Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why do the police, military, and security services agree to carry out politically risky orders?
Police officers, soldiers and service members do not follow risky political orders just because they are “obedient”. They assess who is likely to remain in power, who controls their salary and promotion, what will happen to their family and whether they will one day be held accountable for what they have done.
The authorities increase obedience by choosing loyal elders, special privileges, supervision within the services and the message that the refusal will be punished quickly, while the execution will remain unpunished. It is also important what their colleagues do: the individual is much more difficult to refuse the order if he thinks that he will remain alone. That is why the behavior of the services in crisis can change abruptly when they assess that the balance of forces is changing and that the old protection is no longer safe.
A policeman or a member of the service in Serbia does not only decide whether he agrees with the political leadership. The assessment is shaped by the chain of command, the possibility of advancement or punishment, legal protection, the expectation that the order will be investigated and the belief that the current government will survive. When supervision and responsibility are weak, the personal risk of rejection may be higher than the risk of executing the disputed order.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
BCSP documents the politicization and weak control of the sector, while domestic and international organizations recorded allegations of excessive force and slow or ineffective liability during the protest.
Obedience does not have to mean ideological loyalty. Often a rational response to a hierarchy in which the immediate punishment for disobedience is certain, and the future punishment for abuse is uncertain.
Yes sources well underpin the structure of incentives, but the motive of each individual officer remains different.
The allegation of illegal force requires an independent investigation in case. The entire police force must not be declared a political perpetrator on the basis of the actions of individual units or commanders.
We often find out about the internal decisions of the police and the military only after the crisis. One case can well explain the procedure, but it does not have to be valid everywhere.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows how the organization of the security apparatus shapes to whom the forced services are loyal and what kind of repression they can carry out. Individual obedience depends on the institution in which the official works, not only on the personal attitude.
comparing several countries or cases
Talmadge, C. (2015), The Dictator’s Army, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Talmadge shows that political criteria in promotion, command and training can increase loyalty to the regime, but at the same time weaken professional military capability. Career structure therefore changes the calculation of officers.
comparing several countries or cases
Barany, Z. (2016), How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Barany shows why the army in some revolutions defends the regime, in others it refuses to shoot, and in the third it is divided. The decision depends on the cohesion of the army, relations with the government, legitimacy, the character of the protest and the external environment.
data from a large number of countries
Paine, J. (2022), „Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators“, American Political Science Review 116(4): 1425–1442.
- Contribution to this answer
- Paine shows that the military has two types of possible disobedience it can threaten the dictator with a coup or refuse to protect him from opponents. The way the leader organizes civil-military relations tries to reduce both risks.
comparing several countries or cases
Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Svolik provides a broader framework: the apparatus of force is part of a coalition that maintains authoritarian power, but its members have their own interests and can become a threat to the leader. That is why the regime must constantly manage their loyalty.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- Document political ties, hierarchy and weak accountability that shape the incentives of officials.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Domestic NGOs annual monitoring of human rights - Verified 21.08.2026
Beogradski centar za ljudska prava. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Urednik Dušan Pokuševski. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Editor Dušan Pokuševski. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.
- What the source records
- The twenty-eighth annual report documents systemic pressures and violations of rights in 2025 and brings together data from institutions and sectoral organisations on the prosecution of protest participants and incidents towards journalists.
- Claim it supports
- Annual monitoring of human rights records police conduct and the issue of responsibility in a protest context.
- Source limitation
- The report follows the rights and institutional treatment, not the type of regime; part of the numerical data is taken from state authorities and other organizations and should be read with their original records.
Domestic NGO monitoring of civic space - Verified 21.08.2026
Građanske inicijative. 2025. Udruženja građana — sužavanje prostora za delovanje 2024. Beograd: Građanske inicijative.
Civic Initiatives. 2025. Citizens’ Associations narrowing the space for action 2024. Belgrade: Civic Initiatives.
- What the source records
- Based on the standardized regional matrix and bi-weekly reports, 234 cases of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms were registered, with an increase in physical and verbal attacks and other pressures compared to the previous year.
- Claim it supports
- Domestic monitoring of the civic space collects cases of arrest, violence and intimidation of activists.
