Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How does a leader learn what is really happening if everyone below tells them only what they want to hear?
The leader has a problem because people below him are afraid to report failure, corruption or dissatisfaction. The higher the punishment for bad news, the more beautiful the reports on the way to the top become, so the authorities can be well informed about the citizens, and poorly informed about their own work.
That’s why it uses multiple channels: elections, polls, complaints, inspections, local party reports, secret services and sometimes limited public criticism. This information can help fix the problem or put pressure more precisely. But no channel solves the matter if its employees also embellish the numbers or if the top punishes the finding it does not like. A reliable information system requires the possibility that the bearer of bad news survives what it has discovered.
There is no public evidence to show what the President of Serbia really knows at all times. Nevertheless, the centralized system creates a reason for lower managers to embellish the results, not to mention the failure and convey what they believe the top wants to hear. The top therefore tries to check information through polls, services, party networks, media and direct contacts, but the more he punishes the bad news, the less reliable all channels are.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Studies of personalization, clientelistic networks and security overlap describe multiple parallel channels of information; management reports note dependent appointments that encourage compliance.
Centralization brings a lot of data to the leader, but reduces the quality: the subordinates have more reason to hide the problem, and the leader is increasingly difficult to distinguish support from fear and the actual result from the staged report.
Partially the incentive structure is substantiated, but the content of the secret reports and the leader’s personal knowledge are not available.
This is an explanation of a probable information problem, not a claim about the psychological state of a particular person. Without documents or testimony, we do not know what information has reached the top.
A lot of research comes from China and other well-organized authoritarian systems. The same channels do not have to work in a country that collects less data or punishes the bearers of bad news.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Egorov, G., Guriev, S. i Sonin, K. (2009), „Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media“, American Political Science Review 103(4): 645–668.
Egorov, G., Guriev, S. i Sonin, K. (2009), "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media", American Political Science Review 103(4): 645–668.
- Contribution to this answer
- Egorov, Guriev and Sonin explain why the dictator sometimes intentionally suffers from freer media even though they are politically annoying: without independent information, it is difficult to know whether his officials are really doing the job or just reporting to him what he wants to hear. The media can thus be the instrument by which the top control its own bureaucracy.
Detailed analysis of one or several cases
Lorentzen, P. (2014), „China’s Strategic Censorship“, American Journal of Political Science 58(2): 402–414.
- Contribution to this answer
- Lorentzen shows why authoritarian authorities can allow investigative journalism on local issues: it exposes corruption, mismanagement and dissatisfaction that otherwise lower levels might hide. But this same information becomes dangerous if it shows citizens that discontent is broad and helps them to coordinate.
analysis of institutions in China
Truex, R. (2016), Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Truex shows how the Chinese government uses controlled representation as another channel of information: MPs can transfer the needs of citizens and push solutions to politically insensitive problems, while the border is set where representation could turn into political competition. Thus, the government receives feedback without opening the whole system.
Explain how the system works
Wallace, J. (2022), Seeking Truth and Hiding Facts: Information, Ideology, and Authoritarianism in China, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wallace shows why even a huge amount of government data does not automatically solve the information problem: when an employee’s progress is tied to several desirable numbers, they have a reason to beautify those numbers. The top can therefore build a sophisticated system of measurement and at the same time become blind to problems that do not fit into what it wants to measure and reward.
Detailed analysis of one or several cases
Blaydes, L. (2011), Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Blaydes shows that even a controlled election can give the upper hand information about its own elites: in Egypt, the ability of party people to limit the opposition result served as a signal of their political ability and loyalty, while the election game helped the regime decide who deserved access to positions and rents.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
- What the source records
- "The paper links presidencialization with the immediate election of the president, weaknesses in constitutional design, proportional elections and oligarchic parties.
- Claim it supports
- Limited claim that centralization and dependent appointments encourage beautification of bad news, while the top builds more parallel checking channels.
- Source limitation
- It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- Limited claim that centralization and dependent appointments encourage beautification of bad news, while the top builds more parallel checking channels.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.
- What the source records
- At the end of 2021, officials accounted for 52% of the highest official positions, so temporary appointments became a common way of retaining political control.
- Claim it supports
- Limited claim that centralization and dependent appointments encourage beautification of bad news, while the top builds more parallel checking channels.
- Source limitation
- Follows the top of the state administration until 2021 and does not show that every acting person is unskilled or politically obedient.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- Limited claim that centralization and dependent appointments encourage beautification of bad news, while the top builds more parallel checking channels.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Is a relevant source missing? Send it to us.
Suggest a source or report an error in this answer →