AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

Start with a question→

100questions

20areas

148academic works

130Serbia sources

SIX ENTRIES INTO THE MATRIX

Which question do you want to start with?

Concrete questions are the starting point. The other 94 are available through the map of 20 areas.

22How can elections be unfair if no one stole my vote?What elections are for when they are not fair 62Why do people use connections even when they believe connections should not be necessary?Why people stay silent, adapt, and think they are alone 48What happens to institutions when people are hired and promoted mainly for political loyalty?How the system changes public administration and public services 33How does a court lose its independence while remaining independent on paper?How law, courts, and parliament are used 49Why do employees find it harder to say 'no' when their job or term continually depends on a new government decision?How the system changes public administration and public services 36How can an institution be captured if no one ordered every employee what to do?How independent institutions are neutralized and crises are used

MAP OF THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

Twenty areas guide you through the system as a whole.

Select an area to see why it matters and which five questions it opens.

01How to recognize authoritarian rule and distinguish its forms5 questions 02How democracy disappears step by step5 questions 03Who really rules and what happens after the leader5 questions 04Why the police, military, and security services obey5 questions 05What elections are for when they are not fair5 questions 06How the ruling party and local networks hold the system together5 questions 07How law, courts, and parliament are used5 questions 08How independent institutions are neutralized and crises are used5 questions 09How money, jobs, and state assistance preserve power5 questions 10How the system changes public administration and public services5 questions 11How those in power shape what people can learn5 questions 12How digital surveillance and bad news change power5 questions 13Why people stay silent, adapt, and think they are alone5 questions 14Why people support the government and how power is justified5 questions 15How associations, unions, schools, and churches are controlled5 questions 16How the system punishes and intimidates without open violence5 questions 17How people organize and when protest changes power5 questions 18How an authoritarian system falls and what remains afterward5 questions 19How authoritarian rulers use support from abroad5 questions 20How democracy is defended and rebuilt5 questions

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WHY THIS AREA MATTERS

Who really rules and what happens after the leader

Authoritarian rule is not just one person. It depends on people, services, parties, and business circles whose support makes it possible to carry out decisions.

QUESTIONS IN THIS AREA

11Which people and groups does political power really rest on?12How does a leader share power with those around them, and why are rules necessary?13Why do those in power often choose loyal people instead of the best experts?14Why do governments create parallel services, overlap responsibilities, rotate personnel, and carry out purges?15What happens to the system when all power becomes tied to one person?

Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How does a leader share power with those around them, and why are rules necessary?

Confidence in the conclusionwell substantiated

key academic works5

linked Serbia sources11

Period201226

ANSWER FROM THE MATRIX

The leader needs rules because his co-workers can never be completely sure that he will not lose his position, property or freedom tomorrow. Agree on who gets what function, how it is advanced, how benefits are shared and who participates in important decisions reduce this fear and make cooperation more predictable.

The party, parliament, council or constitution can therefore play a real role in the authoritarian system: they do not have to protect citizens, but they can regulate relations among the people in power. Such a division of power lasts only if there are groups behind the rules that can punish the leader when he violates them. If they can not, the institution becomes an ornament, and loyalty depends on personal grace. Therefore, one should ask not only if there is a rule, but who can enforce it against the most powerful man.

SERBIA CASE STUDY

Example from SerbiaChecked 11 sources; 11 manufacturers

11 related sources; 11 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 2

The leader cannot personally run every municipality, public company, committee or service, so he needs a division of affairs and reliable rules within the governing network. In Serbia, this division is seen through the party hierarchy, control of the parliamentary group, acting and local mediators who implement decisions and return information to the top. The rules are not just laws: they are important and unwritten expectations about loyalty, reward and punishment.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01Established fact

Research by parliament, acting officials and clientelistic networks shows how formal appointments and informal ties distribute power across multiple levels.

02Our interpretation

The leader shares tasks, access and benefits, but tries to keep the last word. Such a system can be very centralized even though a large number of intermediaries participate in it.

03Does it show the same process?

Yes Serbian sources show an organized division of power under a strong political center.

04Important caveat or alternative explanation

Evidence of unwritten rules often comes from interviews, appointment forms and behavior, so it is more difficult to determine the exact content of the agreement than with the published law.

LIMITS OF THE CONCLUSION

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The same institution can sometimes limit the leader, and sometimes it is just a decoration. It is important who has enough strength behind it to enforce the rule.

GENERAL RESEARCH BASE

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

comparing several countries or cases

Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.

Contribution to this answer: Gandhi and Przeworski show that parliaments and parties can be useful to the dictator because through them he negotiates with opponents, offers concessions and co-opts groups that might otherwise threaten him.

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

Which question do you want to start with?

Who really rules and what happens after the leader

How the finding is separated in the matrix

Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.

Gandhi, J. (2008), Political Institutions under Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Boix, C. i Svolik, M. W. (2013), „The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government“, Journal of Politics 75(2): 300–316.

Magaloni, B. (2008), „Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule“, Comparative Political Studies 41(4–5): 715–741.

Hassan, M., Mattingly, D. i Nugent, E. R. (2022), „Political Control“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 155–174.

Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C

Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

CRTA. 2023. Mreža političkih pritisaka u centrima za socijalni rad. Beograd: CRTA.

Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346

Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349

Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3

Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociološki pregled 47(1): 3–22.

Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008

OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Based on academic research

Practice documented in Serbia

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