Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How do those in power create support, bind important people to themselves, and intimidate opponents at the same time?
Power survives by offering different people a different relationship. The general public tries to show results, legality, national role or the absence of a safe alternative. It gives important business, party and security groups positions, contracts and access to decision-making, which ties their interest to the survival of power.
Opponents are punished or intimidated so that the price of organizing increases for those who are not yet directly affected. These strategies often overlap: the same subsidy can be real help, a reward for support and a warning that it will disappear after a political change. Therefore, it is not enough to ask whether people are “loving” or “fearing”. One should see who gets what, what choice really has and what happens to whoever tries to refuse the offered relationship.
The government in Serbia combines three different relationships. It offers real projects and a picture of stability to a wide audience; it gives important party, business and institutional actors positions, contracts and access; it increases the price of critics through mudslinging, pressure, inspection or loss of opportunity. The system survives because it does not have to convince everyone or scare everyone it is enough to offer each group an incentive that affects it.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Economic reports confirm part of the visible results, clientelism studies describe the co-optation of elites and voters, and reports on civic space and media document pressures against critics.
Support, cooperation, and fear are not opposite tools; together they reduce the number of people who want change, can organize it, or believe it is safe.
Yes different types of sources support all three parts, with different levels of precision.
Not every supporter receives a benefit nor is every critic a target. An example describes the distribution of incentives in the system, not the unique motive of millions of individuals.
Support, benefit and fear often work together and are difficult to measure separately. The same help can be a real benefit and a message that it will be lost without support.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Gerschewski, J. (2013), „The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes“, Democratization 20(1): 13–38.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gerschewski shows that long-term authoritarian power does not usually rest on one technique: it must justify its right to rule, to bind important people and groups to the system and to keep potential opponents under control. Legitimacy, co-optation and repression are therefore not three separate stories, but three pillars that can complement each other.
review more research
Gerschewski, J. (2023), The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Gerschewski goes a step further and shows that the same three means do not have to be connected everywhere in the same way: some autocracy intensively mobilizes society, emphasizes enemies and uses harder repression, while keeping other citizens satisfied and politically passive, relying more on results and milder forms of control.
review more research
Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wintrobe shows why the dictator uses rewards and fear at the same time: privileges and rents help him to produce loyalty, while repression increases the price of opposition. Different dictatorships also differ in how much they rely on one side and how much they rely on the other side of the relationship.
comparing several countries or cases
Dukalskis, A. i Gerschewski, J. (2017), „What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation“, Contemporary Politics 23(3): 251–268.
Dukalskis, A. i Gerschewski, J. (2017), "What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation", Contemporary Politics 23(3): 251–268.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dukalskis and Gerschewski show that authoritarian authorities not only demand obedience, but also the reason why people would consider their government justified. They highlight four ways in which they try to do this indoctrination, political passivity, the results of government and calling for democratic procedures.
review more research
Davenport, C. (2007), „State Repression and Political Order“, Annual Review of Political Science 10: 1–23.
- Contribution to this answer
- Davenport shows that repression is not a constant violence against everyone: the government chooses when, according to whom and how much it will use surveillance, prohibitions, arrests or force, most often in relation to the political threat it sees. That is why intimidation can act selectively, while a large part of society experiences at the same time a completely different face of the same government.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
International Development Institution Economic Diagnostics - Verified 21.08.2026
World Bank. 2024. Serbia Country Economic Memorandum: Fostering Growth Through a More Diversified Industrial Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- What the source records
- The analysis acknowledges macroeconomic progress and investment-driven growth, but warns against dependence on subsidies, poor productivity and the need for stronger domestic institutions and competition.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government is simultaneously building support for the results, binds important actors with benefits and increases the cost of the critics’ actions.
- Source limitation
- Economic diagnostics does not measure authoritarianism and cannot interpret every subsidy as political control.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociologija 58(2): 239–252. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
Cvejić, Slobodan. 2016. “On Inevitability of Political Clientelism in Contemporary Serbia.” Sociology 58(2): 23952. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602239C
- What the source records
- The paper describes clientelist networks that connect party tops, economy, public sector and voters in a weak institutional environment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government is simultaneously building support for the results, binds important actors with benefits and increases the cost of the critics’ actions.
- Source limitation
- It is based on qualitative interviews and theoretical synthesis; it does not measure the frequency of every practice in the entire population.
Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026
Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.
Civic Initiatives. 2025. Citizens’ Associations narrowing the space for action 2024. Belgrade: Civic Initiatives.
- What the source records
- Based on the standardized regional matrix and bi-weekly reports, 234 cases of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms were registered, with an increase in physical and verbal attacks and other pressures compared to the previous year.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government is simultaneously building support for the results, binds important actors with benefits and increases the cost of the critics’ actions.
- Source limitation
- The records include documented and reported cases, and not a representative rate of all incidents in Serbia, while the organization at the same time has a clear role of protecting the civil space.
Domestic NGOs qualitative election research - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2022. Preliminarni izveštaj o izbornom nasilju i korupciji. Beograd: CRTA.
CRTA. 2022. Preliminary report on electoral violence and corruption. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes repeated patterns of reward and punishment towards fixed-term employees, party members, poor and other dependent groups.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government is simultaneously building support for the results, binds important actors with benefits and increases the cost of the critics’ actions.
- Source limitation
- The deliberate and “snowball” pattern is not representative and the statements are not the same as the legally established facts in any case.
Is a relevant source missing? Send it to us.
Suggest a source or report an error in this answer →