Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why does each institution become easier to weaken once the first one has been brought under control?
Institutions protect democracy as a connected system, not as separate islands. The media can detect abuse, the court can stop it, the assembly can ask for an explanation, the independent body collects data, and citizens and the opposition can turn the knowledge into political pressure.
When the government takes over or intimidates one of these institutions, they are left without an important source of information, support or a way for their decisions to be implemented. The next institution then pays a higher price if it opposes, because it knows it can remain alone. That is why taking control often accelerates itself. Still, the institution is not a protection just because it exists on paper: it needs people who can decide on their own, enough money and data, clear powers and public support when it comes under
When parliament poorly examines the executive power, it becomes easier to implement appointments and laws without serious debate. When the media is unequal, it is harder for citizens to find out what is changed by these appointments and laws; when the prosecution and other controls are weak, the detected abuses are less likely to result. In Serbia, therefore, pressures on different institutions cannot be understood separately: weakening one leaves the other without information, support or execution of their decisions.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
The Open Parliament has poor oversight and accelerated procedures, legislative takeover studies follow the appointments of other bodies, and reports on the security sector and the rule of law show how control is passed on.
“The institution is most vulnerable when it knows that if it opposes it will be left alone without media attention, parliamentary support, prosecutorial reaction or public pressure.
Yes the findings show interdependence, not a set of completely unrelated failures.
The link between weaknesses is not always directly proven for every decision. Here we cross-reference sectoral findings and therefore clearly separate documented facts from the interpretation of their common effect.
The institution does not limit power just because it exists. It needs independent people, money, powers and the support of society.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
review more research
Ginsburg, T. i Huq, A. Z. (2018), How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, University of Chicago Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ginsburg and Huq show that the constitutional brakes are not automatic: if one institution weakens, the executive power gets more room to influence the next, because the mechanisms of mutual control rely on each other.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows how one legal change can open the way for the following: rearrangement of appointments, procedures or jurisdictions changes who has the power to decide on the next institutional changes.
review more research
Haggard, S. i Kaufman, R. R. (2021), Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Haggard and Kaufman show that the gradual character of setbacks makes a coordinated response difficult: when the cost of each individual move seems limited, opponents tend to unite in time.
Detailed analysis of one or several cases
Laebens, M. G. i Lührmann, A. (2021), „What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability“, Democratization 28(5): 908–928.
- Contribution to this answer
- Laebens and Lhrmann give an important reverse proof: erosion can be stopped when horizontal, diagonal and vertical responsibility reinforce each other. This shows why the loss of one control center is important to defend the others.
comparison of different combinations of conditions
Panzano, G. i Tomini, L. (2026), „Unity Makes Strength: Patterns of Democratic Resistance against Autocratization“, European Journal of Political Research, First View: 1–26.
- Contribution to this answer
- Panzano and Tomini show that democratic resistance works best through combinations of institutional, political, social and external pressure. When these sources of resistance are separated or weakened, the government is easier to continue the next step.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346
- What the source records
- The paper claims that the control of parliament has enabled the further takeover of independent institutions and continued democratic backlash since 2012.
- Claim it supports
- Shows how parliamentary control opens the way for appointments and influence over other institutions.
- Source limitation
- Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
Open Parliament. 2025. Annual Report on the work of the XIV Assembly of the National Assembly, February 2024 April 2025. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
- Claim it supports
- Document the weakening of one key link parliamentary oversight and public debate.
- Source limitation
- It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- It shows how weak parliamentary and civilian control facilitates the political takeover of the security sector.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- It links findings on parliament, judiciary, independent bodies, media and civil society in the same period.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 954–979. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 95479. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
- What the source records
- Beširević analyzes the politically sensitive cases of the Constitutional Court and finds that a formally independent court in key disputes often chooses caution and formalism.
- Claim it supports
- Historical analysis shows that formal independence is not enough if the court does not have the practice and institutional strength to effectively limit political power.
- Source limitation
- The analysis covers 2001-2013 and refers primarily to the Constitutional Court, so it does not describe all the courts or the latest reforms.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, and Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
- What the source records
- BCSP identifies legal and institutional “grey zones” and veto points in the security sector and proposes strengthening external controllers that have previously been left without sufficient power.
