Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
What does a ruling party do besides win elections?
The ruling party is much more than a voting machine. It transmits orders from the top to the local level, selects and supervises personnel, gathers information about the mood of citizens, distributes positions and resolves conflicts among people who support the government.
A party organization can show the leader who is loyal and who can move people, but also provide the system with rules that last longer than one man. That is why a strong party can have a double role: it keeps power from society, but sometimes limits the leader himself because its people have their own interests and ways to agree. It is necessary to distinguish an organized party with internal rules from a personal movement that depends almost exclusively on the popularity and decisions of one leader.
SNS is not just an election machine that is activated before the vote. Its network connects the top authorities with municipalities, public companies, jobs, local intermediaries and citizens who need service or protection. The party transmits orders down, information and results up, rewards activists and checks who is reliable. That is why the rule can be personally centralized, and yet depend on a huge organization.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Studies of parties and clientelism, CRTA field work and CINS investigations of call centres and party finances are documented by organizational, financial and service functions of the ruling party.
The party transforms the state power into a presence in everyday life: work, telephone, local service, transportation to a gathering or assistance. This gives the government both support and information.
Yes domestic sources show functions that far exceed the election campaign.
A large and organized party is not authoritarian in itself. The problem is when it uses public data, official vehicles, working hours or decisions that should be available to everyone on equal terms.
The fact that something is called a ‘party’ does not mean that it has its own rules and organization. It can only be an election machine of a leader.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Brownlee shows how a strong ruling party holds the elites together, resolves conflicts within the government and helps the regime survive political crises.
comparing several countries or cases
Magaloni, B. (2008), „Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule“, Comparative Political Studies 41(4–5): 715–741.
- Contribution to this answer
- Magaloni shows how the dominant party enables a convincing distribution of future positions and benefits among the elites. Membership becomes a long-term agreement that ties political careers to the survival of the system.
comparing several countries or cases
Reuter, O. J. (2017), The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Reuter shows how dominant parties in autocracy are created to connect the leader with local and economic elites, organize their interests and reduce the problem of coordination within the regime.
Development and verification of measurement methods
Meng, A. (2021), „Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength“, British Journal of Political Science 51(2): 526–540.
- Contribution to this answer
- Meng distinguishes a really strong ruling party from an organization that exists only as long as the founder holds it together personally. The institutional strength of the party can be seen by whether it can survive and function outside a leader.
review more research
Geddes, B., Wright, J. i Frantz, E. (2018), How Dictatorships Work, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Geddes, Wright and Frantz show that the way the regime is organized including the role of the ruling party affects the distribution of power, personalization, duration and manner of the fall of the dictatorship.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the ruling party transmits orders, collects information, distributes resources and maintains the network even between elections.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Domestic investigative journalism a specific case - Verified 21.08.2026
Milosavljević, Ivana, Teodora Ćurčić i Vladimir Kostić. 2023. CINS Inside SNS’s Call Center: Hostess Agency, Vote Buying, and Millions in Cash. Beograd: CINS.
Milosavljević, Ivana, Teodora určić and Vladimir Kostić. 2023. CINS Inside SNS’s Call Center: Hostess Agency, Vote Buying, and Millions in Cash. Belgrade: CINS.
- What the source records
- CINS journalist documented firsthand the work of a large col-centre, cash payments and job offer related to voting, which raises suspicions of vote buying, illegal financing and misuse of personal data.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the ruling party transmits orders, collects information, distributes resources and maintains the network even between elections.
- Source limitation
- The investigation documents one operation and serious doubts, but it is not a court epilogue or proof that the same practice is being carried out everywhere or that each participant knew the full purpose of the system.
Domestic investigative journalism a specific case - Verified 21.08.2026
Nikolić, Jovana, i Ivana Milosavljević. 2023. People Brought to SNS Rally by Vehicles of State Institutions. Beograd: CINS.
Nikolić, Jovana, and Ivana Milosavljević. 2023. People Brought to SNS Rally by Vehicles of State Institutions. Belgrade: CINS.
