Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How does a government control the media without formally banning them?
The government does not have to formally prohibit the media in order to influence what it publishes. Control can go through the owners, state advertising, permits, tax and other inspections, expensive lawsuits, access to officials and information or business interests related to the state.
The editor sees over time which topic brings the loss of ads, court costs or problems to the owner, so he avoids the risk himself. Thus, self-censorship is created, and the government can still claim that no news is banned. Similar content in the media can arise due to the market, savings or the search for the audience. Political control is more reliably seen when financial or regulatory reward and punishment follow the attitude of the media to the government, and the critical redaction of the system.
In Serbia, critical media are not formally banned, but the largest TV channels and tabloids give the authorities incomparably more space and a more favorable tone. Control is built through ownership, state advertising and project financing, access to information, pressure on journalists, a regulator who reacts poorly and the business dependence of the media. A citizen can therefore have the freedom to seek criticism, and almost never meet it in everyday information.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
CRTA systematically measures the dominant representation of the authorities, media associations and the European Commission record political and economic pressures, and scientific work connects media clientelism with reduced freedom. Local Press and Res Audience now locally document both financial channels of control: state advertising without criteria and competition co-financing of promotional content.
Contemporary media control often does not close the newsroom; it makes critical work more expensive, risky and less visible, while pro-government content gets money and access to the audience.
Yes the combination of quantitative monitoring, interviews and external reports strongly substantiates the pattern.
In Serbia there is an important critical media space, especially online and on certain cable channels. The claim is about range, resources and inequality, not about complete monopoly.
Similar media content can be created due to the market, savings or the desire for an audience. For political control, money, pressure or different treatment of the media should be shown.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
Explain how the system works
Gehlbach, S. i Sonin, K. (2014), „Government Control of the Media“, Journal of Public Economics 118: 163–171.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gehlbach and Sonin show that the government does not have to shut down or ban the media in order to influence what people hear: it can affect its bias, ownership and economic incentives. Full control is not always the best for the government the media that the audience finds obviously propaganda loses some of its ability to persuade or move people.
Explain how the system works
Petrova, M. (2008), „Inequality and Media Capture“, Journal of Public Economics 92(1–2): 183–212.
- Contribution to this answer
- Petrova shows how the media can lose independence even without a state ban: when rich and powerful actors can pay to influence the information being published, economic inequality increases the space for “capturing” the media. The work is not specifically about the authoritarian state, but about the economic mechanism through which the private media can become less independent.
comparing several countries or cases
Schiffrin, A. (ur.) (2017), In the Service of Power: Media Capture and the Threat to Democracy, CIMA/NED.
- Contribution to this answer
- This collection shows how modern “press capture” often looks much more subtle than censorship: political and economic elites use ownership, financial dependence and other leverage to make private media formally free, while their space for independent journalism gradually narrows.
Explain how the system works
Guriev, S. i Treisman, D. (2020), „A Theory of Informational Autocracy“, Journal of Public Economics 186: 104158.
- Contribution to this answer
- Guriev and Treisman explain the model in which the government survives by convincing citizens that it is capable: it invests in propaganda, censors independent information and co-opts informed elites that could break the image. Information control can therefore replace a large part of open violence.
review more research
Rosenfeld, B. i Wallace, J. (2024), „Information Politics and Propaganda in Authoritarian Societies“, Annual Review of Political Science 27: 263–281.
- Contribution to this answer
- Rosenfeld and Wallace show that propaganda is not a simple technique that automatically “brainwashes”: its effect depends on the content of the message, the political environment, the attitude of citizens towards the source and their previous attitudes, and it should be viewed in conjunction with censorship and other ways of managing information.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Monitoring finds that more than half of the time intended for political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television broadcasts and almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the media can be subordinated through money, ownership, access, regulatory passivity and pressure, without formally banning critical content.
- Source limitation
- The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Domestic media associations survey and qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026
Asocijacija medija, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Lokal pres i Slavko Ćuruvija fondacija. 2023. Strategija razvoja medijskog sistema Srbije (2020–2025) i njena implementacija: saznanja, stavovi i predlozi medijskih radnika. Beograd.
Media Association, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Local Press and Slavko Curuvija Foundation. 2023. Strategy of development of media system of Serbia (2020-2025) and its implementation: findings, attitudes and proposals of media workers. Belgrade.
- What the source records
- Respondents describe the gap between formal rules and implementation, political influence through financing and regulators, as well as low confidence in the institutions of protection of media freedom.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the media can be subordinated through money, ownership, access, regulatory passivity and pressure, without formally banning critical content.
- Source limitation
- The sample of media workers and interviews do not represent all the newsrooms or the entire audience; they find measures of experience and attitudes of the professional community.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Dragojlov, Aleksandra. 2026. “Influence of Political Clientelism on Media Freedom under Vučić and the Progressive Party.” Nationalities Papers 54(2): 391–407. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2025.25
Dragojlov, Aleksandra. 2026. “Influence of Political Clientelism on Media Freedom under Vucic and the Progressive Party.” Nationalities Papers 54(2): 39107. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2025.25
- What the source records
- The paper concludes that subtle mechanisms of indirect control undermined media freedom despite the formal adoption of new laws.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the media can be subordinated through money, ownership, access, regulatory passivity and pressure, without formally banning critical content.
- Source limitation
- It is focused on the media sector and relies partly on a limited number of professional interviews.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the media can be subordinated through money, ownership, access, regulatory passivity and pressure, without formally banning critical content.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Local media network comparative analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
Lokal pres. 2026. State Advertising at the Local Level. Kragujevac: Lokal pres.
- What the source records
- Shows that state advertising can exceed competition co-financing and that money often goes to media related to political officials or violation of the code.
- Claim it supports
- Supports economic control of the media without prohibition and formal censorship.
- Source limitation
- The survey covers one year and eight local self-governments; EMFA standards used as a benchmark are not yet fully enshrined in domestic law.
Local NGOs comparative analysis of media financing - Verified 21.08.2026
Res Publika. 2026. Propaganda vs. javni interes: Analiza projektnog finansiranja i medijskog pluralizma u lokalnim zajednicama. Kragujevac: Res Publika.
Res Publika. 2026. Propaganda vs. Public Interest: Analysis of Project Financing and Media Pluralism in Local Communities. Kragujevac: Res Publika.
- What the source records
- It documents how the selection of commissions and allocation of project money can reward promotional reporting and make local media dependent.
- Claim it supports
- Supports financial control of the editorial space without a formal ban.
- Source limitation
- Comparing one competition year in five local self-governments and complementing it with journalistic texts; it shows the mechanism and cases well, but does not measure its frequency throughout Serbia.
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