Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How do those in power divide society into the 'real people' and 'enemies' and use that division to justify greater power?
When the government presents itself as the only authentic voice of the “real people”, the political opponent is no longer just someone with a different program. He becomes a traitor, a foreign mercenary, a dangerous minority or an enemy of the community. Then the denial of his rights can seem like the defense of the majority, and institutions that limit the leader as obstacles to the popular will.
The division also binds supporters to power: the admitted mistake of its side begins to resemble the betrayal of its own identity. However, identities and fears are not only invented from above; they can have a real history and different meaning for different people. Abuse is seen when the government translates any criticism into hostility and uses that label to justify unequal rights, punishment and removal of control.
In Serbian political speech, critics often present themselves not as legitimate opponents with a different program, but as traitors, foreign mercenaries, thieves or enemies of the state. Thus, the ruling majority identifies with the ‘people’, and the control of the government looks like an attack on the community. When an opponent loses the status of an equal citizen, it is easier to justify media inequality, pressure and circumvention of the rules.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Scientific analyses of populism, parliamentary speech and political caricatures, as well as monitoring of the media and civic space, document the division into morally clean people and dangerous opponents. The “Croatia II dossier” follows the label of “Ustaše” as a means of dehumanization, and FemPlatz shows how the same logic towards women at the protests is further sexualized and attacks their legitimacy in public.
The division turns a political dispute into a struggle for survival. If the other side is the enemy, the restriction of power can be portrayed as weakness and compromise as betrayal.
Yes the form of speech and its institutional use are well documented.
Sharp rhetoric also exists in democracies and is used by various actors. Authoritarian risk grows when it is systematic, comes from the top of the state and is accompanied by unequal power of media, institutions and sanctions.
Identity is not a fabrication that government simply imposes. It can be profound and real, and the effect of government depends on the audience and other stories that exist in society.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
long-term direct monitoring of political life
Wedeen, L. (1999), Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, University of Chicago Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wedeen shows how regime symbols and rituals determine what can be said publicly and what kind of loyalty is expected. This can help the authorities to mark the boundaries of acceptable political behavior, but the book is not primarily a study of the division of society into a “real people” and a political enemy.
comparing several countries or cases
Dukalskis, A. i Gerschewski, J. (2017), „What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation“, Contemporary Politics 23(3): 251–268.
Dukalskis, A. i Gerschewski, J. (2017), "What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation", Contemporary Politics 23(3): 251–268.
- Contribution to this answer
- Dukalskis and Gerschewski show that autocracy builds stories about why they have the right to rule and how citizens should understand the political order. This is a good framework for the legitimation function of political narratives, but their four mechanisms are not specifically the theory of division into “people” and “enemies”.
review more research
Paglayan, A. S. (2026), „Education as a Political Institution“, Annual Review of Political Science 29: 525–546.
- Contribution to this answer
- Paglayan shows how education can shape political values, national identity and social order and why states invest in indoctrination. This explains how a certain image of the political community can be transmitted through the school, but does not prove specifically the strategy of creating an internal enemy.
research that checks more closely what the cause is
Cantoni, D. i dr. (2017), „Curriculum and Ideology“, Journal of Political Economy 125(2): 338–392.
- Contribution to this answer
- Cantons and co-authors give strong evidence that changing the curriculum can change the political attitudes of students: China’s reform has increased positive assessments of state governance and changed attitudes towards democracy and the market. This shows that the state can shape political attitudes through education, but does not study the division of society into “us” and “them”.
data from a large number of countries
Neundorf, A., Nazrullaeva, E., Northmore-Ball, K., Tertytchnaya, K. i Kim, W. (2024), „Varieties of Indoctrination: The Politicization of Education and the Media around the World“, Perspectives on Politics 22(3): 771–798.
