical images of the enemy.
- Source limitation
- It studies the official policy of remembrance, not showing how every citizen accepts or rejects these messages.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Stojiljković, Zoran, i Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populistički Zeitgeist u ‘proevropskoj’ Srbiji.” Politička misao 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populist Zeitgeist in ‘Pro-European’ Serbia.” Political Thought 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
- What the source records
- The paper shows that populism in Serbia has several forms and can be merged with a broad, ideologically expansive party.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that power through media, ceremonies and institutions shapes the boundaries of common memory and binds today’s opponents to historical images of the enemy.
- Source limitation
- He studies populism and parties, and does not independently prove that the political system is authoritarian.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vladisavljević, Nebojša, i Aleksandra Krstić. 2023. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Populism in Serbia Under Vučić in Political Cartoons.” Europe-Asia Studies 75(9): 1429–1452. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2149700
Vladisavljević, Nebojša, and Aleksandra Krstić. 2023. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Populism in Serbia Under Vučić in Political Cartoons.” Europe-Asia Studies 75(9): 142952. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2149700
- What the source records
- The paper shows how unequal political match, media freedom and populist personalization are presented together in public criticism of the authorities.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that power through media, ceremonies and institutions shapes the boundaries of common memory and binds today’s opponents to historical images of the enemy.
- Source limitation
- Caricatures are a critical cultural source and cannot replace the direct measurement of institutions or attitudes of the entire population.
Domestic media associations survey and qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026
Asocijacija medija, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Lokal pres i Slavko Ćuruvija fondacija. 2023. Strategija razvoja medijskog sistema Srbije (2020–2025) i njena implementacija: saznanja, stavovi i predlozi medijskih radnika. Beograd.
Media Association, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Local Press and Slavko Curuvija Foundation. 2023. Strategy of development of media system of Serbia (2020-2025) and its implementation: findings, attitudes and proposals of media workers. Belgrade.
- What the source records
- Respondents describe the gap between formal rules and implementation, political influence through financing and regulators, as well as low confidence in the institutions of protection of media freedom.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that power through media, ceremonies and institutions shapes the boundaries of common memory and binds today’s opponents to historical images of the enemy.
- Source limitation
- The sample of media workers and interviews do not represent all the newsrooms or the entire audience; they find measures of experience and attitudes of the professional community.
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