- Source limitation
- The records include documented and reported cases, and not a representative rate of all incidents in Serbia, while the organization at the same time has a clear role of protecting the civil space.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- The report notes weak election conditions, limited parliamentary scrutiny, strong political pressure on the judiciary and concerns that the president is in practice directing decision-making beyond the constitutional idea.
- Claim it supports
- The EU report provides an independent external review of problems with police accountability and fundamental rights.
- Source limitation
- The report is related to the EU accession process and describes a certain period; it does not represent a scientific causal study or a uniform assessment of the type of regime.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349
Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 126. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349
- What the source records
- The survey shows that political coercion relies on economic and institutional dependence, not just ideological consent.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the interpretation that the perpetrator assesses the career, safety and price of disobedience, not just the content of the order.
- Source limitation
- The paper does not examine the representative pattern of police officers or soldiers or their personal motives.
Domestic think tank analysis of a protest cycle - Viewed full report, summary and description of events
Đorđević, Saša. 2020. Spontani protest i postupanje policije. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
orđević, Saša. 2020. Spontaneous protest and police conduct. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- “In July 2020, it records the violence of acts of protesters, but also brutal or excessive police force, attacks on journalists and issues of command responsibility.
- Claim it supports
- It shows how the chain of command and institutional reaction shape the implementation of a risky order on the ground.
- Source limitation
- One short protest cycle does not reveal the motive of every police officer.
Domestic Center for Human Rights Analysis of Cases and Evidence - Viewed full report, documented chronology and listed items
Ilić, Vladica, Sanja Radivojević i Luka Mihajlović. 2021. Istrage slučajeva policijskog zlostavljanja na julskim građanskim protestima 2020. godine. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.
Ilić, Vladica, Sanja Radivojević and Luka Mihajlović. 2021. Investigations of cases of police abuse at July 2020 civil protests. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.
- What the source records
- Monitors how reports, recordings and medical documentation passed through the prosecutor’s office and internal control, with delays and difficulties of identification.
- Claim it supports
- substantiates that the expectation of weak individual responsibility reduces the future risk of executing the disputed order.
- Source limitation
- The submitted applications are not verdicts, and the authors represent part of the damaged.
Official international contractual monitoring of human rights - Viewed full adopted document, especially points 2627 and 4043
United Nations Human Rights Committee. 2024. Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Serbia. CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, 3 May 2024.
- What the source records
- The UN committee finds a high number of complaints, low prosecution rates, and an absence of accountability for police officers in the 2020 protests.
- Claim it supports
- Independently confirms the mechanism in which the penalty for overdraft is uncertain, while the hierarchical command is immediate.
- Source limitation
- The Contracting Authority does not establish a personal motive or adjudicate any incident.
International Organization for Human Rights annual monitoring - Official Earth Report 2025/26
Amnesty International. 2026. The State of the World’s Human Rights 2025/26 — Serbia.
- What the source records
- For 2025, there is excessive force, intimidation and beatings during mostly peaceful protests throughout Serbia.
- Claim it supports
- He adds contemporary evidence that the politically risky use of force does not come down to a single event in 2020.
- Source limitation
- Monitoring does not establish a command decision and legal responsibility in any case.
International Field Inspection Council of Europe - Full official report, method, findings and response from the Government
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). 2024. Report to the Serbian Government on the Visit to Serbia from 21 to 30 March 2023. CPT/Inf (2024) 04.
- What the source records
- The field delegation, through interviews, files and medical documentation, finds severe abuses and weaknesses of investigations, with the testimony of many about the correct treatment.
- Claim it supports
- It shows how the real probability of investigation and sanctions shape professional incentives in the police chain.
- Source limitation
- The focus is police detention, not political orders or the military as a whole.
Primary source finding of an independent state body - Full official report and section on police conduct
Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2022. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2021. godinu.
Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia. 2022. Regular Annual Report of the Protector of Citizens for 2021.
- What the source records
- The Protector establishes illegal conduct and violation of rights in one case from the protest, as well as omissions of documentation and identification.
- Claim it supports
- Primary domestic findings show that responsibility depends on whether the use of force is recorded and the officer can be identified.
- Source limitation
- The findings in individual cases do not describe the motives or actions of the entire police force.
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