Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How do we know that elections are no longer enough for a country to be democratic?
Elections are necessary for democracy, but they are not enough. The country is not really democratic if the opposition is allowed to be on the ballot, but it cannot freely organize, finance, speak in the media, protect its people from pressure and take power when it gets more votes.
It is important all the way to the elections and after them: who sets the rules, who uses state money, whether the courts resolve the objections independently and whether the defeated government accepts the result. Therefore, democracy is measured not only by counting the votes, but also by the rights, freedom of information, equal rules and the real uncertainty of the outcome. If the government can lose only on paper, the elections more confirm the existing power than they control it.
In the elections in Serbia, voters receive more lists and votes are mostly counted in front of observers, but the game starts much earlier. ODIHR and CRTA record huge visibility of the government, misuse of public function and resources, pressures on a part of voters and inefficient protection of electoral law. Elections therefore remain important, but are not enough if one side enters the race for months with an advantage that the other can not realistically achieve.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Observers for 2023 confirmed the political alternatives and the orderly implementation of many procedures, as well as unequal conditions, media dominance of the president and the ruling party and serious irregularities.
Democratic choice is not only the exact sum of the ballots. Free choice is needed without blackmail, sufficient information, equal access to voters and effective procedure when the rule is broken.
Yes the example clearly shows the difference between the existence of elections and the democratic quality of the entire electoral process.
Irregular condition does not automatically mean that every vote is false or that the result can be exactly reversed. The claim is about systemic advantage and freedom of choice, not about calculating the hypothetical winner.
The division into ‘democracy’ and ‘non-democracy’ simplifies reality. It can hide how quickly, deeply and in what areas the country is going backwards.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
Development and verification of measurement methods
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), „Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited“, Public Choice 143: 67–101.
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. i Vreeland, J. R. (2010), "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited", Public Choice 143: 67–101.
- Contribution to this answer
- Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland show that it is not enough for elections to exist: the real possibility of the current government losing and leaving office is key. The regime with elections can still be a dictatorship if this shift is not real.
comparison of different types of systems
Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), „Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective“, Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.
Wahman, M., Teorell, J. i Hadenius, A. (2013), "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective", Contemporary Politics 19(1): 19–34.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius show how broad the category of electoral authoritarian regimes is: holding multi-party elections does not remove major differences in actual competition and power distribution.
Development and verification of measurement methods
Teorell, J. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „Beyond Democracy–Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789–2016“, Perspectives on Politics 17(1): 66–84.
- Contribution to this answer
- Teorell and Lindbergh show that direct elections can only be one of several sources of executive power. To understand the regime, we must also look at party, army, inheritance or parliamentary responsibility, and not just the electoral procedure.
review more research
Brancati, D. (2014), „Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects“, Annual Review of Political Science 17: 313–326.
- Contribution to this answer
- Brancati explains why autocrats organize elections and build parties and assemblies: these institutions can give them information, distribute benefits and stabilize the regime, so their existence is not evidence of democratic control of the government.
review more research
Little, A. T. i Meng, A. (2024), „What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding“, PS: Political Science & Politics 57(2): 224–229.
Little, A. T. i Meng, A. (2024), "What We Do and Do Not Know about Democratic Backsliding", PS: Political Science & Politics 57(2): 224–229.
- Contribution to this answer
- Little and Meng warn that different standards of democracy and autocracy can give different images of the same case. Disagreement and measurable uncertainty should therefore be openly displayed, not hidden behind a single label.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Official election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The monitoring mission noted the real choice of political alternatives, but also the decisive participation of the president, the systemic advantages of the government, media bias, pressures and misuse of public resources.
- Claim it supports
- The most detailed official source for the 2023 elections distinguishes an orderly count from an unequal campaign and pressures.
- Source limitation
- Proves the quality of one electoral process, not independently the entire type of regime or all the events after February 2024.
Domestic NGOs election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report – 2023. Beograd: CRTA Election Observation Mission.
CRTA. 2024. Final Election Observation Report 2023. Belgrade: CRTA Election Observation Mission.
- What the source records
- CRTA estimates that the elections were not free and fair and recorded serious irregularities in 13% of the polling stations observed in the parliamentary and 21% in the Belgrade elections, with documented pressures, institutional passivity and organized migration of voters.
- Claim it supports
- CRTA’s parallel monitoring provides domestic data on the campaign, election day and protection of electoral law.
