Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Which people and groups does political power really rest on?
Authoritarian power usually rests on a circle of people and groups without which the leader cannot make and implement decisions. These can be the top parties, police and security services, military commanders, businessmen, administration, media owners and local mediators.
Each of them gives something that the authorities need force, money, information, organization or votes and in turn expects position, protection, access to jobs or security. The leader therefore does not have to just control the citizens; he must constantly prevent and conflict or association of people within his own circle. The true support of the authorities is not always seen from official functions. The most important thing is who can stop the decision, withhold the resource or move other people, and not only whose name stands at the top of the institution.
Power in Serbia does not rest only on the president or ministers. It relies on the top of the ruling party, people who control the parliamentary majority and appointments, managers of public companies and administrations, local party networks, as well as parts of the security apparatus and business circles that depend on state decisions. The system survives while key actors believe that their power is safer than outside it.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Studies on Parliament, Clientelism, Public Enterprises and the Security Sector describe different decision-making groups, allocate resources and maintain political discipline.
“The real question is not just who is most visible, but who can lose office, contract, protection or access to resources if they stop cooperating and who can threaten the government in return.
Yes sources show a wider coalition of supporters, not the power of one person without intermediaries.
Not all party members, officials, police officers or businessmen are part of the same network nor act for the same reason. Sources describe the structures of incentives and documented connections, not the collective guilt of entire professions.
The real circle of power is often hidden and variable. A high function does not always mean the real power to stop the decision.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Svolik shows that a leader only survives if he simultaneously controls society and keeps the agreement with the elites who give him money, organization, information or force. Authoritarian power is therefore a coalition, not just one man.
comparing several countries or cases
Boix, C. i Svolik, M. W. (2013), „The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government“, Journal of Politics 75(2): 300–316.
- Contribution to this answer
- Boix and Svolik show why authoritarian institutions can help divide power: when allies have enough strength to punish a leader, formal rules allow them to monitor whether he respects the deal and to reduce their fear of betrayal.
review more research
Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.
- Contribution to this answer
- “Meng, Paine and Powell show that real power sharing requires more than shared functions and benefits mechanisms are needed by which allies can enforce a deal and limit a leader.
comparing several countries or cases
Gandhi, J. i Przeworski, A. (2007), „Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats“, Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gandhi and Przeworski show why dictators include part of the opposition in institutions: parliaments and parties can help co-opponents, offer concessions and reduce the risk of open conflict.
review more research
Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wintrobe explains why the dictator combines rewards and repression: he doesn’t know for sure who is truly loyal to him, so he uses rents to buy support and fear to increase the price of betrayal.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- Describes clientelistic links between party leadership, economy, public sector and voters.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346
- What the source records
- The paper claims that the control of parliament has enabled the further takeover of independent institutions and continued democratic backlash since 2012.
- Claim it supports
- Shows the role of parliamentary majority and appointment in transferring power through the system.
- Source limitation
- Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- The analysis describes the long-term circumvention of competition for directors, political ties in governance, poor transparency and risks of using public resources for party needs.
- Claim it supports
- Document political risks in the management of public enterprises and the appointment of directors.
- Source limitation
- Anti-corruption analysis identifies risks and documented irregularities, but does not prove the criminal responsibility of every manager or company.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- It shows why parts of the security sector are an important pillar of political control.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349
Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 126. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349
- What the source records
- A 2024 survey shows that political exchange of services and coercion intertwine and differ according to employment, local competition and social position.
- Claim it supports
- substantiates that the power also rests on the intermediaries that connect the workplace, local resources and political mobilization, not only on the formal top.
- Source limitation
- Measures experience and perception; does not map the names of all actors in the network.
Reviewed scientific paper quantitative study of the network - Viewed full work, method, tables and bibliographic record
Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3
Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015” Croatia and Comparative Public Administration 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3
- What the source records
- In one city board there are 1,725 members, their network positions, secured votes and 341 patronage jobs.
- Claim it supports
- Provides micro-evidence that local party activists and network intermediaries can be the backbone of the government in the exchange of votes, work and public employment.
- Source limitation
- “A 2015 committee is not a national picture or evidence for each member.
Reviewed scientific paper municipal panel and political data - View full work and bibliographic record
Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociološki pregled 47(1): 3–22.
Dragojević, Mila, and Andy Konitzer. 2013. “The Forensics of Patronage: Identifying the Linkage Between Parties and Public Sector Employment in Serbia.” Sociological Review 47(1): 3.
- What the source records
- More than 165 municipalities associate the composition of local coalitions with employment in public enterprises.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the role of local parties, coalition partners and public companies in the wider range of resources on which the government rests.
- Source limitation
- The data is before 2010 and show an aggregate connection, not today’s individual networks.
peer-reviewed scientific paper comparative case studies - Viewed full text and bibliographic record
Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008
- What the source records
- Through the NBS, the anti-corruption agency and EPS reconstructs how high appointments serve political control, resources and clientelism.
- Claim it supports
- It shows why the leaders of key institutions and public systems are an important part of the coalition of government supporters.
- Source limitation
- Three case studies do not represent all appointments or the entire state.
Domestic think tank multisectoral research report - Review full report, methodology framework and chapters by sectors
Petrović, Predrag, i Jelena Pejić Nikić, ur. 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Petrović, Predrag, and Jelena Pejić Nikić, editor 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- Connects the top of the governing structure, services, police, defense, parliament and business interests through multiple documented cases.
- Claim it supports
- Complements the support map to security and business actors who can provide force, information and protection of resources.
- Source limitation
- The BCSP uses the same framework of the captured state as earlier reports and is not a new independent producer.
International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed
OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.
- What the source records
- The administration observes through the political management of reform, the acting authorities, accountability and public finances.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the claim that the political leadership and senior officials transmit political power through formal administrative positions.
- Source limitation
- It does not map the secrets or informal relationships of individual actors.
International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- What the source records
- Describes the dominance of the president and the SNS over the government, parliament, judiciary and governance.
- Claim it supports
- Adds a comparative expert confirmation that the pillars of power include several institutions and a party organization.
- Source limitation
- “A broad-based assessment does not identify all the people and connections in the ruling coalition.
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