How do many small changes turn into a completely different system?
Many small changes become a new system when each of them facilitates the next. If the government weakens the media first, the citizens have a harder time finding out about later abuses; if it then affects the courts and the prosecution, these abuses have a harder time getting legal consequences; if it then uses public resources in elections, it is easier to win a new mandate and get time for further changes.
A single move may seem technical, temporary or not big enough to cause resistance, but their totality changes the balance of power. It is important therefore to look at the direction and connection between decisions: whether different changes repeatedly reduce the possibility of power being checked, limited or dismissed. The transition to authoritarian power is often a process of accumulating advantages, not a dramatic break.
There was not a day in Serbia when elections, parliament, media, administration and security services suddenly changed their character. Sources record a number of separate changes: increasing media dominance of the government, weaker parliamentary oversight, appointments that depend on political will, pressure on voters and selective responsibility. Each move facilitates the next, so what individually looks like a technical omission over time becomes a system in which the government is more difficult to check and remove.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Scientific papers and ten-year monitoring of the elections follow a gradual, cumulative decline; reports by sectors show that problems in parliament, media, administration and control of public authority are piling up in the same period.
The sum is more important than any individual decision: media imbalance reduces the visibility of abuses, poor control reduces the consequences, and electoral advantage gives time for new changes.
Yes the Serbian case is an example of change through the accumulation of interrelated advantages.
Not every bad reform can be attributed to a single plan. Inherited weaknesses, ignorance and administrative capacity also exist; the authoritarian pattern is seen only when the changes persistently go in the same direction and use the same side.
There is no single order in which every democracy weakens. The same move can be much more dangerous if other protections have already been removed.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Waldner, D. i Lust, E. (2018), „Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding“, Annual Review of Political Science 21: 93–113.
- Contribution to this answer
- Waldner and Lust show why a series of small institutional changes should be viewed together: democratic decline is caused by the accumulation of changes in competition, participation and responsibility, not necessarily by a single dramatic event.
data from a large number of countries
Lührmann, A. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), „A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?“, Democratization 26(7): 1095–1113.
Lührmann, A. i Lindberg, S. I. (2019), "A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?", Democratization 26(7): 1095–1113.
- Contribution to this answer
- Lhrmann and Lindbergh find that modern autocracy most often takes place through a gradual reduction of democratic rights and restrictions, so individual steps may seem small as their sum changes regime.
review more research
Grillo, E., Luo, Z., Nalepa, M. i Prato, C. (2024), „Theories of Democratic Backsliding“, Annual Review of Political Science 27: 381–400.
- Contribution to this answer
- Grillo, Luo, Nalepa and Prato classify theories of backwardness according to whether the government is attacking electoral competition or expanding executive power and whether obstacles come from voters or horizontal institutions. This shows that small steps may belong to different but related erosion pathways.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows how democracy can be dismantled by a series of technical and formally legal changes that individually do not seem crucial, but together reshuffle appointments, jurisdictions and procedures in favor of the executive.
review more research
Lührmann, A. (2021), „Disrupting the Autocratization Sequence: Towards Democratic Resilience“, Democratization 28(5): 1017–1039.
Lührmann, A. (2021), "Disrupting the Autocratization Sequence: Towards Democratic Resilience", Democratization 28(5): 1017–1039.
- Contribution to this answer
- Lhrmann describes autocratization as a sequence with multiple stages and points at which the process may still be interrupted. This helps to read a number of minor changes as a related process rather than as isolated incidents.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 1617–1638. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
Castaldo, Antonino. 2020. “Back to Competitive Authoritarianism? Democratic Backsliding in Vučić’s Serbia.” Europe-Asia Studies 72(10): 161738. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1817860
- What the source records
- The author concludes that Serbia under Vucic has returned to competitive authoritarianism through gradual rather than abrupt regime change.
- Claim it supports
- A long series of indicators substantiate the claim that the change was cumulative, not related to one break.