- Source limitation
- The finding refers to one election cycle and represents an expert assessment of the domestic observation mission, not a court ruling or independent classification of the entire regime.
Domestic NGOs systematic media monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2025. Media Monitoring of Political Pluralism: Government in Focus, Opposition Almost Invisible. Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- Monitoring finds that more than half of the time intended for political actors went to the president, who had 354 live television broadcasts and almost exclusively neutral or positive treatment.
- Claim it supports
- The systematic measurement of the media shows the advantage of the power that arises before the vote.
- Source limitation
- The sample includes the central news of five national TV stations, but does not measure all media, the entire program offer, the audience or the direct impact of such reporting on voting.
Domestic NGO ten-year monitoring synthesis - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2026. A Decade of Election Observation: Is Everything the Same, Worse, or Better? Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- “The synthesis concludes that the key electoral problems have not been solved and that many have deepened, with a ten-year deletion of the border between the state and the ruling party.
- Claim it supports
- The ten-year synthesis confirms that the problem is not limited to one election cycle.
- Source limitation
- It is a short institutional retrospective, not a new methodological report; the claims should be checked in the individual election reports on which the synthesis is based.
Domestic NGO campaign financing monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Povećanje nesrazmere među akterima, procena ukupne vrednosti kampanje i preliminarni izveštaji: monitoring izbora 2023. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija.
Transparency Serbia. 2024. Increase of disproportion among stakeholders, estimate of total campaign value and preliminary reports: monitoring of elections 2023. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- Transparency Serbia in the 2023 campaign records the use of public resources, intensive official campaign, large financial disproportion and lack of timely reaction of supervisory authorities.
- Claim it supports
- Monitoring shows that equality of elections is determined even before the election day access to money, public function and effective supervision.
- Source limitation
- The report is preliminary and refers to a single campaign; part of the findings are estimates and reasonable doubts, not legally determined infringements.
Domestic investigative journalism a specific case - Verified 21.08.2026
Milosavljević, Ivana, Teodora Ćurčić i Vladimir Kostić. 2023. CINS Inside SNS’s Call Center: Hostess Agency, Vote Buying, and Millions in Cash. Beograd: CINS.
Milosavljević, Ivana, Teodora určić and Vladimir Kostić. 2023. CINS Inside SNS’s Call Center: Hostess Agency, Vote Buying, and Millions in Cash. Belgrade: CINS.
- What the source records
- CINS recorded the work of a large SNS col-centre, cash payments and job offer related to voting through covert direct observation, documents and interviews.
- Claim it supports
- The specific case supports the claim that freedom of choice also depends on the absence of vote buying, pressure and misuse of personal data.
- Source limitation
- The investigation documents one operation and serious doubts, but it is not a judicial epilogue or proof that the same practice is carried out everywhere.
Domestic investigative journalism database - Verified 21.08.2026
Ćurčić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Beograd: CINS.
určić, Teodora. 2024. Party Funds Database: SNS, the Financially Strongest Political Party in Serbia. Belgrade: CINS.
- What the source records
- CINS database on financial statements of 40 political actors monitors revenues and expenditures 2015-2023 and shows a very large long-term material advantage of SNS.
- Claim it supports
- The long-term base shows that the formal right of all lists to participate does not mean that they have approximately equal material opportunities to reach voters.
- Source limitation
- The database shows the reported finances; part of the imbalance results from the election results and the current rules, while the unreported flows are not fully visible.
Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
- What the source records
- Nations in Transit monitors the electoral process together with the media, local democracy, judiciary and corruption, and notes the long-standing deterioration of electoral equality in Serbia.
- Claim it supports
- Multiannual monitoring confirms that democratic quality depends not only on the counting of votes, but also on the media, rights, supervision and the possibility of dismissal.
- Source limitation
- Expert assessment shows a trend, but does not determine how much individual irregularity would change the election result.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The European Commission monitors the implementation of the recommendations of the ODIHR, the Parliament, the media, the judiciary and institutional protection and notes the persistent weaknesses of the electoral environment and accountability.
- Claim it supports
- The official international review confirms that democratic elections are assessed throughout the institutional path before and after the vote.
- Source limitation
- The report is an annual monitoring of the accession process and cannot reconstruct every event in the elections or a hypothetical winner.
Official international election monitoring - Full official report reviewed
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 2024. Observation of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Serbia (17 December 2023). Doc. 15895.
- What the source records
- He observes the entire process and finds that despite a technically regulated voting day and political alternatives, pressures, media bias and systemic advantages have created unfair conditions.
