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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
Go to the general AUTLASExplore general mechanisms of authoritarian systems without the Serbia evidence layer.

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AVtokratija›How the system changes public administration and public services
50
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

Why do capable people leave institutions - and why are employees not solely responsible for the decline of public administration?

Confidence in the conclusionquite substantiated, with important conditions
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources4
Period201226

Capable people leave when their work no longer depends on knowledge and results, but on political obedience, and there is no safe way to point out the problem. Some leave the institution, some move to a less visible place, and many remain silent because they have a family, credit and few other jobs.

Each departure further burdens the remaining employees and increases the power of personnel willing to adapt, so the deterioration only accelerates. That is why bad administration is not the sum of “bad officials”. It can be the product of rules that reward silence, punish professional objection and deny people real choice. In order to distinguish the political cause from a small salary or private reasons, one should monitor who is leaving, after what kind of event, who is progressing.

Example from SerbiaChecked connection 4 sources; waiting for saturation pass
4 related sources; Serbia not yet logged on Saturation Pass

Capable people from institutions leave when they see that professional opinion is ignored, that progress depends on the relationship, that the salary is weak or that they bear the responsibility for the signature without the right to decide. Those who remain work in rules that they did not make themselves: with a lack of people, temporary leadership and political demands. That is why the deterioration of the administration is not a moral flaw of all employees, but a consequence of a system that punishes independence and consumes expertise.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01Established fact

Reports on public administration reform record problems with staff retention, measurable employment, officials and limited participation of the expert public in decision-making.

02Our interpretation

The bad system makes a negative choice: the most adaptable are more easily advanced, the most skilled have more alternatives to leave, and overworked officials become the face of decisions they could not change.

03Does it show the same process?

Yes to the institutional mechanism; the precise reasons for departure differ between professions and people.

04Important caveat or alternative explanation

Employees retain personal responsibility for unlawful conduct. Understanding pressure is not an excuse for abuse, but an explanation of why the problem is not solved by simply replacing individuals.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

People leave because of salary, family or private plans. The political cause should be shown through the time of departure, different treatment and testimony.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

surveys in several countries

Schuster, C. i dr. (2022), „Exit, Voice, and Sabotage: Public Service Motivation and Guerrilla Bureaucracy in Times of Unprincipled Political Principals“, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32(2): 416–435.

Contribution to this answer
In a large survey of Brazilian civil servants, the authors show that people with a stronger motivation to work in the public interest are not necessarily the ones who will suffer the most from problematic political orders: they are more willing to try to stop them, but also to leave the job if they have to carry them out. The institution can thus lose precisely the people who care about its public task the most.
Open source ↗
A02

review more research

Dahlström, C. i Lapuente, V. (2022), „Comparative Bureaucratic Politics“, Annual Review of Political Science 25: 43–63.

Contribution to this answer
Shows why the quality of the institution cannot be explained only by the quality of individual employees: political control, professional autonomy and the rules under which bureaucracy systematically affects corruption, development and quality of services. People work within a structure that can make their professional conduct easier or more difficult.
Open source ↗
A03

review more research

Pepinsky, T. B., Pierskalla, J. H. i Sacks, A. (2017), „Bureaucracy and Service Delivery“, Annual Review of Political Science 20: 249–268.

Contribution to this answer
Pepinsky, Pierscalla and Sacks also shift the focus from “good and bad officials” to the organizational and social context in which they work. The quality of service depends on the institution, the relationship with citizens and the way in which the bureaucracy is incorporated into society, and not only on the personal ability or will of the employee.
Open source ↗
A04

comparing several countries or cases

Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), „Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding“, Perspectives on Politics.

Alon-Barkat, S., Gilad, S., Kosti, N. i Shpaizman, I. (2025), “Career Civil Servants’ Socially Embedded Responses to Democratic Backsliding,” Perspectives on Politics.

Contribution to this answer
The authors show how democratic backsliding can only produce the loss of people from the institution: those who see change as a threat expect more politicization and less professional influence, more often they want to leave and see less sense in trying to change things from the inside. In subsequent monitoring, the intention of leaving was also related to the actual departure from the service.
Open source ↗
A05

comparing several countries or cases

Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), „Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention“, Public Money & Management 46(4).

Staroňová, K., Rybář, M. i Spáč, P. (2026), “Anticipating Illiberalism: Drivers of Bureaucratic Turnover Intention”, Public Money & Management 46(4).

Contribution to this answer
Staroová, Ryb and Spáč find a particularly worrying pattern: when they expect an illiberal government and a conflict over professional integrity, highly motivated and principled officials are more likely to think about leaving rather than staying and resisting. Thus, political change can weaken the institution even before anyone formally dismisses employees.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Regional NGO monitoring of public administration - Verified 21.08.2026

WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkan PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.

WeBER 2.0 / European Policy Centre. 2023. Western Balkans PAR Monitor 2021/2022. Belgrade: European Policy Centre.

What the source records
For Serbia, there are persistent gaps between formal reform and the experience of citizens and officials, especially in employment, transparency and accountability.
Claim it supports
The claim that poor rules of retention, promotion and decision-making push professional people to leave and burden employees with responsibility without autonomy.
Source limitation
The regional methodology gives a comparison, but does not explain every institution or every bad result with political pressure.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026

European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.

What the source records
At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
Claim it supports
The claim that poor rules of retention, promotion and decision-making push professional people to leave and burden employees with responsibility without autonomy.
Source limitation
Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Open source ↗
S03

Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026

European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.

What the source records
The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
Claim it supports
The claim that poor rules of retention, promotion and decision-making push professional people to leave and burden employees with responsibility without autonomy.
Source limitation
The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Open source ↗
S04

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929

Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 1939. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929

What the source records
The work links the weakening of democracy with the rules and economic incentives that enable the authorities to turn public resources into a political advantage.
Claim it supports
The claim that poor rules of retention, promotion and decision-making push professional people to leave and burden employees with responsibility without autonomy.
Source limitation
It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

Many sources. Clear methodology. Verifiable answers.

AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research findings into clear answers to the questions people ask when trying to understand elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life in an authoritarian system.

01

Based on academic research

The answers are based on relevant academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms. AUTLAS connects findings from scholarly articles, books, and comparative studies and presents them in language accessible to the wider public.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from civil society organizations, independent institutions, professional associations, investigative media, and other relevant sources. General findings and evidence from Serbia are presented separately.

03

Sources open to scrutiny

Each answer lists the sources used. Visitors can check which research, data, and reports underpin the conclusions. The authors of the research and the organizations that collected the data remain clearly credited.

04

Why questions?

Knowledge about authoritarian systems is scattered across scholarly papers, books, databases, and reports. AUTLAS organizes it through 100 questions in 20 areas, so people can start with a phenomenon they recognize and understand the wider system to which it belongs.

05

Focus on the system, not on blaming people

Authoritarian systems change the rules, narrow the range of choices, raise the cost of refusal, and create the impression that nothing can change. AUTLAS therefore analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms - rather than blaming people trying to live and work within such a system.

06

Who is behind AUTLAS?

AUTLAS and AVtokratija were conceived and are being developed by Civic Initiatives. Civic Initiatives is the author and editor of the website and is responsible for topic selection, treatment of sources, and presentation. The content is updated and corrected in line with new research and reliable data.

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