- Source limitation
- The classification depends on the thresholds chosen and the data for the most part precedes the 2020-2025 elections.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
Pavlović, Dušan. 2020. “The Political Economy Behind the Gradual Demise of Democratic Institutions in Serbia.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 20(1): 1939. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1672929
- What the source records
- The work links the weakening of democracy with the rules and economic incentives that enable the authorities to turn public resources into a political advantage.
- Claim it supports
- Work connects institutional and economic changes that increase each other’s political performance.
- Source limitation
- It is a causal interpretation of a long process; it does not cover developments beyond 2019 and does not exclude other explanations.
Domestic NGO ten-year monitoring synthesis - Verified 21.08.2026
CRTA. 2026. A Decade of Election Observation: Is Everything the Same, Worse, or Better? Beograd: CRTA.
- What the source records
- “The synthesis concludes that the key electoral problems have not been solved and that many have deepened, with a ten-year deletion of the border between the state and the ruling party.
- Claim it supports
- Ten years of election observation shows the duration and deepening of the same imbalances.
- Source limitation
- It is a short institutional retrospective, not a new methodological report; the claims should be checked in the individual election reports on which the synthesis is based.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- Annual monitoring finds parallel problems in several institutions, so it allows checking their common direction.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
International scientific base and report - Verified 21.08.2026
Nord, Marina, David Altman, Tiago Fernandes, Ana Good God, i Staffan I. Lindberg. 2026. Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling the Democratic Era? University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, dataset v16.
- What the source records
- V-Dem time series for Serbia show changes over several years on electoral, liberal and other democratic indicators, not just one crucial decision.
- Claim it supports
- The long time series directly supports the claim that the change of the system is seen through the cumulative direction of a number of indicators.
- Source limitation
- Aggregate indicators may show direction and pace, but they do not establish that all changes were part of a single plan or explain each step.
Independent annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Burazer, Nikola. 2024. Serbia: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
- What the source records
- Nations in Transit through the same areas and annual cycles records how problems accumulate simultaneously in elections, media, local democracy, justice and corruption.
- Claim it supports
- A parallel multi-year trend shows that the sum of changes changes changes the system even when no single change is a complete break.
- Source limitation
- “Scores are expert and do not prove a causal link between every two moves; they are used to check trends and simultaneity.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, and Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
- What the source records
- BCSP links previous findings on police, services, the military and poor surveillance with institutional points that allow capture to be maintained even after personal changes.
- Claim it supports
- Sectoral findings show that the earlier weakening of supervision creates conditions for the next changes to be more easily fixed and survive the shift of the individual.
- Source limitation
- The study starts from the framework of the captured state and is focused on the security sector and reforms, so it does not cover all institutions equally.
Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.
- What the source records
- prEUgovor at one time connects the concentration of power, institutional abuses, pressures on the judiciary, control of the media, selective fight against corruption and the stalemate of reforms.
- Claim it supports
- Simultaneous domestic monitoring of several sectors shows how separate moves can have a common effect on the accountability and control of the authorities.
- Source limitation
- The report does not prove that every recorded event is centrally coordinated and has a clear reform and advocacy purpose.
Domestic NGOs anti-corruption parallel report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đorđević, Miloš, i Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Beograd: Transparentnost Srbija i UNCAC Coalition.
orđević, Miloš, and Nemanja Nenadić. 2023. Civil Society Report on the Implementation of UNCAC Chapters II and V in Serbia. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia and UNCAC Coalition.
- What the source records
- Transparency Serbia and the UNCAC Coalition find a broad formal anti-corruption framework, but weak, inefficient or selective application in political financing, procurement, conflict of interest and supervision.
- Claim it supports
- The distinction between a growing number of formal rules and their poor application reinforces the claim that a series of technical solutions can leave the same cumulative power relationship.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to UNCAC commitments and ends in mid-2023; it does not classify the regime and does not cover all subsequent events.
Domestic journalistic association monitoring of attacks - Verified 21.08.2026
Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospektiva 2025: godina u kojoj je pritisak postao sistem. Beograd: NUNS.
Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospective 2025: the year in which pressure became a system. Belgrade: NUNS.