- Contribution to this answer
- Neundorf and co-authors show that regimes use different combinations of education and media to politicize what citizens learn and hear. This explains the infrastructure of indoctrination well, but it is broader than the concrete strategy of labeling a part of society as an enemy.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Stojiljković, Zoran, i Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populistički Zeitgeist u ‘proevropskoj’ Srbiji.” Politička misao 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
Stojiljković, Zoran, and Dušan Spasojević. 2018. “Populist Zeitgeist in ‘Pro-European’ Serbia.” Political Thought 55(3): 104–128. https://doi.org/10.20901/pm.55.3.04
- What the source records
- The paper shows that populism in Serbia has several forms and can be merged with a broad, ideologically expansive party.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that critics present themselves as enemies of the people and the state, making inequality and greater power of government easier to justify as protection of the community.
- Source limitation
- He studies populism and parties, and does not independently prove that the political system is authoritarian.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Ugarković, Uroš. 2023. “What Is Parliamentarism to Populists? The Populist Redefinition of the Concept of Parliamentarism in Parliamentary Debates in Post-Milošević Serbia.” Redescriptions 26(2): 160–175. https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.403
Ugarković, Uros. 2023. “What Is Parliamentarism to Populists? The Populist Redefinition of the Concept of Parliamentarism in Parliamentary Debates in Post-Milosevic Serbia.” Redescriptions 26(2): 1605. https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.403
- What the source records
- The author finds that the centralization of executive power and the weakening of government control are accompanied by an attempt to present parliamentary subordination as normal parliamentaryism.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that critics present themselves as enemies of the people and the state, making inequality and greater power of government easier to justify as protection of the community.
- Source limitation
- Analyzing speech and congregational practices, it does not measure the whole regime or all the centers of power.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vladisavljević, Nebojša, i Aleksandra Krstić. 2023. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Populism in Serbia Under Vučić in Political Cartoons.” Europe-Asia Studies 75(9): 1429–1452. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2149700
Vladisavljević, Nebojša, and Aleksandra Krstić. 2023. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Populism in Serbia Under Vučić in Political Cartoons.” Europe-Asia Studies 75(9): 142952. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2149700
- What the source records
- The paper shows how unequal political match, media freedom and populist personalization are presented together in public criticism of the authorities.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that critics present themselves as enemies of the people and the state, making inequality and greater power of government easier to justify as protection of the community.
- Source limitation
- Caricatures are a critical cultural source and cannot replace the direct measurement of institutions or attitudes of the entire population.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Monitoring finds that more than half of the time intended for political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television broadcasts and almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that critics present themselves as enemies of the people and the state, making inequality and greater power of government easier to justify as protection of the community.
- Source limitation
- The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Domestic NGOs exploratory qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026
FemPlatz. 2025. Između megafona i tišine: žene u borbi za promene. Pančevo: FemPlatz.
FemPlatz. 2025. Between megaphone and silence: women in the fight for change. Pančevo: FemPlatz.
- What the source records
- Analyzes sexist targeting, media representation and dehumanizing messages to women participating in the protests.
- Claim it supports
- It shows that the mark of the enemy may have a gender-specific form that further challenges the legitimacy of women’s political participation.
- Source limitation
- The sample is not representative, the research is exploratory, and the database of incidents is not intentionally complete; the findings show patterns and experiences, not their frequency in the entire population.
Domestic NGOs documented case study - Verified 21.08.2026
Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava. 2026. Dosije Hrvatska II: Proterivanje, targetiranje i drugi primeri kršenja ljudskih prava građana i građanki Hrvatske u Srbiji. Beograd: YIHR Srbija.
Youth Initiative for Human Rights. 2026. File Croatia II: Expulsion, targeting and other examples of violations of human rights of Croatian citizens in Serbia. Belgrade: YIHR Serbia.
- What the source records
- Analyzes how the label “Ustaše” is used against Croatian citizens and domestic political opponents.
- Claim it supports
- Gives the case of turning a national label into a label of an internal enemy that justifies greater institutional and media power.
- Source limitation
- It documents certain affected persons and the media pattern; it does not show that all foreign citizens are treated equally or that Serbia systematically persecutes its own critics abroad.
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