Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How can democracy disappear even though the constitution and elections formally remain in place?
Democracy can disappear without a day in which it was officially abolished. The government can keep the constitution, elections, courts and assembly, and then change them so that they are increasingly limiting those who rule.
This is done through unequal electoral conditions, political influence on the courts and the prosecution, pressure on the media, abuse of state resources and laws that are applied more strictly to opponents than to allies. Citizens still vote, but the opposition can increasingly be organized, reach out to voters, protect votes and really take power. Therefore, the formal existence of democratic institutions is not enough; it is crucial whether they create a real possibility of control, accountability and peace.
Serbia still has a constitution, multi-party elections, courts, assembly and independent bodies. However, the multi-year national and international monitoring notes that the government is entering the electoral match with a great media and resource advantage, that parliamentary oversight is weak, and that institutions that need to control the government often do not provide effective accountability. That is why the Serbian example shows how democratic institutions can remain visible, while gradually vacating their ability to govern.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
In 2023, ODIHR noted the real choice of political alternatives, but also the decisive advantage of government, pressure and misuse of public resources; domestic monitoring of parliament, media and security sector finds a similar gap between the formal institution and its control function.
"It is not only crucial that the institution exists, but that the opposition can compete equally, that the court and the prosecution can act against the powerful and that the assembly and independent bodies can force the executive to answer.
Yes formal institutions survive, but multiple sources note the weakening of their real control power.
Serbia is not a closed dictatorship: the opposition, critical media, protests and court decisions continue to exist. The claim is therefore about a gradual authoritarian backlash and inequality, not about the complete disappearance of all democratic spaces.
International grades show the general direction well, but they differ and are sometimes late for events. Therefore, more sources and concrete facts should be used.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
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Bermeo, N. (2016), „On Democratic Backsliding“, Journal of Democracy 27(1): 5–19.
- Contribution to this answer
- Bermeo shows that democracy today often disappears gradually: the executive power expands its powers and changes election rules through formal legal steps, while institutions and elections still exist.
data from a large number of countries
Lührmann, A. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?“, Democratization 26(7): 1095–1113.
Lührmann, A. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), "A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?", Democratization 26(7): 1095–1113.
- Contribution to this answer
- Lhrmann and Lindbergh show that the modern wave of autocracy is mostly undergoing gradual losses of democratic qualities under elected authorities, while retaining the electoral facade.
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Waldner, D. i Lust, E. (2018), „Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding“, Annual Review of Political Science 21: 93–113.
- Contribution to this answer
- Waldner and Lust treat democratic backwardness as a change within the existing regime, not as a single moment of transition. That is why democracy can be seriously thinned before it is obvious that the type of regime has been changed.
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Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2021), Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Haggard and Kaufman show how the limitations of executive power, the rights and integrity of political competition can be gradually eroded through a series of moves by elected power, without formally abolishing the constitution or elections.
comparison of different combinations of conditions
Maerz, S. F. (2020), „The Many Faces of Authoritarian Persistence“, Government and Opposition 55(1): 64–87.
- Contribution to this answer
- “Maerz is a more circumstantial source here: it shows that existing autocracy can survive through different combinations of repression, co-optation and legitimation, but it does not directly study the transition from democracy to autocracy.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 161738. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
- What the source records
- The author concludes that Serbia under Vucic has returned to competitive authoritarianism through gradual rather than abrupt regime change.
- Claim it supports
- The work follows a gradual change of regime type and shows that formal democratic institutions can survive while their actual function weakens.
- Source limitation
- The classification depends on the thresholds chosen and the data for the most part precedes the 2020-2025 elections.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346
- What the source records
- The paper claims that the control of parliament has enabled the further takeover of independent institutions and continued democratic backlash since 2012.
- Claim it supports
- Analysis of the legislative takeover shows how control of parliament transfers political dominance to other bodies.
- Source limitation
- Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Official election monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
OSCE/ODIHR. 2024. Republic of Serbia: Early Parliamentary Elections, 17 December 2023 — Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The monitoring mission noted the real choice of political alternatives, but also the decisive participation of the president, the systemic advantages of the government, media bias, pressures and misuse of public resources.
- Claim it supports
- ODIHR also confirms the existence of political alternatives and the deep inequality of conditions in the 2023 elections.
- Source limitation
- Proves the quality of one electoral process, not independently the entire type of regime or all the events after February 2024.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
Open Parliament. 2025. Annual Report on the work of the XIV Assembly of the National Assembly, February 2024 April 2025. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
- Claim it supports
- Parliamentary monitoring records weak control of the executive branch and procedures that narrow the actual debate.
- Source limitation
- It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
International scientific base and report - Verified 21.08.2026
Nord, Marina, David Altman, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, i Staffan I. Lindberg. 2026. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling the Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, dataset v16.
- What the source records
- V-Dem measures elections, political freedoms, the rule of law and the limitations of executive power through the time series and ranks Serbia as an electoral autocracy in the ongoing episode of autocracy in 2025.
- Claim it supports
- The long-term decline in multiple indicators reinforces the claim that formal elections and institutions can survive while their ability to limit power weakens.
- Source limitation
- The indicators are based on expert assessments and thresholds; they do not prove each individual event or the exact moment of regime change.
International expert report - Verified 21.08.2026
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2026. BTI 2026 Serbia Country Report. Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
- What the source records
- At the same time, BTI 2026 is considering elections, the rule of law, parliament, the judiciary, governance and political integration, and considers Serbia a moderate autocracy.
- Claim it supports
- The finding that formal institutions exist with the practical domination of the president and the SNS supports the distinction between the existence of the institution and its actual control power.
