Does an election victory give the government the right to remove every constraint?
No. Election victory gives the authorities the mandate to make decisions within the rules that apply to everyone, not the right to remove the possibility of future defeat. Democracy implies that the majority governs, but also that the minority retains the basic rights, that the courts can stop the illegal decision, that the media can criticize and that the opposition has a fair chance to become a majority.
If the winner changes the election rules, courts, media or state administration so that they serve him permanently, then the mandate is used to abolish the conditions under which the mandate is democratic in general. The practical criterion is simple: can the new rule apply equally when the current government becomes the opposition, or is it designed to provide it with the advantage and protection?
Election victories of the SNS give the authorities the right to implement the program under the Constitution, but not the right to abolish equal competition, subordinate the courts or use state resources as a party. In Serbia, the problem is precisely in mixing majority support with unlimited mandate: the parliamentary majority can legally vote, and that the way of discussion, appointment and control at the same time weakens institutions that must limit any authority.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
The Constitution divides power and guarantees rights, while scientific and parliamentary monitoring notes that the control of the majority over the assembly and appointments can spread the influence of the executive power to other bodies.
The Democratic majority decides who governs, but constitutional restrictions determine what the winner must not do. Without these limits, electoral victory becomes a means to permanently remove future competition.
Yes the electoral mandate exists, but sources show why it cannot be identified with the right to unlimited power.
Criticism of the majority is not the same as contesting elections. It is necessary to check the constitutional basis, procedure, proportionality and effect on rights and political competition for each measure.
Not every change of constitution or institution is an abuse. It is important whether the rule serves everyone or gives the current government a lasting advantage.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
critical review of more research
Przeworski, A. (2023), „Formal Models of Authoritarian Regimes: A Critique“, Perspectives on Politics 21(3): 979–988.
- Contribution to this answer
- Przeworski shows how many theories about authoritarian regimes can easily become too neat: often presuppose what the dictator wants, why people support him and how repression, propaganda or good effect work. His main message is that these assumptions should be proven, not taken for granted.
review more research
Ginsburg, T. i Huq, A. Z. (2018), How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, University of Chicago Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Ginsburg and Huq show why electoral victory does not lift constitutional restrictions: democracy also depends on real competition, law and the rule of law, which must also limit the majority winner.
comparing several countries or cases
Landau, D. (2013), „Abusive Constitutionalism“, UC Davis Law Review 47: 189–260.
Landau, D. (2013), "Abusive Constitutionalism", UC Davis Law Review 47: 189–260.
- Contribution to this answer
- Landau shows how elected power can formally legal constitutional changes weaken the courts, opposition and other brakes, while calling for a democratic mandate. Procedural legality is therefore not the same as democratic legitimacy.
comparing several countries or cases
Varol, O. O. (2015), „Stealth Authoritarianism“, Iowa Law Review 100: 1673–1742.
- Contribution to this answer
- Varrol describes "stealth authoritarianism" - the use of legal mechanisms that formally resemble normal democratic practices, but which serve to increase the costs of opposition and protect the government from shift.
comparing several countries or cases
Scheppele, K. L. (2018), „Autocratic Legalism“, University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.
- Contribution to this answer
- Scheppele shows that the government can only claim to change the law within its mandate, while a number of such changes as a whole remove the restrictions that should apply to the winner of the election.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Primary legal source - Verified 21.08.2026
Republika Srbija. 2006. Ustav Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik RS 98/2006, engleski prevod Narodne skupštine.
Republic of Serbia. 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of RS 98/2006, English translation of the National Assembly.
- What the source records
- The Constitution bases the system on balance and mutual control of power; the President expresses state unity, while the Government exercises executive and the Assembly exercises constitutional and legislative power.
- Claim it supports
- The Constitution establishes a division of power and rights that do not cease to apply because a party has won a majority.
- Source limitation
- The Constitution says that power should be distributed, but it does not show how powers are used in practice.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Milačić, Filip. 2025. “Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Capture in Serbia: A One-Man Show.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 712(1): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027162251316346
- What the source records
- The paper claims that the control of parliament has enabled the further takeover of independent institutions and continued democratic backlash since 2012.
- Claim it supports
- The paper shows how an electoral majority can be used to take over institutions that should restrict it.
- Source limitation
- Emphasis on the role of one leader can suppress other actors, inherited weaknesses and external incentives.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia – Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345–363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
Jovanović, Milan. 2022. “Presidentialization of Parliamentarism in Serbia Causes and Consequences.” Politeja 19(1/76): 345363. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.76.17
- What the source records
- "The paper links presidencialization with the immediate election of the president, weaknesses in constitutional design, proportional elections and oligarchic parties.
- Claim it supports
- Compare the parliamentary constitutional model to the practice of concentrated presidential power.
- Source limitation
- It covers a longer period and cannot attribute any change after 2012 to the same cause or to the same actor.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
Open Parliament. 2025. Annual Report on the work of the XIV Assembly of the National Assembly, February 2024 April 2025. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
- Claim it supports
- Monitoring shows when the parliamentary majority confirms decisions instead of independently controlling the executive power.
- Source limitation
- It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The European Commission separates the formal constitutional order from the practice and records limited parliamentary scrutiny, political pressure on the judiciary and concerns about directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- The finding supports the claim that the electoral and parliamentary majority do not abolish the division of power or the obligation of other institutions to independently control the executive power.