- What the source records
- CINS has documented at least eight vehicles owned by public institutions and collected conflicting or incomplete answers on the legal basis and payment of their use.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the ruling party transmits orders, collects information, distributes resources and maintains the network even between elections.
- Source limitation
- It is a single gathering, and contracts and responsibility are not finally established in all cases, so the findings show the basis for control, not independently proof of the entire political system.
Domestic investigative journalism database - Verified 21.08.2026
Ćurčić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Beograd: CINS.
určić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Belgrade: CINS.
- What the source records
- The base shows that the SNS received about 49.2 million euros from the regular work budget, more than 38 other actors spent together for the same purpose, and reported a total of about 76.1 million euros in revenue.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the ruling party transmits orders, collects information, distributes resources and maintains the network even between elections.
- Source limitation
- The data show reported finances and a large imbalance, but part of the difference is due to the election results and current rules, while unreported or illegal flows by definition are not fully visible in the database.
Academic chapter organizational analysis of political parties - Viewed bibliographic record, abstract, chapter coverage and conclusions
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2017. “Serbia: Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Serbia.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik, Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, and Piotr Borowiec, 369–390. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2017. “Serbia: Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Serbia.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Katarzyna Sobolewska-Mylik, Beata Kosowska-Gsto, and Piotr Borowic Press.
- What the source records
- Analyzes formal structures, concentration of power and varying degrees of organizational development of parties, including early SNS.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the distinction between a party with independent rules and a leader-centric organization.
- Source limitation
- The period ends around 2016 and formal rules do not reveal any actual practice.
Reviewed scientific paper analysis of election strategies - Viewed full open work, method, findings and bibliographic record
Bursać, Dejan, and Dušan Vučićević. 2025. “Electioneering Strategies in the Hybrid Regime: Another Regular Snap Election in Serbia.” New Perspectives 33(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X241308429
- What the source records
- Describes SNS as the dominant organization that nationalizes local competitions and uses the president’s popularity, institutions and coalition partners.
- Claim it supports
- “It shows how the party connects the top, local lists, campaigning and the distribution of political power beyond the counting of votes.
- Source limitation
- The work is primarily an electoral analysis, not a complete ethnography within the party.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vuković, Danilo, i Bojan Spaić. 2022. “Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia.” Sociologija 64(4): 519–542. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC2204519V
Vuković, Danilo, and Bojan Spaić. 2022. “Parallel Normative Reality: The Informal Order of Corruption and Clientelism in Serbia.” Sociology 64(4): 519542. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC2204519V
- What the source records
- Reconstructs the informal order of corruption and clientelism in which personal and political ties direct access to institutions and resources.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the intermediary and distributive function of the party and the network between formal rules and actual decisions.
- Source limitation
- Qualitative synthesis does not map every member or prove a party relationship in every transaction.
Reviewed scientific paper quantitative study of the network - Viewed full work, method, tables and bibliographic record
Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015.” Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3
Lazić, Uroš. 2025. “Predictors of Party Patronage: A Case of the City Committee of a Serbian Parliamentary Political Entity in 2015” Croatia and Comparative Public Administration 25(1): 111–148. https://doi.org/10.31297/hkju.25.1.3
- What the source records
- In one city organization it measures members, secured votes, network position and patronage employment.
- Claim it supports
- Gives micro-proof that the party measures the effect, distributes the benefit and maintains the local network.
- Source limitation
- “A 2015 anonymised committee is not the entire SNS or the current state of affairs.
peer-reviewed scientific paper comparative case studies - Viewed full text and bibliographic record
Tomić, Slobodan, and Dušan Pavlović. 2023. “Blatant, Not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia.” NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 16(1): 181–209. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0008
- What the source records
- Through three senior appointments, it shows political control, resource management and clientelism.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the personnel and control function of the party authority outside the elections.
- Source limitation
- Three deliberately chosen cases do not represent all appointments.
Domestic NGOs analysis of public companies - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Public Enterprises — A Symbol of Abuses and Violation of the Law. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- Documents the long-term circumvention of the competition, acting officials and political influence in public companies.
- Claim it supports
- Adds domestic sectoral evidence that the party network affects executives and resources between elections.
- Source limitation
- Does not establish illegality or party order for each appointment.
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