Do all authoritarian governments operate in the same way?
Not all authoritarian authorities function the same, even when they similarly limit political competition and control of power. Somewhere the leader relies on a strong ruling party, somewhere on the army, the royal family, security services or a narrow personal circle, and somewhere there is an opposition that participates in elections under extremely unequal conditions.
It depends on who can stop the leader, how the positions and money are shared, how much open force is used and what happens when the leader leaves. That is why the same event protest, election defeat or economic crisis in different systems can produce completely different consequences. The markings help to ask the right questions, but they can not replace the description of the real power relations in a particular country.
Election monitoring shows that in Serbia the opposition participates in the elections and that political competition formally exists, but also that the conditions are not equal. The government has much greater media visibility, benefits from the benefits of the public function and state resources, while a part of voters and employees are exposed to pressures. This shows that authoritarian control does not have to abolish the elections: it is enough to permanently facilitate one side and make it harder for the other to win voters and take power.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Domestic sources show that in Serbia there are elections, opposition, parliament, critical media, protests and organizations, but that inequality is produced differently: through public resources and pressures in elections, pronounced media dominance, weakening parliamentary oversight, political ties in the security sector and increasing the price of civic organizing.
This is different from a closed one-party or military dictatorship. Control is often achieved by selective application of existing rules and institutions, and not by their complete abolition, with different sectors using different mechanisms.
Yes domestic sources show multiple mechanisms within a competitive authoritarian form
The sector report speaks only about the area it follows, and documented incidents are not representative of each institution or citizen. The conclusion on the type of system therefore arises only when the sectoral findings intersect with scientific and comparative research.
Systems change and mix properties of multiple species. The label helps to compare, but never explains the whole country.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Geddes, Wright and Frantz show that dictatorships differ in who founded them, how the government is organized, how power is shared and how the regime is personalized. These differences strongly affect their behavior and duration.
comparison of different types of systems
Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), „Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective“, Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.
Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective", Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius show that within the authoritarian world there are different electoral, party, military, and monarchical patterns, so the unification of all autocracy into one category hides important differences.
Development and verification of measurement methods
Teorell, J. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „Beyond Democracy–Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789–2016“, Perspectives on Politics 17(1): 66–84.
- Contribution to this answer
- Teorell and Lindbergh show that the basics of executive power can be different and overlap. The two regimes that act similarly on the outside can therefore rest on quite different mechanisms of coming to power and its loss.
review more research
Brancati, D. (2014), „Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects“, Annual Review of Political Science 17: 313–326.
- Contribution to this answer
- Brancati shows that the same formal institutions elections, parties, assemblies can perform different tasks in different autocracy: from information gathering to the distribution of benefits and control of political actors.
comparing several countries or cases
Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Svolik shows that authoritarian systems solve two separate problems control of society and power sharing among the elites and that different institutions can be made to solve different parts of the problem.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Bieber, Florian. 2018. “Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.” East European Politics 34(3): 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1490272
- What the source records
- Comparison of old and new patterns of competitive authoritarianism in the Western Balkans, including Serbia.
- Claim it supports
- Bieber explicitly distinguishes contemporary competitive authoritarian regimes of the Western Balkans from regimes of the 1990s and shows that different types use different supports and tactics.
- Source limitation
- The regional pattern does not explain every internal difference in Serbia.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 161738. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
- What the source records
- Changing the type of regime in Serbia using V-Dem indicators and dozens of criteria of competitive authoritarianism.
- Claim it supports
- Castaldo describes Serbia as a competitive authoritarianism, i.e. a system with real political competition that is seriously distorted, and not as a completely closed autocracy.
- Source limitation
- It is an academic classification and should be compared to other methodologies.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Laštro, Claudia, i Florian Bieber. 2021. “The Performance of Opposition Parties in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Three Case Studies from the Western Balkans.” European Political Science 20(4): 617–629. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-021-00326-w
Laštro, Claudia, and Florian Bieber. 2021. “The Performance of Opposition Parties in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Three Case Studies from the Western Balkans.” European Political Science 20(4): 61729. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-021-0326-w
- What the source records
- How opposition parties operate in competitively authoritarian regimes of Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia.