- Source limitation
- The report is part of the EU enlargement policy and does not establish the constitutionality of each individual decision.
Domestic NGO Coalition semi-annual monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Koalicija prEUgovor. 2025. Alarm Report on Progress of Serbia in Cluster 1 – May 2025. Beograd: prEUgovor.
- What the source records
- prEUgovor documents the concentration of power, institutional abuses, pressures on the judiciary and selective responsibility in areas where the government is formally bound by constitutional and legal rules.
- Claim it supports
- Domestic findings show that formal legal procedures and most can be used in a way that weakens the actual division of power and responsibility.
- Source limitation
- The monitoring of the coalition does not replace the judicial assessment of the constitutionality or legality of the concrete measure.
Domestic NGOs and research media case study - Verified 21.08.2026
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparentnost Srbija i CINS.
Cvijić, Srđan. 2018. When Law Doesn’t Rule: State Capture of the Judiciary, Prosecution, Police in Serbia. Open Society European Policy Institute, Transparency Serbia and CINS.
- What the source records
- The case study documents the mechanisms of political control of the judiciary, the prosecution and the police through appointments, discretion, information and the absence of effective investigations.
- Claim it supports
- “Examples show why the existence of law and a majority elected government does not mean that control bodies are free to act against the politically powerful.
- Source limitation
- The findings are based on selected cases until 2018 and cannot be automatically applied to any subsequent decision.
Domestic NGOs annual monitoring of human rights - Verified 21.08.2026
Beogradski centar za ljudska prava. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Urednik Dušan Pokuševski. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Editor Dušan Pokuševski. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The Annual Human Rights Report 2025 monitors the pressures of the executive on the judiciary and the problems of effective accountability in actions of great public importance.
- Claim it supports
- Modern domestic monitoring confirms that constitutional rights and control institutions must have practical protection even after the election victory of the majority.
- Source limitation
- The report documents the rights and institutional conduct, but does not give a final legal assessment of each case or type of regime.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 954–979. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
Beširević, Violeta. 2014. “Governing Without Judges: The Politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(4): 95479. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou065
- What the source records
- Analysis of the Constitutional Court shows that in politically sensitive disputes there was often no strong judicial control, although the Court was formally independent.
- Claim it supports
- “The finding shows why the democratic mandate of the majority must remain under real and not just formal constitutional control.
- Source limitation
- The work ends in 2013 and does not prove the proceedings of the Constitutional Court in every recent case.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed
European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.
- What the source records
- Separates the limited constitutional competencies of the president from the practice of political direction, poor oversight of parliament and unfilled control posts.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the claim that the electoral mandate does not change constitutional restrictions or replace independent controls.
- Source limitation
- The report is not a domestic decision on the constitutionality of individual proceedings.
Official international election monitoring - Full official report reviewed
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 2024. Observation of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Serbia (17 December 2023). Doc. 15895.
- What the source records
- He finds that there was a political choice and a legal framework, but that the systemic advantages, pressures and mergers between the state and the party created unfair conditions.
- Claim it supports
- Shows that electoral victory does not retroactively justify abuse of function, resources or unequal conditions.
- Source limitation
- Observing one cycle does not solve the legality of each action.
Official political and institutional document of the EU - Viewed adopted text and official explanation
European Parliament. 2024. Resolution of 8 February 2024 on the Situation in Serbia Following the Elections. P9_TA(2024)0075.
- What the source records
- The European Parliament cites the absence of an institutional response and sanctions for serious suspicions of manipulation and abuse.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the claim that democratic government restriction includes verification and accountability even after the election day.
- Source limitation
- Political resolution is not a court ruling and relies on the findings of observers.
International Integrity and Anti-Corruption Practices Indicator - Viewed official Earth page and indicator data
OECD. 2026. Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Serbia.
- What the source records
- The distinction between rules and practices of political financing shows that formal majority and formal regulation do not guarantee effective control.
- Claim it supports
- Adds measurable proof that legislative rules remain the limit of power only if they are applied and monitored.
- Source limitation
- Indicators do not judge individual violations of the election campaign.
Domestic NGOs analysis of political integrity - Verified 21.08.2026
Transparency Serbia. 2024. Assessing Political Integrity Rules in Serbia. Belgrade: Transparency Serbia.
- What the source records
- Find loopholes in the rules and the application of political integrity, including oversight, registers and accountability.
- Claim it supports
- The domestic institutional test supports the claim that the majority is not a license to abolish neutral rules and check conflicts of interest.
- Source limitation
- Risk assessment is not the determination of the fault of a specific actor.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. 2026. Report on the work of the Commissioner for 2025.
- What the source records
- Record binding decisions of an independent body that a part of the government and public companies still do not execute.
- Claim it supports
- It shows that the formal right of citizens and the border of government exist independently of the electoral majority, but that their effect depends on the execution.
- Source limitation
- The report is about access to information, not all constitutional controls.
Primary source annual report of the state anti-corruption body - Viewed full official report and tables
Agencija za sprečavanje korupcije Republike Srbije. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
Agency for Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Serbia. 2026. Annual Report 2025.
- What the source records
- Primary data shows incomplete implementation of local anti-corruption obligations and the need for further legal changes.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that the electoral mandate does not abolish the obligation of local authorities to establish mechanisms of integrity and supervision.
- Source limitation
- The Agency’s independent annual report is not an external assessment of its work.
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