Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
When does the ruling party protect the system, and when does it become a threat to the leader?
The ruling party guards the system when it connects the top with the local level, chooses successors, rewards work, punishes offenses and resolves conflicts before they become dangerous. Members then know which path they can take and why it is more worthwhile for them to stay together than to leave power.
The same organization, however, can become a threat to the leader if its managers control their own people, money and information and can agree without it. The leader therefore often tries to weaken the internal rules, bypass the party authorities and bind the functions to personal loyalty. It is a practical measure whether the party can change an important decision or choose a new leader according to its own rules, or only confirms what one person has already decided.
In today’s Serbia, the SNS is strongly subordinated to the top and does not have a publicly visible faction that can threaten the president, so the country is not a good clean example of a party that turned against the leader. However, the history of the SPS, JUL and the coalition of the nineties shows why the leader of the party at the same time needs and is dangerous: it owns local networks, personnel and information that can survive defeat or be redirected to the new center.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
SNS studies and parliamentary presidencialization record a high level of centralization, while transitional literature shows the continuity of party networks even after the fall of Milosevic.
The party preserves the system while transmitting orders and mobilizing support; it becomes a threat when its executives can coordinate to deny obedience or offer the apparatus to another leader.
Partially Serbia shows well the leader’s dependence on and control over the party, but not the contemporary open conflict between the leader and the ruling party.
There is no direct evidence about the future behavior of SNS after the change of leaders. It is an analytical possibility based on organizational structure and historical comparison, not prediction.
The party changes over time. To know whether it is a support or a threat to the leader, we need to monitor who has the money, the people and the right to make decisions.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Magaloni, B. (2008), „Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule“, Comparative Political Studies 41(4–5): 715–741.
- Contribution to this answer
- Magaloni shows that a strong ruling party stabilizes the regime precisely because it gives the elites the expected future benefits and space within the system. But it also creates organized actors who are not completely without power to the leader.
comparing several countries or cases
Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Brownlee shows that the institutionalized party can keep the elites together and limit the personalization of the regime. The party therefore simultaneously protects the system and preserves a part of the collective power against a single leader.
comparing several countries or cases
Reuter, O. J. (2017), The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Reuter shows that the dominant party connects the leader with local and economic elites and helps him to coordinate them. That is why these elites become important partners whose interests the leader cannot completely ignore.
Development and verification of measurement methods
Meng, A. (2021), „Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes: Rethinking Institutional Strength“, British Journal of Political Science 51(2): 526–540.
- Contribution to this answer
- Meng shows that a strong ruling party is not only an extension of the founder: when it has its own organization and permanence, it can stabilize the regime, but also represent an actual institutional structure that outlives the individual.
review more research
Meng, A., Paine, J. i Powell, R. (2023), „Authoritarian Power Sharing“, Annual Review of Political Science 26: 153–173.
- Contribution to this answer
- Meng, Paine and Powell show that power sharing only works when the allies have the means to implement the deal. The institution that protects the leader from chaos therefore also gives a piece of power to the people with whom he has to rule.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
- What the source records
- "The paper links presidencialization with the immediate election of the president, weaknesses in constitutional design, proportional elections and oligarchic parties.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
- Source limitation
- It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 1939. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
- What the source records
- The work links the weakening of democracy with the rules and economic incentives that enable the authorities to turn public resources into a political advantage.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
- Source limitation
- It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 161738. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
- What the source records
- The author concludes that Serbia under Vucic has returned to competitive authoritarianism through gradual rather than abrupt regime change.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that a leader needs a broad party network, but that it is its organization and resources that can survive a leader or become an independent center of power.
- Source limitation
- The classification depends on the thresholds chosen and the data for the most part precedes the 2020-2025 elections.
Academic chapter organizational analysis of political parties - Viewed bibliographic record, abstract, chapter coverage and conclusions
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2017. “Serbia: Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Serbia.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik, Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, and Piotr Borowiec, 369–390. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2017. “Serbia: Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Serbia.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Katarzyna Sobolewska-Mylik, Beata Kosowska-Gsto, and Piotr Borowic Press.
- What the source records
- It distinguishes developed party structures from the SNS, which in the observed period strongly relied on the popularity of the leaders and did not yet have an equally solid organization.
- Claim it supports
- It supports the test of whether the party has its own rules and power centers or overwhelmingly confirms the decisions of the leaders.
- Source limitation
- The finding is historical until approximately 2016, and does not prove today’s relationship within the SNS.
Reviewed scientific paper analysis of election strategies - Viewed full open work, method, findings and bibliographic record
Bursać, Dejan, and Dušan Vučićević. 2025. “Electioneering Strategies in the Hybrid Regime: Another Regular Snap Election in Serbia.” New Perspectives 33(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X241308429
- What the source records
- “For 2023-2024, he shows that Vucic remained a practical informal leader of the SNS even after formally resigning as party president.
- Claim it supports
- Directly substantiates the leader-centricity and the difference between formal function and real political control.
- Source limitation
- He does not document organized party rebellion or prove that the SNS is currently a threat to the leader.
International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- What the source records
- The wider stability of the regime is associated with the dominant party and the personalised control of the institutions.
- Claim it supports
- It adds an independent confirmation that the party is guarding the system, but its autonomy is limited by a strong leader.
- Source limitation
- A broad expert assessment does not see closed internal agreements or provide for succession.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Stojiljković, Zoran, i Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populistički Zeitgeist u ‘proevropskoj’ Srbiji.” Politička misao 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populist Zeitgeist in ‘Pro-European’ Serbia.” Political Thought 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
- What the source records
- Analyzes the populist personalization and the way in which the leader and party are reshaping political representation in Serbia.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the interpretation of why a leader can weaken the autonomy of party rules and organs.
- Source limitation
- The same author team as A31 and the earlier period; does not represent a separate confirmation of the party's threat to the leader.
Domestic investigative journalism database - Verified 21.08.2026
Ćurčić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Beograd: CINS.
určić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Belgrade: CINS.
- What the source records
- The party finance base shows the exceptional resource strength of SNS compared to competitors.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that the organization possesses the money and capacity that preserve the system and can outlive the individual campaign.
- Source limitation
- “Financial strength alone does not prove the autonomy of the executives or the intention to oppose the leader.
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