- What the source records
- NUNS for 2025 records physical attacks, threats, legal, economic and digital pressures on journalists and describes pressure as a systemic pattern.
- Claim it supports
- The sectoral range of different forms of pressure shows how the accumulation of smaller and larger measures weakens the ability of the media to detect later abuses.
- Source limitation
- The register depends on the reported and documented cases, it can overlap with other databases and does not measure the experience of every journalist.
The International Longitudinal Democratic Index - Viewed official website, methodological framework and Serbia profile
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia — The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Poslednje ažuriranje: septembar 2025.
International IDEA. 2025. Serbia The Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Democracy Tracker. Last updated: September 2025.
- What the source records
- “Year after year shows declines in elections, parliament and freedoms, instead of a single date for the abolition of democracy.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the cumulative character of change across multiple dimensions and years.
- Source limitation
- It does not define the exact sequence of each individual reform.
International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed
OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.
- What the source records
- Through several areas of administration, it finds formalist reform management, poor coordination, acting officers and exceptions in procedures.
- Claim it supports
- Shows how a series of small management discrepancies can jointly weaken accountability and facilitate the next discrepancies.
- Source limitation
- The report does not claim that every failure is part of a central plan.
International Integrity and Anti-Corruption Practices Indicator - Viewed official Earth page and indicator data
OECD. 2026. Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Serbia.
- What the source records
- In a number of areas, it shows the differences between regulations and practice, especially in political financing.
- Claim it supports
- substantiates the claim that cumulation is seen when the same rule gapapplication is repeated in different control systems.
- Source limitation
- Different areas use different last available years.
Independent international monitoring of media pluralism - Viewed official country page and available full report
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), European University Institute. 2026. Media Pluralism Monitor 2026: Serbia.
- What the source records
- “For 2025, it links high risks in the protection, market, political independence and social inclusion of the media.
- Claim it supports
- Shows how the weakening of one part of the media system facilitates financial, regulatory and political pressures in other parts.
- Source limitation
- The interconnection of risks is not the same as the evidence of a linear causality.
Domestic NGOs institutional and judicial monitoring - Full report and methodology reviewed
Mandić, Sofija, i CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council: 2025.
Mandic, Sofia, and CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutory Council: 2025.
- What the source records
- The third consecutive monitoring cycle of judicial advice shows which recommendations remain unfulfilled, partially fulfilled or fulfilled.
- Claim it supports
- Gives a concrete example of how small process and information gaps accumulate over time.
- Source limitation
- Monitor transparency, not all consequences for the outcomes of the judiciary.
Local media network local survey and field research - Full report and methodology reviewed
Cvejić, Bojan, i ANEM. 2026. Indikatori stanja lokalnih medija u Srbiji za 2025. godinu: studija slučaja osam gradova i opština i jednog regiona.
Cvejić, Bojan, and ANEM. 2026. Indicators of the state of local media in Serbia for 2025: case study of eight cities and municipalities and one region.
- What the source records
- Comparing the same local media indicators for 2024 and 2025 and recording a deterioration in the overall score and multiple individual dimensions.
- Claim it supports
- Adds a measurable local example of cumulative deterioration, without reducing it to one incident.
- Source limitation
- Two-year comparison and small samples limit the long-term conclusion.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. 2026. Report on the work of the Commissioner for 2025.
- What the source records
- Shows repeated silence of the administration, non-execution and special problems of journalists and public companies in exercising the right to information.
- Claim it supports
- substantiates the claim that a lot of individual non-actions can together change the practical availability of institutional control.
- Source limitation
- Failure to comply with each decision can have a different cause.
Primary source annual report of the state anti-corruption body - Viewed full official report and tables
Agencija za sprečavanje korupcije Republike Srbije. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
Agency for Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Serbia. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
- What the source records
- The number of local plans is significantly higher than the number of appropriate bodies for monitoring their implementation.
- Claim it supports
- Shows how partial implementation over time creates a formally fulfilled, but operationally weak control.
- Source limitation
- The report does not follow all local activities after the adoption of the plan.
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