Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why do governments create parallel services, overlap responsibilities, rotate personnel, and carry out purges?
Parallel services, overlapping competencies, frequent shifts and purges help the leader prevent any group from gathering enough people, forces and information to threaten him. If the two services do a similar job and monitor each other, the leader can compare their reports and more easily detect disloyalty.
Frequent rotations break personal ties among the personnel, while purges show everyone the price of suspicion or disobedience. But what increases the security of the leader often reduces the ability of the state: institutions hide information, shift blame, duplicate work and fear initiative. That is why such an organization is not an ordinary administrative mess. It should be seen whether changes in personnel and competencies are repeatedly used to weaken the independent centers of power and personal responsibility for personal responsibility.
In the security sector of Serbia, researchers note the overlap of formal powers, unclear coordination centers, personnel changes and political ties that make external supervision difficult. Such a structure allows the top not to become completely independent and that information and tasks can be redirected to more loyal people or parallel channels. The consequence is a harder determination of who has made the decision and who is responsible when the authority is abused.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
The BCSP has documented through studies in 2020 and 2024 the political takeover of police, services and defence, weak parliamentary control and informal ties between power centers.
“Overlapping is not just an organizational disorder: it can be a way for a leader to compare information, prevent a competitive center from emerging, and retain the ability to reward or remove a shot.
Sources show political control and vague responsibility, but they do not reveal every secret order or internal purge.
Security institutions legitimately keep part of the data and periodically reorganize the work. The problem is political, not operational secrecy: when there is no independent supervision, a clear legal trace and consequences for abuse.
Purgatory can serve to prevent a riot, a showdown within the government or a real fight against corruption. The intention cannot be concluded without information about the targets and the procedure.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wintrobe shows that the leader constantly balances between rewards and fear and that he cannot fully know who is loyal to him. This creates an incentive to organize the security apparatus so as to reduce the risk of betrayal.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows how dictators build secret police and security structures against two different threats a rebellion from below and a coup from within. The organization of the apparatus of force therefore often sacrifices part of the efficiency to make it politically safer for the leader.
data from a large number of countries
De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- De Bruin shows that creating parallel armed organizations can reduce the risk of a military coup because no force has a monopoly, but such a coup-proofing arrangement can have serious costs for coordination and military capability.
comparing several countries or cases
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.
- Contribution to this answer
- Quinlivan shows classic coup-proofing techniques: parallel forces, kinship and sectarian ties, privileges and careful monitoring of the military. The goal is not only the security of the state, but also to prevent the apparatus of force from endangering the ruler.
review more research
Hassan, M., Mattingly, D. i Nugent, E. R. (2022), „Political Control“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 155–174.
- Contribution to this answer
- Hassan shows how authoritarian leaders use personnel and organizational interventions to keep state institutions under political control. For parallel services there is a broader framework, but it helps to see the same logic of personnel security.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- An early study systematically documents the political takeover of police, services and defense.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, and Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
- What the source records
- The report concludes that the structures in the police, services, military and surveillance system help to maintain the captured state and that the change requires more than one person to be replaced.
- Claim it supports
- A later study monitors how the control networks are maintained and adjusted after the first takeover period.
- Source limitation
- The work starts from the concept of the captured state and is aimed at security and recommendations for reform, so its framework should be read together with wider and methodologically different sources.
Research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Ejdus, Filip. 2010. Democratic Security Sector Governance in Serbia. PRIF Report No. 94. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. ISBN 978-3-942532-04-4.
- What the source records
- The report shows that formal reform after 2000 has progressed unevenly and that political influence, weak accountability and old networks remain important problems.
- Claim it supports
- Historical analysis shows the legacy of uneven reform and political personnel changes after 2000.
- Source limitation
- The period ends before the SNS comes to power, so it is used for heritage and transition, not for assessing the current state of affairs.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- External monitoring confirms persistent problems with civilian and parliamentary surveillance of the security sector.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Domestic think tank multisectoral research report - Review full report, methodology framework and chapters by sectors
Petrović, Predrag, i Jelena Pejić Nikić, ur. 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Petrović, Predrag, and Jelena Pejić Nikić, editor 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- Describes rotations at the top of the Ministry of Interior and Defence, informal management, secrecy and weak external and parliamentary control.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that personnel changes and parallel political channels can reduce the independence of services and cloud accountability.
- Source limitation
- “It does not prove that any reorganization was planned to prevent a rival centre.
Domestic think tank historical and institutional analysis - View full report, author data, chronology and conclusion
Popović, Đorđe, Predrag Petrović, Gorana Odanović i Jelena Radoman. 2011. Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 1989–2009. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Popović, orđe, Predrag Petrović, Gorana Odanović and Jelena Radoman. 2011. Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 19892009. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- It historically follows separate and privileged police and security structures, old personnel and reserved domains before and after 2000.
- Claim it supports
- Shows the long-term cost of parallel centers and unfinished reform: changing the formal top does not automatically remove networks and overlapping competencies.
- Source limitation
- “The period ends in 2009 and it does not say who is making the secret decisions today.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed
European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.
- What the source records
- Weak parliamentary oversight and accountability problems are noted in the system in which formal institutions exist.
- Claim it supports
- Adds an independent confirmation that vague responsibility and weak control are not just internal organizational topics.
- Source limitation
- The Rule of Law report does not detail the internal structure of all services.
International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed
OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.
- What the source records
- Finds poor coordination, low transparency of decision-making and insufficient management responsibility in public administration.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the administrative consequences of overlaps and temporary arrangements: it is difficult to follow who decides and who is responsible.
- Source limitation
- The assessment of the entire administration is not an immediate study of the secret or security services.
Reviewed review paper domestic institutional analysis - Viewed full work, method, findings and bibliographic record
Mitrović, Sava, i Milica Škorić. 2022. „Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji: dometi i ograničenja demokratskog upravljanja policijom.” Politička revija 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7
Mitrović, Sava, and Milica Škorić. 2022. “Reform of the Security Sector in Serbia: Scopes and Limitations of Democratic Governance of Police.” Political Review 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7
- What the source records
- Through the legal framework, documents and control mechanisms, there is room for politicization, weak parliamentary oversight and lack of internal police control.
- Claim it supports
- Independently substantiates that complex structure and weak controls can cloud accountability and facilitate political management of personnel and powers.
- Source limitation
- Review work does not prove that any overlap was deliberately made for political control.
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