- Claim it supports
- Directly substantiates the claim that election day is not enough: campaigning, information, resources, freedom of choice and legal remedies are important.
- Source limitation
- PACE shares part of the findings with the joint mission of ODIHR; it is a triangulation of the same cycle, not a new event.
Official political and institutional document of the EU - Viewed adopted text and official explanation
European Parliament. 2024. Resolution of 8 February 2024 on the Situation in Serbia Following the Elections. P9_TA(2024)0075.
- What the source records
- Document the political assessment of irregularities, media inequality and insufficient institutional response after the elections.
- Claim it supports
- It adds the post-election part of the cycle: democracy requires investigation, legal remedies and sanctions, not just the publication of results.
- Source limitation
- The resolution is a political document and does not constitute an independent monitoring base.
Independent international monitoring of media pluralism - Viewed official country page and available full report
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.
- What the source records
- Finds a very high risk of political independence of the media and bias in local campaigns during 2025.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the information requirement of democratic elections and shows that the problem is not limited to the 2023 campaign.
- Source limitation
- It does not count how the votes would change without media bias.
Local media network local survey and field research - Full report and methodology reviewed
Cvejić, Bojan, i ANEM. 2026. Indikatori stanja lokalnih medija u Srbiji za 2025. godinu: studija slučaja osam gradova i opština i jednog regiona.
Cvejić, Bojan, and ANEM. 2026. Indicators of the state of local media in Serbia for 2025: case study of eight cities and municipalities and one region.
- What the source records
- Local journalists in several cities are seeing a deterioration in freedom, security and access to information, with political and economic pressures.
- Claim it supports
- Adds a local perspective on the conditions in which citizens receive information before and between elections.
- Source limitation
- The sample is not representative for all local media or voters.
Domestic research organization systematic analysis of online media - Full report and methodology reviewed
Bajić, Mila, Snežana Bajčeta i SHARE Fondacija. 2024. Izbori 2023. na informativnoj margini: analiza predizborne kampanje u onlajn medijima.
Bajić, Mila, Snezana Bajčeta and SHARE Foundation. 2024. Elections 2023. on the information margin: analysis of the election campaign in online media.
- What the source records
- On 10,772 central online text it finds that only 17% of the content was about elections, analytics 7.8%, and debate framework 1%.
- Claim it supports
- Proves that the formal existence of elections is not enough if the most influential online space does not provide comparable information and argumentative debate.
- Source limitation
- It includes 15 portals and their most prominent positions, not all online content.
Local NGO comparative analysis of public media financing - Viewed full report and publicly available documentation described in methodology
Res Publika. 2025. Propaganda vs. javni interes: analiza projektnog finansiranja i medijskog pluralizma u lokalnim zajednicama.
Res Publika. 2025. Propaganda vs. public interest: analysis of project funding and media pluralism in local communities.
- What the source records
- In five local communities, it documents how public funding can support promotional content and narrow local pluralism.
- Claim it supports
- It connects the electoral conditions with the infrastructure between the elections: who survives financially and what kind of content citizens get at the local level.
- Source limitation
- One competition cycle in five environments does not describe all local media.
Local NGO monitoring of local election campaign - View full report and official summary
Transparentnost Srbija. 2024. Lider novog sveta: raspisuj lokalno, plaši globalno — monitoring lokalnih izbora 2. juna 2024.
Transparency Serbia. 2024. Leader of the new world: publish locally, scare globally monitoring of local elections 2 June 2024.
- What the source records
- In 90 local units monitors the official campaign, media, public resources, financing and reactions of competent authorities during the 2024 elections.
- Claim it supports
- Expands evidence beyond one national cycle and shows why equality of choice is also measured through local use of function and resources.
- Source limitation
- The same manufacturer already exists in the matrix; this is a new report, but not a new independent organization.
Primary source official regulatory monitoring of media - Full official report, methodology and end tables
Regulatorno telo za elektronske medije (REM). 2025. Izbori 2023 — završni izveštaj monitoringa pružalaca medijskih usluga.
Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM). 2025. Elections 2023 final report of monitoring of media service providers.
- What the source records
- Official regulatory data shows a high dominance of the list of authorities on commercial broadcasters and a high share of state officials in election media time.
- Claim it supports
- Gives primary evidence that the formal representation of all lists does not mean equal visibility and informational conditions.
- Source limitation
- REM methodology and delayed publication require comparison with ODIHR, CRTA and other monitoring.
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