Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why are only a few people punished at times, while an entire group is targeted at others?
The government chooses the extent of punishment according to the information it has, the type of threat and the political price. If it knows who organizes others, punishing a few visible people can scare a much wider circle with less public resistance. Such a precise punishment also preserves the possibility that the government claims that the problem is not political.
When he does not know who is crucial, when he wants to break ties within the entire community or to send a collective message, the pressure becomes wider and affects family members, the workplace, the settlement or the entire organization. A wide punishment can be effective, but also more expensive because it creates more victims and possible allies of resistance. Therefore, the case should be described specifically: who was affected, what measure, at what point and whether the goal is to isolate the organizers or punish the affiliation of the group.
The government in Serbia often selects several visible targets journalists, organizers, whistleblowers or employees who refuse pressure because one sentence can send a message to a wider group. It strikes the whole group when it assesses that the organization itself represents the infrastructure of resistance, as in campaigns against critical media, NGOs or universities. The choice depends on whether it wants to isolate the ‘guilt’ or break the network that gives it support.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Reports on civil space, media and political pressures record both targeted cases and wider campaigns against entire professions or organizations.
Selective punishment saves resources and preserves the illusion of normality; collective pressure is used when individual intimidation is not enough or when solidarity turns a target into a symbol.
Yes both strategies are documented, but the intention is most often deduced from the form, not from the published command.
Multiple simultaneous procedures do not prove automatically coordinated campaign. It is necessary to check the joint message, time, actors, legal basis and disproportion.
The boundaries between these types of punishment are not harsh. Each case should be described according to who was hit, when, what and to what extent.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Davenport, C. (2007), „State Repression and Political Order“, Annual Review of Political Science 10: 1–23.
- Contribution to this answer
- Davenport shows that repression is not an automatic reaction to any opposition: the government assesses the political threat, its own capabilities and the price of different responses. That is why the intensity of repression varies, but his review shows more how complex the choice is than one rule gives, which determines in advance who the target will be.
data from a large number of countries
Bhasin, T. i Gandhi, J. (2013), „Timing and Targeting of State Repression in Authoritarian Elections“, Electoral Studies 32(4): 620–631.
- Contribution to this answer
- Bhasin and Gandhi show very clearly that the government chooses who and when to repress. Before the authoritarian elections, it strikes more often opposition leaders and activists who directly threaten its result, while sparing ordinary voters whose votes and appearance of legitimacy are still needed; the pressure on citizens grows more easily after the elections.
Explain how the system works
Ritter, E. H. i Conrad, C. R. (2016), „Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression“, American Political Science Review 110(1): 85–99.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ritter and Conrad show that targeting also depends on what the authorities did before the opposition became visible. Preventive repression is already “filtering” part of potential opponents, so the people we see protesting are not a random pattern they are often the ones that earlier obstacles failed to stop.
review more research
Earl, J. (2003), „Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression“, Sociological Theory 21(1): 44–68.
- Contribution to this answer
- Earl shows that the question of “whom the government is repressing” cannot be separated from what kind of repression it uses: different measures can be directed at an individual, an organization or a wider movement and can come from the state or other actors. For just explaining why a narrow or broad target is chosen, however, work is more a conceptual framework than a direct answer.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows that the extent of repression also depends on what kind of apparatus the government has made. Better information services can more easily identify specific opponents and use targeted repression; a fragmented apparatus designed primarily to prevent a coup has weaker information and incentives that can lead to wider and less selective violence.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026
Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.
Civic Initiatives. 2025. Citizens’ Associations narrowing the space for action 2024. Belgrade: Civic Initiatives.
- What the source records
- Based on the standardized regional matrix and bi-weekly reports, 234 cases of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms were registered, with an increase in physical and verbal attacks and other pressures compared to the previous year.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government chooses several visible targets for intimidation, and increases the pressure when it wants to weaken the entire organizational network.
- Source limitation
- The records include documented and reported cases, and not a representative rate of all incidents in Serbia, while the organization at the same time has a clear role of protecting the civil space.
Domestic journalistic association monitoring of attacks - Verified 21.08.2026
Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospektiva 2025: godina u kojoj je pritisak postao sistem. Beograd: NUNS.
Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospective 2025: the year in which pressure became a system. Belgrade: NUNS.
- What the source records
- NUNS recorded 371 cases, including 113 physical attacks and 165 threats, along with legal, economic and digital forms of pressure.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government chooses several visible targets for intimidation, and increases the pressure when it wants to weaken the entire organizational network.
- Source limitation
- The register depends on the reported and documented cases, it can overlap with other databases and does not measure the experience of every journalist.
Domestic NGOs analysis of the political crisis - Verified 21.08.2026
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 2025. Political and Institutional Crisis in Serbia: Possible Scenarios. Belgrade: BCSP.
- What the source records
- The analysis describes mass mobilization and growing repression, but concludes that the size of the protests does not alone address the issue of organization, choice and division within the government.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government chooses several visible targets for intimidation, and increases the pressure when it wants to weaken the entire organizational network.
- Source limitation
- Scenario analysis is time-sensitive and does not predict the future; it is based on information available until November 2025.
Domestic NGOs annual monitoring of human rights - Verified 21.08.2026
Beogradski centar za ljudska prava. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Urednik Dušan Pokuševski. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Editor Dušan Pokuševski. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The twenty-eighth annual report documents systemic pressures and violations of rights in 2025 and brings together data from institutions and sectoral organisations on the prosecution of protest participants and incidents towards journalists.
- Claim it supports
- The claim that the government chooses several visible targets for intimidation, and increases the pressure when it wants to weaken the entire organizational network.
- Source limitation
- The report follows the rights and institutional treatment, not the type of regime; part of the numerical data is taken from state authorities and other organizations and should be read with their original records.
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