Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How do bots, organized networks, and algorithms make a message seem larger and more popular than it is?
Bots and organized networks can give the same message the appearance of mass and spontaneous support. A large number of orders repeat the same claims, artificially raise the mark among popular topics, attack critics and bury the conversation so that the actual participants withdraw. The platform algorithm can then further spread content that already receives a lot of reactions, regardless of whether they are authentic.
The important effect is not just persuasion, but creating the impression that “everybody thinks so”, that opposition is lonely or that public speaking will bring an attack. However, high visibility is not the same as changing opinions, and bot detection tools are wrong. The claim seeks evidence of a harmonized time, content and account network, as well as the careful separation of an organized campaign from actual popularity.
Organized accounts, party activists and algorithms can make the same message seem like the spontaneous mood of thousands of people. In Serbia, network accounts and coordinated commenting have been repeatedly linked to the promotion of power and attacks on critics, while television dominance spills over into social networks. The number of repetitions does not only measure support; it measures organizational money, access and the ability to take up space.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Domestic and international research records coordinated pro-government networks and digital harassment, and media monitoring shows content that such networks can further amplify.
The algorithm rewards attention, so organized initial activity can attract real users and turn an artificial signal into a real political effect.
To a significant extent coordination has been documented on several occasions, but the identity and ordering party of each order is not known.
The popular message is not automatically the result of bots, and the party activist is not necessarily a fake account. Patterns of time, content, network connections and behavior are required to assert coordination.
Programs that recognize bots and organized networks can be wrong. The high visibility of the message also does not prove that people have changed their minds.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
Explain how the system works
Schlumberger, O., Edel, M., Maati, A. i Saglam, K. (2024), „How Authoritarianism Transforms: A Framework for the Study of Digital Dictatorship“, Government and Opposition 59(3): 761–783.
- Contribution to this answer
- The paper shows how digital technologies can increase the ability of authoritarian authorities to monitor, direct and shape political communication, but it does not specifically study how bots or coordinated networks artificially increase the popularity of a message. Here is a wider framework of digital authoritarianism.
research that checks more closely what the cause is
Milli, S. i dr. (2025), „Engagement, user satisfaction, and the amplification of divisive content on social media“, PNAS Nexus 4(3): pgaf062.
- Contribution to this answer
- Milli and co-authors show very concrete what the algorithm itself can do: ranking according to engagement gives more visibility to emotionally charged and politically divisive content than a chronological representation, even when users themselves do not say that they want such content more. The message may therefore seem more important simply because the system rewards it with a greater range.
research that checks more closely what the cause is
Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K., Doan, T. N. i Crockett, M. J. (2021), „How Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks“, Science Advances 7(33): eabe5641.
Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K., Doan, T. N. i Crockett, M. J. (2021), "How Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks", Science Advances 7(33): eabe5641.
- Contribution to this answer
- Brady and the co-authors show another mechanism of reinforcement: when the expression of moral indignation receives more social rewards likes, shares and other reactions people learn to repeat it more often. Thus, the network itself can produce more and more content that looks like a broad and intense mood of the public.
study of Iran and international technology firms
Conduit, D. (2025), „Digital Authoritarianism and the Global Technology Industry: Evidence from Iran“, Government and Opposition 60(3): 751–772.
- Contribution to this answer
- Conduit shows how global technology companies can enable authoritarian regimes to have sophisticated digital control and operations, but the work is not about bots, algorithmic rankings or artificial creation of popularity messages.
review more research
Roberts, M. E. (2020), „Resilience to Online Censorship“, Annual Review of Political Science 23: 401–419.
- Contribution to this answer
- Roberts studies when people manage to bypass Internet censorship and give up on it. This is important for digital information space, but does not explain the mechanism of bots, coordinated amplification or algorithmic popularity.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Technology Platform Report Technical Attribution of the Network - Verified 21.08.2026
Nimmo, Ben, Margarita Franklin, David Agranovich, Lindsay Hundley i Mike Torrey. 2023. Meta Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report, Q4 2022. Menlo Park: Meta.
Nimmo, Ben, Margarita Franklin, David Agranovich, Lindsay Hundley and Mike Torrey. 2023. Meta Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report, Q4 2022. Menlo Park: Meta.
- What the source records
- The target has removed 5,374 Facebook accounts, 12 groups and 1,060 Instagram accounts from a network that has created the appearance of widespread spontaneous support for the president and the SNS and criticized the opposition.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that coordinated orders and the media ecosystem can create the illusion of mass spontaneous support and intensify the attack on critics.
- Source limitation
- The platform sees only the activities on its own services and publishes the conclusions of the internal investigation, without a complete set of data that independent researchers could repeat as a whole; the findings do not measure the conclusiveness or electoral performance of the network.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Monitoring finds that more than half of the time intended for political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television broadcasts and almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that coordinated orders and the media ecosystem can create the illusion of mass spontaneous support and intensify the attack on critics.
- Source limitation
- The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Dragojlov, Aleksandra. 2026. “Influence of Political Clientelism on Media Freedom under Vučić and the Progressive Party.” Nationalities Papers 54(2): 391–407. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2025.25
Dragojlov, Aleksandra. 2026. “Influence of Political Clientelism on Media Freedom under Vucic and the Progressive Party.” Nationalities Papers 54(2): 39107. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2025.25
- What the source records
- The paper concludes that subtle mechanisms of indirect control undermined media freedom despite the formal adoption of new laws.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that coordinated orders and the media ecosystem can create the illusion of mass spontaneous support and intensify the attack on critics.
- Source limitation
- It is focused on the media sector and relies partly on a limited number of professional interviews.
Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026
Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.
Civic Initiatives. 2025. Citizens’ Associations narrowing the space for action 2024. Belgrade: Civic Initiatives.
- What the source records
- Based on the standardized regional matrix and bi-weekly reports, 234 cases of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms were registered, with an increase in physical and verbal attacks and other pressures compared to the previous year.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that coordinated orders and the media ecosystem can create the illusion of mass spontaneous support and intensify the attack on critics.
- Source limitation
- The records include documented and reported cases, and not a representative rate of all incidents in Serbia, while the organization at the same time has a clear role of protecting the civil space.
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