AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

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100questions

20areas

148academic works

130Serbia sources

SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

22How can elections be unfair if no one stole my vote?What elections are for when they are not fair 62Why do people use connections even when they believe connections should not be necessary?Why people stay silent, adapt, and think they are alone 48What happens to institutions when people are hired and promoted mainly for political loyalty?How the system changes public administration and public services 33How does a court lose its independence while remaining independent on paper?How law, courts, and parliament are used 49Why do employees find it harder to say 'no' when their job or term continually depends on a new government decision?How the system changes public administration and public services 36How can an institution be captured if no one ordered every employee what to do?How independent institutions are neutralized and crises are used

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

01How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms5 questions 02How democracy disappears step by step5 questions 03Who really rules and what happens after the leader5 questions 04Why the police, military, and security services obey5 questions 05What elections are for when they are not fair5 questions 06How the ruling party and local networks hold the system together5 questions 07How law, courts, and parliament are used5 questions 08How independent institutions are neutralized and crises are used5 questions 09How money, jobs, and state assistance preserve power5 questions 10How the system changes public administration and public services5 questions 11How those in power shape what people can learn5 questions 12How digital surveillance and bad news change power5 questions 13Why people stay silent, adapt, and think they are alone5 questions 14Why people support the government and how power is justified5 questions 15How associations, unions, schools, and churches are controlled5 questions 16How the system punishes and intimidates without open violence5 questions 17How people organize and when protest changes power5 questions 18How an authoritarian system falls and what remains afterward5 questions 19How authoritarian rulers use support from abroad5 questions 20How democracy is defended and rebuilt5 questions

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WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms

We first need to distinguish one bad decision from a system in which those in power become increasingly difficult to remove through elections or hold to account. These systems are not all alike, and they do not survive in the same way.

QUESTIONS IN THIS AREA

01How can we tell that this is not just one bad decision, but an authoritarian way of governing?02What is the difference between an authoritarian leader, the current government, and the system as a whole?03How can we distinguish authoritarian rule from populism, corruption, or simply bad governance?04Do all authoritarian governments operate in the same way?05Does it matter whether a government emerged through a coup, war, revolution, or the gradual weakening of democracy?

Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Does it matter whether a government emerged through a coup, war, revolution, or the gradual weakening of democracy?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions

key academic works5

linked Serbia sources21

Period2012-2026, with a legacy in the 1990s and transitions after 2000.

ANSWER FROM THE MATRIX

Yes, because the way government is created usually determines its first supports, fears and rules.

The government created by the military coup must resolve the relationship with the officers who brought it to power; the revolutionary government often relies on the party and organizations created during the struggle; the government created in the war can long justify the concentration of power by the security threat. When democracy weakens gradually, elected leaders more often use existing laws, elections and institutions to change them from within to their advantage. Yet the origin is influenced by who can replace the leader and what kind of crisis is not the best.

SERBIA CASE STUDY

Example from SerbiaChecked 21 sources; 17 manufacturers

21 related sources; 17 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 7

Multiannual reports on Serbia do not show a single moment in which the democratic system was suddenly abolished. They record a gradual deepening of media imbalance, concentration of political power, weakening of parliamentary and institutional supervision and increasingly unfavorable conditions for critical media and organizations. Elections, laws and institutions have remained in place, but over time they have become less and less able to limit power and enable equal political change.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01Established fact

CRTA’s review of ten years of election observation notes that key problems have not been solved and that many have deepened. The study on political control of the judiciary, prosecution and police documents mechanisms already by 2018, BCSP monitors them in the security sector 2019-2024, while the Open Parliament, prEUgovor and Civic Initiatives record their further development in parliament, reforms and the civil space 2024-2025.

02Our interpretation

This timeline corresponds to the gradual weakening of democracy: the government was won by elections, and the institutions were not abolished by a single move, but their control functions changed through a series of laws, appointments, procedures, resources and informal practices.

03Does it show the same process?

Yes domestic sources give more time points of gradual erosion

04Important caveat or alternative explanation

Continuity does not mean that every period was the same, nor does one cause explain all the changes. War heritage, transition weaknesses, party system, European integration, economy and foreign policy incentives remain part of the explanation.

LIMITS OF THE CONCLUSION

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

Origin is not destiny. War, economy, new leader and external support can later completely change the initial way of governing.

GENERAL RESEARCH BASE

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

review more research

Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer: Geddes, Wright and Frantz show that the way in which dictatorship arises leaves a long organizational trail: who initially held power and how the regime is organized influences the later distribution of power, personalization, and the way it falls.

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

Which question do you want to start with?

How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms

How the finding is separated in the matrix

Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.

Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press.

Bermeo, N. (2016), „On Democratic Backsliding“, Journal of Democracy 27(1): 5–19.

Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2021), Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press.

Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.

Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860

Bieber, Florian. 2018. “Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans.” East European Politics 34(3): 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1490272

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17

Kakarnias, Theofanis. 2025. “Decoding Serbia’s Democratic Backsliding: EU Conditionality Meets Domestic Realities.” European Political Science 24(3): 293–312. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-025-00518-8

Nord, Marina, David Altman, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, i Staffan I. Lindberg. 2026. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling the Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, dataset v16.

Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.

Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.

Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821

Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.

Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.

Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.

CRTA. 2026. A Decade of Election Observation: Is Everything the Same, Worse, or Better? Beograd: CRTA.

International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.

Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospektiva 2025: godina u kojoj je pritisak postao sistem. Beograd: NUNS.

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 2025. Political and Institutional Crisis in Serbia: Possible Scenarios. Belgrade: BCSP.

Cvejić, Bojan, i ANEM. 2026. Indikatori stanja lokalnih medija u Srbiji za 2025. godinu: studija slučaja osam gradova i opština i jednog regiona.

Based on academic research

Practice documented in Serbia

Sources open to scrutiny

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Focus on the system, not on blaming people

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