- Source limitation
- It is a periodic expert assessment with its own methodology, not a peer-reviewed study that isolates a single cause.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- For the same period, the European Commission notes weak electoral conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, political pressure on the judiciary and problems in the media and civil society.
- Claim it supports
- Sectoral findings show that the gap between formal rules and effective control does not arise only in one institution.
- Source limitation
- The report is part of the EU accession process and describes the situation by sector; it does not give a unified scientific classification of the regime.
Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
- What the source records
- Nations in Transit follows elections, media, local authorities, judiciary, corruption and civil society with the same methodology over time and records a decline in several areas.
- Claim it supports
- “The long-term parallel decline in areas confirms that it is not just one bad decision or one election cycle.
- Source limitation
- Expert reports show a trend, but the individual claim should be checked with a sectoral or primary source.
Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.
- What the source records
- Coalition prEUgovor documents the concentration of power, institutional abuse, pressures on the judiciary, media control and lack of reforms in several areas of Cluster 1.
- Claim it supports
- Domestic multisectoral monitoring substantiates the claim that formal institutions can remain in place while accountability and division of power weaken in practice.
- Source limitation
- It is an advocacy half-year monitoring of the coalition; each claim should be read with documents and sectoral examples to which it refers.
Domestic NGOs annual monitoring of human rights - Verified 21.08.2026
Beogradski centar za ljudska prava. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Urednik Dušan Pokuševski. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Editor Dušan Pokuševski. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The Belgrade Centre for Human Rights monitors the legal framework and the application of rights during 2025 and documents pressures on the judiciary, protests, journalists and civil society.
- Claim it supports
- The report shows the difference between formally guaranteed rights and effective protection when citizens, media and institutions are under pressure.
- Source limitation
- The report monitors the rights and institutional conduct, and does not specify the type of regime; it takes some of the data from authorities and other sectoral organizations.
The International Longitudinal Democratic Index - Viewed official website, methodological framework and Serbia profile
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Last updated: September 2025.
- What the source records
- “It shows that Serbia formally remains in the middle range, but that credible elections and an effective parliament have significantly weakened over time.
- Claim it supports
- “It supports the claim that the constitution, parliament and elections can survive while their real democratic impact is diminishing.
- Source limitation
- The index measures the trend and dimensions, not the legal validity of each act.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed
European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.
- What the source records
- “Continued constitutional reform of the judiciary, but also high political pressure, weak oversight of parliament and problems of independent bodies.
- Claim it supports
- Directly demonstrates the coexistence of formal reforms and weakened implementation of control institutions.
- Source limitation
- The report does not prove that any formal reform is empty or unsuccessful.
Official international election monitoring - Full official report reviewed
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 2024. Observation of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Serbia (17 December 2023). Doc. 15895.
- What the source records
- Finds real political alternatives and mostly respected basic freedoms, but also unfair conditions, pressures, media bias and weak supervisory authorities.
- Claim it supports
- “It shows most clearly that formally held and technically regulated elections are not enough for full democratic control.
- Source limitation
- It shares part of the observation material with ODIHR and refers to a single cycle.
International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed
OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.
- What the source records
- Finds well-developed formal frameworks of administration, but poor transparency of decision-making, acting officials and exceptions in procurement and investment.
- Claim it supports
- Wider mechanism of erosion beyond choice: rules exist, but liability can be weakened through the method of application and exceptions.
- Source limitation
- The data ends in mid-2024 and does not represent every institution in the same detail.
Independent international monitoring of media pluralism - Viewed official country page and available full report
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.
- What the source records
- The high risk of political independence of the media and the dysfunctional REM Council coexist with the formal media laws and a large number of media.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the claim that the formal institution and the plural offer are not the same as effective independent control.
- Source limitation
- Media assessment does not measure all other branches of government.
Domestic NGOs institutional and judicial monitoring - Full report and methodology reviewed
Mandić, Sofija, i CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council: 2025.
Mandic, Sofia, and CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutory Council: 2025.
- What the source records
- Finds that the legal obligations of the public exist, but a number of recommendations to the judicial councils are unfulfilled or partially fulfilled.
- Claim it supports
- Shows how an institution can formally work and make decisions, yet leave important control information unavailable.
- Source limitation
- Transparency is not the only dimension of judicial independence.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. 2026. Report on the work of the Commissioner for 2025.
- What the source records
- Notes that the Commissioner’s decisions are mostly implemented, but that a fifth of the orders for the submission of information remain unexecuted.
- Claim it supports
- Gives primary evidence that an independent institution formally exists and operates, but that its ability to force organs to act is not complete.
- Source limitation
- The Commissioner’s cases do not include all types of control by the authorities.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2026. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2025. godinu.
Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia. 2026. Regular annual report of the Protector of Citizens for 2025.
- What the source records
- Establishes thousands of violations of rights, but also a high rate of action according to the recommendations of the Protector of Citizens.
- Claim it supports
- Protecting an important fence: Democratic erosion does not mean that every institution has disappeared or never produces a corrective effect.
- Source limitation
- A single organ cannot represent the state of the entire control system.
Primary source annual report of the state anti-corruption body - Viewed full official report and tables
Agencija za sprečavanje korupcije Republike Srbije. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
Agency for Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Serbia. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
- What the source records
- It shows that the formal adoption of local anti-corruption plans is much broader than the establishment of appropriate supervisory bodies.
- Claim it supports
- Gives a prime example of how a democratic and anti-corruption mechanism can remain incomplete even though the document formally exists.
- Source limitation
- It does not measure the actual performance of every established body.
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