Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why do those in power often choose loyal people instead of the best experts?
The government often chooses loyalty over expertise because an independent and able-bodied person can be more politically risky than an obedient co-worker. An expert can point to a mistake, refuse an illegal order, build his own reputation or have information that the leader does not control.
Loyal staff is more predictable and ready to implement the decision without questions, but it is precisely for this reason that they often keep silent about the problem and transmit only the news that the top wants to hear. The consequence is not only poor quality of services: the system can become very effective in political control, and at the same time unable to solve complex public problems. A practical sign is a pattern in which people progress without clear results, while professional and independent work are not removed after.
In the Serbian state administration, the temporary appointment of acting officials has become a permanent practice: at the end of 2021, more than half of the highest officials were in this status. A man whose position every few months depends on the new decision of the political leadership has less room to insist on expert opinion when it is not desirable. This does not mean that every appointed man is unprofessional, but that the system rewards addiction more than professional independence.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
CEP has established 213 officials among the 408 highest official positions at the end of 2021, with many years of bypassing regular competitions.
Loyalty of the authorities is useful because it reduces the risk of rejection of orders and leakage of information; the price is weaker professional discussion, poorer choice of personnel and greater dependence of the administration on the choice.
Yes the mechanism of dependent appointment is well documented, but it does not speak for itself about the quality of each person.
Sometimes the acting person is justified due to urgency or vacancy. The problem arises when the exception lasts for years and systematically replaces the competition, mandate and reasoned responsibility.
Many researches can more easily see who is making progress than how good the decisions are. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between intention, behavior and the actual result.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
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Hassan, M., Mattingly, D. i Nugent, E. R. (2022), „Political Control“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 155–174.
- Contribution to this answer
- Hassan shows how the political top through personnel decisions and organization of administration tries to maintain control over the state apparatus. The work helps to understand why political reliability can become an important criterion, but does not simply test the choice of 'loyalty or expertise'.
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Pepinsky, T. B., Pierskalla, J. H. i Sacks, A. (2017), „Bureaucracy and Service Delivery“, Annual Review of Political Science 20: 249–268.
- Contribution to this answer
- Pepinsky, Pierscalla and Sacks show that the quality of bureaucracy and public services depends on the manner of employment, organization and relations of officials with politics and citizens. Professionalism is therefore not only a feature of the individual, but a result of the system.
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Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dahlstrm and Lapuente show how the relationship between political control and professional autonomy affects corruption, development and quality of services. Personnel rules therefore have consequences much wider than the choice of an individual official.
surveys in several countries
Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.
- Contribution to this answer
- Schuster and co-authors show that professionally motivated officials respond to politically problematic orders differently they try to influence the decision, obstruct it or think about leaving. The politicization can therefore change the behavior and composition of the institution.
comparing several countries or cases
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.
Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.
- Contribution to this answer
- Alon-Barkat and the co-authors show that officials who see democratic backlash as a threat are more likely to think about leaving and less about additional engagement. The expected politicization can thus leave the institution without a part of the professional staff.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.
- What the source records
- At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
- Claim it supports
- Provides accurate information about 52% of the officials in the highest official positions and explains the political dependence of such status.
- Source limitation
- Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Regional NGO monitoring of public administration - Verified 21.08.2026
WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkan PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.
WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkans PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.
- What the source records
- For Serbia, there are persistent gaps between formal reform and the experience of citizens and officials, especially in employment, transparency and accountability.
- Claim it supports
- Regional monitoring confirms the permanent gap between the measuring system on paper and the practice of employment and advancement.
- Source limitation
- The regional methodology gives a comparison, but does not explain every institution or every bad result with political pressure.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- Official monitoring of the EU reiterates concerns about politicization and acting officials.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 1939. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
- What the source records
- The work links the weakening of democracy with the rules and economic incentives that enable the authorities to turn public resources into a political advantage.
- Claim it supports
- Link the control of personnel and public resources to the wider weakening of institutions.
- Source limitation
- It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349
Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 126. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349
- What the source records
- Finds that clientelism and pressure are associated with employment and economic dependence.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that personnel dependence can reward political obedience and reduce the space for independent professional decision-making.
- Source limitation
- The experience of pressure does not measure the expertise of each named person.
Reviewed scientific paper quantitative study of the network - Viewed full work, method, tables and bibliographic record
Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3
Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015” Croatia and Comparative Public Administration 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3
- What the source records
- In the local network, patronage employment is linked to political contribution and position, while education is not the only criterion of allocation.
- Claim it supports
- It provides direct evidence of a mechanism in which political utility may be more important than neutral professional choice.
- Source limitation
- It does not assess the performance of all 341 employees or the legality of each procedure.
Reviewed scientific paper municipal panel and political data - View full work and bibliographic record
Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociološki pregled 47(1): 3–22.
Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociological Review 47(1): 3.
- What the source records
- The municipal panel connects the party composition of the government with public employment.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the claim that public jobs are used as a political resource, which changes incentives in the selection of personnel.
- Source limitation
- It does not contain individual data on the expertise of employees and is older in time.
peer-reviewed scientific paper comparative case studies - Viewed full text and bibliographic record
Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008
- What the source records
- Document appointments at the top of the three institutions that the authors associate with patronage and management problems.
- Claim it supports
- It most directly supports the claim that political loyalty in high appointments can suppress professional suitability and institutional autonomy.
- Source limitation
- Three cases are not proof of all appointments or consequences.
International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed
OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.
- What the source records
- Finds too many acting officers, poor personnel planning and circumvention of the regular official system.
- Claim it supports
- Provides modern international evidence that the exception to the competition appointment maintains the dependence of the highest officials.
- Source limitation
- It does not claim that every acting person is unskilled or obedient.
International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- What the source records
- Describes the politicized civil service and institutions under strong party influence.
- Claim it supports
- Wider form from individual appointments in the manner of managing the state apparatus.
- Source limitation
- The Earth Expert Assessment does not measure the quality of each person.
Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- Document the long-term circumvention of competition for directors of public companies, political ties and poor transparency.
- Claim it supports
- Adds domestic sectoral evidence that leadership positions can be kept dependent on political decision instead of open elections and results.
- Source limitation
- Anti-corruption analysis does not establish the guilt or incompetence of each director.
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