Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Who really controls our data, networks, and surveillance technology?
Technology control is not only found in the application that the citizen sees. It is important who manages the telephone and internet network, population and documents databases, cameras, biometric systems and centers in which the data is connected.
A private company can sell equipment, the second is to maintain it, the civil service to ask for data, and the security authority to have secret technical access. Therefore, responsibility is easily dissipated between several participants. Ownership of the company or network in itself is not a complete control, but it is a part of the power map. To know who really controls the data, it is necessary to determine who collects them, who can technically search and merge them, on what legal basis, who records the abuse and whether there is independent.
Data of citizens of Serbia pass through state registers, police and services, operators, platforms and private technology suppliers. Formally there are laws, court orders and the Commissioner, but the citizen often does not know who accessed the data, what tool was purchased and whether the use left a verifiable trace. Digital forensics cases show that the actual control is determined not only by ownership of the base, but also by access to the device, contract and chain of command.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Amnesty and SHARE describe the technical and legal paths of digital surveillance, Citizen Lab international suppliers, and domestic monitoring of poor transparency of procurement and security surveillance.
Data control is divided, but uneven: the citizen produces the data, the company keeps it, and the state authority can seek or extract access to various levels of external control.
Yes sources show a complex chain of actors and serious gaps in transparency.
Security procurements and investigations justifiably contain secrets. Secrecy does not, however, eliminate the need for a court order, internal records, supervision of an independent body and subsequent liability.
Ownership of the network or company is not the same as complete control. It is necessary to know who has the technical access, legal authority and the actual possibility of use.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Feldstein, S. (2021), The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology Is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Feldstein shows that digital repression is not only a matter of what the government wants to do, but also what it can and can do technically. Different countries combine domestic capacities, imported technology, platforms and private suppliers, so the control of digital space arises through the entire ecosystem, and not just in one state service.
data from a large number of countries
Xu, X. (2021), „To Repress or to Co-opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance“, American Journal of Political Science 65(2): 309–325.
- Contribution to this answer
- Xu shows what happens when the state manages to turn digital data into politically useful information: it can identify opponents much more accurately and direct repression towards them. The accumulation of data in itself is not a power it is crucial who has the institutions and the capacity to turn them into a decision and sanction.
Explain how the system works
Schlumberger, O., Edel, M., Maati, A. i Saglam, K. (2024), „How Authoritarianism Transforms: A Framework for the Study of Digital Dictatorship“, Government and Opposition 59(3): 761–783.
- Contribution to this answer
- The authors show that technology changes authoritarian power only when it is incorporated into a broader political system institutions, surveillance, data, repression and information management. Therefore, the question of “who controls the technology” cannot be reduced to just the owner of the server or the camera; it is important who controls the entire chain in which data is transformed into political power.
comparing several countries or cases
Tansey, O. (2016), The International Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Oxford University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Tansey shows that the authoritarian government does not need all the resources for control to produce itself: external actors can give it money, weapons, political protection or other support that reduces the cost of repression and other authoritarian actions. This gives a broader international framework, but the book is not specific about data or surveillance technology.
Analysis of international cash flows and impacts
Cooley, A. i Heathershaw, J. (2017), Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia, Yale University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Cooley and Heathershaw show how much authoritarian power can rely on infrastructure outside of one’s own country banks, lawyers, intermediaries, foreign courts, lobbyists and financial centers. This is very important for understanding the international ecosystem of authoritarian government, but it is not research into digital data, networks or surveillance technology.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
International Organization for Human Rights Forensic Research - Verified 21.08.2026
Amnesty International. 2024. A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the Suppression of Civil Society in Serbia. London: Amnesty International.
- What the source records
- The report documents cases of unlocking phones and installing spyware during police or security conversations, as well as consequences for civil society.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that access to data and surveillance is shared by a chain of state authorities, private suppliers and platforms, with insufficiently visible traces of responsibility.
- Source limitation
- Forensic findings are strong for the analyzed devices, but the number of cases is not a measure of distribution in the entire population; the authorities have disputed the allegations of illegal work.
Domestic NGOs legal analysis of digital surveillance - Verified 21.08.2026
SHARE Foundation. 2026. Digital Forensics Tools: Legal Framework Analysis — Serbia. Belgrade: SHARE Foundation.
SHARE Foundation. 2026. Digital Forensics Tools: Legal Framework Analysis Serbia. Belgrade: SHARE Foundation.
- What the source records
- The analysis concludes that Serbian law does not provide grounds for the use of digital forensic tools outside the criminal proceedings or without a court order.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that access to data and surveillance is shared by a chain of state authorities, private suppliers and platforms, with insufficiently visible traces of responsibility.
- Source limitation
- Legal analysis determines what is allowed, and it can not prove on its own who in each individual case ordered or conducted illegal surveillance.
University laboratory technical research - Verified 21.08.2026
Citizen Lab. 2021. Pegasus vs. Predator: Dissident’s Doubly-Infected iPhone Reveals Cytrox Mercenary Spyware. Toronto: Munk School, University of Toronto.
- What the source records
- Scans have listed Serbia among the likely users of Predator infrastructure, showing the international market of tools that give countries secret surveillance capabilities.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that access to data and surveillance is shared by a chain of state authorities, private suppliers and platforms, with insufficiently visible traces of responsibility.
- Source limitation
- The network infrastructure indicates a likely user, but it does not prove itself who used the tool in Serbia, against whom and with what legal basis.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- Claim that access to data and surveillance is shared by a chain of state authorities, private suppliers and platforms, with insufficiently visible traces of responsibility.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
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