- Claim it supports
- A comparison of the opposition in three countries shows that within the same broad type of regime, there are different chances for unification, electoral breakthrough and the change of power.
- Source limitation
- Focusing on the opposition leaves the military, security apparatus and economic networks out of focus.
International scientific base and report - Verified 21.08.2026
Nord, Marina, David Altman, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, i Staffan I. Lindberg. 2026. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling the Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, dataset v16.
- What the source records
- Hundreds of indicators of elections, freedoms, the rule of law and the limitations of executive power over time.
- Claim it supports
- V-Dem distinguishes electoral from closed autocracy and puts Serbia in the first group, thus clearly showing that the existence of multi-party elections changes the way the system works.
- Source limitation
- Boundaries of categories are thresholds with measurement uncertainty, not natural and completely clear divisions.
International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- What the source records
- Elections, rule of law, institutions, governance, economy and political integration in Serbia.
- Claim it supports
- BTI calls Serbia a moderate autocracy and describes in detail the institutions through which power is exercised, which makes it possible to compare the label with the actual mechanisms.
- Source limitation
- BTI’s category is not the same as V-Dem’s or Freedom House’s and should not be merged without explanation.
Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
- What the source records
- Seven areas of democracy, including elections, media, local government, judiciary, corruption and civil society.
- Claim it supports
- Nations in Transit calls Serbia a hybrid regime, so it shows that serious sources can name the same border space between democracy and autocracy differently.
- Source limitation
- The different label reflects in part a different scale and thresholds, not necessarily the opposite description of the facts.
Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Freedom House. 2026. Freedom in the World 2026: Serbia Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
- What the source records
- Political rights and civil liberties, including elections, pluralism, expression, association and the rule of law.
- Claim it supports
- Freedom in the World retains the rating of a partially free country with multi-party elections, but it notes serious limitations, which further confirms that authoritarian systems are not equally closed.
- Source limitation
- The category of freedom is not the same as the scientific typology of the regime.
Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.
CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report 2023. Belgrade: CRTA Election Observation Mission.
- What the source records
- Displays the system with elections, opposition and formal procedures, but with deeply unequal conditions.
- Claim it supports
- CRTA’s monitoring shows one particular authoritarian form: elections and alternatives exist, but their equality is undermined through institutions, resources and pressures.
- Source limitation
- It does not say how closed, military or one-party autocracy works.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Shows indirect control of political visibility through strong dominance and tone on television, not through a formal ban on opposition.
- Claim it supports
- This source shows that authoritarian control can be carried out through unequal access and favorable reporting, without closing all critical media.
- Source limitation
- Does not include the press, portals, social networks or all the local media scene.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
Open Parliament. 2025. Annual Report on the work of the XIV Assembly of the National Assembly, February 2024 April 2025. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- “It shows that parliament has not been abolished, but that its controlling role can be emptied through procedures, mostly through biased leadership.
- Claim it supports
- “This report helps us understand the hybrid form of government in which a democratic institution remains visible, but is increasingly failing to perform its function.
- Source limitation
- One institution does not represent all ways of authoritarian rule in Serbia or other countries.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- Document special mechanisms for the capture of police, services and defence that differ from electoral and media mechanisms.
- Claim it supports
- The study shows that within the same country authoritarian control does not work the same everywhere: in the security sector, it uses different connections, secrecy and surveillance than in elections or in the media.
- Source limitation
- Sectoral findings should not be automatically transferred to all state institutions.
Domestic NGOs annual monitoring of human rights - Verified 21.08.2026
Beogradski centar za ljudska prava. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Urednik Dušan Pokuševski. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Editor Dušan Pokuševski. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.
- What the source records
- A combination of legal restrictions, police action, prosecution and pressure is recorded, while there is a mass civil mobilization.
- Claim it supports
- “This report shows that authoritarian rule does not have to completely stifle society: protest and resistance can remain strong while the state increases the cost of using them.