- Claim it supports
- The study directly shows that weak parliamentary, civil and other external controls facilitate the takeover of institutions that are left without mutual protection.
- Source limitation
- The focus is on the security sector, so the finding cannot be automatically transferred to every independent institution.
Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.
- What the source records
- prEUgovor simultaneously records the concentration of power, pressure on the judiciary, weak anti-corruption responsibility, control of the media and institutional abuses.
- Claim it supports
- “The multisectoral review confirms the conclusion that institutions do not weaken like isolated islands and that the absence of one control increases the burden on others.
- Source limitation
- The common occurrence of weakness does not automatically prove a direct causal link between each of the two institutions.
Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparency Serbia and CINS.
- What the source records
- The study Transparency Serbia, CINS and Open Society European Policy Institute allocates seven mechanisms of political control of the judiciary, prosecution and police through 12 cases.
- Claim it supports
- Linking appointments, discretion, information and dysfunctional investigations shows how the weakness of one link facilitates the failure of the other.
- Source limitation
- Cases precede recent reforms and do not prove that every action today is politically controlled.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed
European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.
- What the source records
- At the same time, it connects weak parliamentary oversight, political pressures on the judiciary, REM problems and limited capacities of independent bodies.
- Claim it supports
- substantiates the claim of interdependence of controls: when more system guards weaken, each following has less institutional support.
- Source limitation
- The report does not establish a precise causal order between each of the two institutions.
International monitoring of public administration with indicators - Full report and methodology reviewed
OECD/SIGMA. 2025. Public Administration in Serbia 2024: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration. SIGMA Monitoring Reports. OECD Publishing.
- What the source records
- Finds poor coordination of the centre of power, insufficient management responsibility and exceptions that bypass standard procedures.
- Claim it supports
- It shows that weak personnel, procedural and financial control can enable problems to be transmitted through multiple institutions.
- Source limitation
- Public administration assessment is not a test of every relationship in the entire political system.
Domestic NGOs Public Administration Analysis - Verified 21.08.2026
European Policy Centre (CEP). 2023. The Neverending Story of Senior Civil Service Depoliticisation in Serbia. Belgrade: CEP.
- What the source records
- Monitor the long-term normalization of acting officials at the top of the state administration.
- Claim it supports
- Provides a specific personnel mechanism through which one weakened appointment control can reduce the willingness of other parts of the administration to refuse pressure.
- Source limitation
- It does not show the behavior of every acting person or automatic obedience.
Domestic NGOs institutional and judicial monitoring - Full report and methodology reviewed
Mandić, Sofija, i CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council: 2025.
Mandic, Sofia, and CEPRIS. 2026. Report on the Transparency of the Work of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutory Council: 2025.
- What the source records
- Shows that unavailable materials, incomplete records and poor communication reduce the public’s ability to monitor judicial councils.
- Claim it supports
- It supports the link between transparency and real external control over institutions that choose and protect judges and prosecutors.
- Source limitation
- It does not prove that every non-transparent decision is politically controlled.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. 2026. Report on the work of the Commissioner for 2025.
- What the source records
- It shows that a part of the body does not act even after the mandatory decision of the Commissioner, especially public companies.
- Claim it supports
- Gives a direct example of how the weak response of executive and public authorities diminishes the effect of an independent control institution.
- Source limitation
- Explanation of non-execution may vary from case to case.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2026. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2025. godinu.
Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia. 2026. Regular annual report of the Protector of Citizens for 2025.
- What the source records
- The high rate of follow-up shows that the support of other authorities to an independent institution can maintain its practical effect.
- Claim it supports
- It serves as an important countercheck: interdependence can work in a positive direction, so weakening is not automatic or irreversible.
- Source limitation
- The rate of action does not measure the quality and durability of any correction.
Primary source annual report of the state anti-corruption body - Viewed full official report and tables
Agencija za sprečavanje korupcije Republike Srbije. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
Agency for Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Serbia. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
- What the source records
- Local plans without a monitoring body show that one link of control can exist without the next necessary link of enforcement.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the mechanism of interdependence at the local level: the plan without a supervisory body has significantly weaker corrective capacity.
- Source limitation
- It does not really evaluate the behavior of all local governments with formed bodies.
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