Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Can the same technology help both governments control people and citizens resist them?
It can, because the same feature of technology gives opportunity to citizens and authorities. The phone allows quick connection, recording of abuse, sharing instructions and gathering of people who did not know each other before. At the same time it leaves the location, contacts and communication pattern that can help the authorities to recognize the organizers, monitor the network or stop access.
The public of a platform increases the range of the message, but also the visibility of the participants; encryption protects the content, but does not have to hide who communicated with whom. The outcome is not determined by the application itself, but by the relationship of abilities, rules and customization of both parties. The more permanent question is who can see, connect and break communication, how quickly people can change the channel and what is the cost of error for the citizen in relation to the government.
Phone, camera and social network have dual use. The state can use them to monitor contacts and identify protest participants, but citizens record police actions, keep evidence, coordinate assistance and quickly inform the public. In Serbia, both are seen during the protest: the digital footprint increases the ability of citizens to prove the event, but at the same time leaves data that can be used against them.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Civil space reports record civil documentation and digital harassment, while Amnesty and SHARE demonstrate the state’s ability to access devices and data.
Technology does not choose sides; an advantage is given to an actor with better access to infrastructure, legal protection, technical knowledge and the ability to turn data into a public consequence.
Yes double use is visible, but the balance of power changes from platform, event and security practice.
Recording and publishing can compromise privacy, source or investigation. Civil protection requires secure storage, authentication and thoughtful disclosure, not just more data.
Platforms change quickly. More lasting conclusions talk about visibility, connecting and recognizing people, not about one application or company.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Feldstein, S. (2021), The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology Is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Feldstein describes the “digital paradox”: the same technologies that make it easier for people to communicate, access information and connect give the authorities new opportunities to monitor, censor, manipulate and target punishment. The outcome is therefore not determined by the technology itself, but by the relationship of political power and capacity of those who use it.
data from a large number of countries
Xu, X. (2021), „To Repress or to Co-opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance“, American Journal of Political Science 65(2): 309–325.
- Contribution to this answer
- Xu shows one side of this relationship very well: the technology of the government allows it to more accurately distinguish opponents from other citizens and thus make the repression more targeted. The work, however, does not examine how citizens use the same technology for resistance.
research that checks more closely what the cause is
Roberts, M. E. (2018), Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Roberts shows that digital control is never completely one-sided: citizens can often technically bypass roadblocks, use alternative channels or seek out forbidden information. The government is therefore trying not only to build them a wall, but also to increase the effort, risk and price required to cross it.
review more research
Chenoweth, E. (2021), Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Chenoweth shows what allows citizens to create political power from below: mass and diverse participation, coordination, tactical adaptability, resistance to repression and the transition of people from the regime. This well explains what communication technology can make easier, but the book is not a study of digital technology as such.
review more research
Han, H., Baggetta, M. i Oser, J. (2024), „Organizing and Democracy: Understanding the Possibilities for Transformative Collective Action“, Annual Review of Political Science 27: 245–262.
- Contribution to this answer
- Han, Baggetta and Oser make an important difference between simply mobilizing a large number of people and organizing that builds relationships, skills, leadership and a lasting ability to act together. That is why a large number of followers or viral publication is not the same as political power capable of surviving after the attention of the Internet disappears.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
International Organization for Human Rights Forensic Research - Verified 21.08.2026
Amnesty International. 2024. A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the Suppression of Civil Society in Serbia. London: Amnesty International.
- What the source records
- The report documents cases of unlocking phones and installing spyware during police or security conversations, as well as consequences for civil society.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the same device and digital footprint can serve state monitoring, but also civil documentation, coordination and protection of evidence.
- Source limitation
- Forensic findings are strong for the analyzed devices, but the number of cases is not a measure of distribution in the entire population; the authorities have disputed the allegations of illegal work.
Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026
Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.
Civic Initiatives. 2025. Citizens’ Associations narrowing the space for action 2024. Belgrade: Civic Initiatives.
- What the source records
- Based on the standardized regional matrix and bi-weekly reports, 234 cases of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms were registered, with an increase in physical and verbal attacks and other pressures compared to the previous year.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the same device and digital footprint can serve state monitoring, but also civil documentation, coordination and protection of evidence.
- Source limitation
- The records include documented and reported cases, and not a representative rate of all incidents in Serbia, while the organization at the same time has a clear role of protecting the civil space.
Domestic NGOs legal analysis of digital surveillance - Verified 21.08.2026
SHARE Foundation. 2026. Digital Forensics Tools: Legal Framework Analysis — Serbia. Belgrade: SHARE Foundation.
SHARE Foundation. 2026. Digital Forensics Tools: Legal Framework Analysis Serbia. Belgrade: SHARE Foundation.
- What the source records
- The analysis concludes that Serbian law does not provide grounds for the use of digital forensic tools outside the criminal proceedings or without a court order.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the same device and digital footprint can serve state monitoring, but also civil documentation, coordination and protection of evidence.
- Source limitation
- Legal analysis determines what is allowed, and it can not prove on its own who in each individual case ordered or conducted illegal surveillance.
Domestic NGOs analysis of the political crisis - Verified 21.08.2026
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 2025. Political and Institutional Crisis in Serbia: Possible Scenarios. Belgrade: BCSP.
- What the source records
- The analysis describes mass mobilization and growing repression, but concludes that the size of the protests does not alone address the issue of organization, choice and division within the government.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that the same device and digital footprint can serve state monitoring, but also civil documentation, coordination and protection of evidence.
- Source limitation
- Scenario analysis is time-sensitive and does not predict the future; it is based on information available until November 2025.
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