- Source limitation
- The Annual Human Rights Survey does not systematically compare Serbia with all types of autocracy.
Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026
Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.
Civic Initiatives. 2025. Citizens’ Associations narrowing the space for action 2024. Belgrade: Civic Initiatives.
- What the source records
- Displays various forms of pressure on association, expression and gathering through concrete cases throughout Serbia.
- Claim it supports
- This monitoring shows a variety of mechanisms from administrative barriers and smear campaigns to physical attacks instead of a single formula of authoritarian control.
- Source limitation
- Documented cases are not a representative sample of all citizens or proof that every pressure is being driven from one center.
Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparency Serbia and CINS.
- What the source records
- Describes political control through administrative and legal weaknesses, discretion and selective treatment, rather than through the abolition of justice and police.
- Claim it supports
- This study shows how contemporary authoritarian authorities can use existing rules and institutions selectively, instead of openly abolishing them.
- Source limitation
- Older cases do not describe all today’s practices or other types of authoritarian government.
The International Longitudinal Democratic Index - Viewed official website, methodological framework and Serbia profile
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Last updated: September 2025.
- What the source records
- Serbia remains in the middle range by main categories, but with significant declines in the credibility of elections, parliament and freedoms.
- Claim it supports
- Supports nuanced classification: formal pluralism and elections can survive while certain democratic dimensions weaken.
- Source limitation
- The index does not specify a single regime label and thresholds carry a measurement uncertainty.
Independent international monitoring of media pluralism - Viewed official country page and available full report
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.
- What the source records
- Breaks down the media system into four types of risks, with political independence being the most vulnerable, but problems vary by market, protection and inclusion.
- Claim it supports
- “It shows that within no hybrid system, all areas do not function the same and that the type of regime cannot be reduced to one feature.
- Source limitation
- Media risk is not the entire political structure of the country.
Domestic media associations survey and qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026
Asocijacija medija, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Lokal pres i Slavko Ćuruvija fondacija. 2023. Strategija razvoja medijskog sistema Srbije (2020–2025) i njena implementacija: saznanja, stavovi i predlozi medijskih radnika. Beograd.
Media Association, AOM, NDNV, NUNS, Local Press and Slavko Curuvija Foundation. 2023. Strategy of development of media system of Serbia (2020-2025) and its implementation: findings, attitudes and proposals of media workers. Belgrade.
- What the source records
- Record various mechanisms of political influence through financing, regulators and the application of media rules.
- Claim it supports
- Complements typology with domestic proof that control can be carried out indirectly, through market and regulatory levers, and not just through prohibition.
- Source limitation
- The findings of the media workers do not represent every newsroom.
Domestic NGOs representative public opinion - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA i Democracy Action Lab. 2026. Veruju u demokratiju, ne veruju u vlast: istraživanje javnog mnjenja u Srbiji. Beograd: CRTA.
CRTA and Democracy Action Lab. 2026. They believe in democracy, they do not believe in government: public opinion research in Serbia. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- At the same time, public opinion shows support for democracy and low confidence in its functioning and the main institutions.
- Claim it supports
- It shows that support for a democratic ideal can exist in a system with weakened controls, which is typical of mixed and hybrid forms.
- Source limitation
- The survey measures attitudes at a specific moment and does not determine the type of regime itself.
Local media network local survey and field research - Full report and methodology reviewed
Cvejić, Bojan, i ANEM. 2026. Indikatori stanja lokalnih medija u Srbiji za 2025. godinu: studija slučaja osam gradova i opština i jednog regiona.
Cvejić, Bojan, and ANEM. 2026. Indicators of the state of local media in Serbia for 2025: case study of eight cities and municipalities and one region.
- What the source records
- Finds major differences among local communities in freedom, security, economic position and access to information.
- Claim it supports
- Local variation confirms that the same country does not function equally in all environments and sectors.
- Source limitation
- Small and non-representative local samples do not allow the ranking of the entire country.
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