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AUTHORITARIANISM - RESEARCH ATLASAVtokratija

How the authoritarian system works in Serbia

General research connected to documented examples, findings, and sources from Serbia.

100questions
20areas
148academic works
130Serbia sources
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AVtokratija›Why the police, military, and security services obey
19
Research-based answerAUTLAS Research Base

How does the police stop protecting all citizens and begin primarily protecting those in power?

Confidence in the conclusionBe cautious and dependent on the case.
key academic works5
linked Serbia sources13
Period201226

The police ceases to be the service of all citizens when they no longer treat the same behavior according to the same rule. Protest supporters of the government can be protected or ignored, while critics are legitimized, monitored, detained or exposed to force.

Change is built through the choice of managers, advancement by loyalty, political lists, selective orders and impunity of officials who exceed the authority against “wrong” people. The authorities can also use private security, party activists or criminal groups to make the pressure look like a private conflict and to make the denial of responsibility easier. That is why the politicization of the police is not proven by one incident, but by a repeated pattern of different protections.

Example from SerbiaChecked 13 sources; 10 manufacturers
13 related sources; 10 groups of evidence producers; domestic NGOs/research producers: 5

The police must formally protect citizens, protesters, journalists and officials equally. In practice, reports from Serbia record cases in which the force towards the protesters was disputed, attacks on journalists are not quickly clarified or police powers are used towards critical activists. When protection and investigation differ according to political closeness, the police cease to be a joint service and become a protective belt of power.

How the finding is separated in the matrix

01Established fact

BCHR, NUNS, Amnesty and BCSP note patterns of unequal protection, allegations of excessive force, digital surveillance and weak accountability in politically sensitive cases. In addition, FemPlatz records the 48 most serious incidents against 71 women at protests, among them police physical violence and arbitrary arrests; the base is not complete.

02Our interpretation

The transition is not measured by the police, but by the behavior of: who is being prevented, who is being protected, whose reports are being investigated and whether the same rules apply to supporters and opponents of the government.

03Does it show the same process?

To a significant extent multiple sources document politically sensitive inequality, but each individual decision requires a special check.

04Important caveat or alternative explanation

The police perform a large number of legal and non-political tasks on a daily basis. Criticism of systemic incentive and command responsibility is not an accusation against every police officer.

What the general answer does not allow us to conclude

The connection of the authorities with private or criminal perpetrators is deliberately hidden. At the same time, violence is not enough without evidence of agreement, assistance or impunity.

Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.

A01

review more research

Davenport, C. (2007), „State Repression and Political Order“, Annual Review of Political Science 10: 1–23.

Contribution to this answer
Davenport shows that the state directs repression towards the political threat it sees, so that police and other coercive power can be used selectively towards groups that the government considers dangerous, not equal to all citizens.
Open source ↗
A02

review more research

Earl, J. (2003), „Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression“, Sociological Theory 21(1): 44–68.

Contribution to this answer
Earl shows that repression involves much more than police violence: legal, administrative and economic measures can also limit political action. The work is wider than authoritarian police work, but it helps to see the repertoire of control.
Open source ↗
A03

Explain how the system works

Ritter, E. H. i Conrad, C. R. (2016), „Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression“, American Political Science Review 110(1): 85–99.

Contribution to this answer
Ritter and Conrad show that the government reacts strategically to dissent and that part of the repression is pre-emptive, before the protest becomes visible. This means that the coercion apparatus can protect the political order even without the constant visible violence.
Open source ↗
A04

Study of Serbia

Petrović, V. (2026), „Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia“, Democratization.

Petrović, V. (2026), “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia”, Democratization.

Contribution to this answer
Petrović shows how political dependence and pressure can permeate everyday relations with the state in Serbia. For the police, work is indirect, but it gives a domestic context in which access to state resources is not politically neutral.
Open source ↗
A05

comparing several countries or cases

González, Y. M. (2020), Authoritarian Police in Democracy: Contested Security in Latin America, Cambridge University Press.

Contribution to this answer
González directly shows how the police can keep authoritarian patterns of work even in a democratic environment, when the political interests and institutional autonomy of the police are stronger than responsibility to all citizens.
Open source ↗

Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.

S01

Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026

Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.

What the source records
The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
Claim it supports
Provides a systematic analysis of the political takeover of the police, instead of the conclusion from a single incident.
Source limitation
Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Open source ↗
S02

Domestic NGOs annual monitoring of human rights - Verified 21.08.2026

Beogradski centar za ljudska prava. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Urednik Dušan Pokuševski. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.

Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. 2026. Human Rights in Serbia 2025. Editor Dušan Pokuševski. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.

What the source records
The twenty-eighth annual report documents systemic pressures and violations of rights in 2025 and brings together data from institutions and sectoral organisations on the prosecution of protest participants and incidents towards journalists.
Claim it supports
Record specific violations of rights and reactions of institutions in politically sensitive situations.
Source limitation
The report follows the rights and institutional treatment, not the type of regime; part of the numerical data is taken from state authorities and other organizations and should be read with their original records.
Open source ↗
S03

Domestic journalistic association monitoring of attacks - Verified 21.08.2026

Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospektiva 2025: godina u kojoj je pritisak postao sistem. Beograd: NUNS.

Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS). 2026. NUNS retrospective 2025: the year in which pressure became a system. Belgrade: NUNS.

What the source records
NUNS recorded 371 cases, including 113 physical attacks and 165 threats, along with legal, economic and digital forms of pressure.
Claim it supports
The record of attacks on journalists shows the problem of unequal protection and impunity.
Source limitation
The register depends on the reported and documented cases, it can overlap with other databases and does not measure the experience of every journalist.
Open source ↗
S04

International Organization for Human Rights Forensic Research - Verified 21.08.2026

Amnesty International. 2024. A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the Suppression of Civil Society in Serbia. London: Amnesty International.

What the source records
The report documents cases of unlocking phones and installing spyware during police or security conversations, as well as consequences for civil society.
Claim it supports
Document the analyzed cases in which police or security powers have been used according to critical actors.
Source limitation
Forensic findings are strong for the analyzed devices, but the number of cases is not a measure of distribution in the entire population; the authorities have disputed the allegations of illegal work.
Open source ↗
S05

Domestic NGOs exploratory qualitative research - Verified 21.08.2026

FemPlatz. 2025. Između megafona i tišine: žene u borbi za promene. Pančevo: FemPlatz.

FemPlatz. 2025. Between megaphone and silence: women in the fight for change. Pančevo: FemPlatz.

What the source records
The database of incidents records police physical violence, arbitrary detentions and gender-specific forms of humiliation towards women at the protests.
Claim it supports
Provides documented cases in which police authorities do not act as protective of protesters.
Source limitation
The sample is not representative, the research is exploratory, and the database of incidents is not intentionally complete; the findings show patterns and experiences, not their frequency in the entire population.
Open source ↗
S06

Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026

Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349

Petrović, Valentina. 2025. “Under Pressure: The Politics of Clientelism and Coercion in Serbia.” Democratization, online first: 126. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2520349

What the source records
Shows how coercion differs according to the political, work and economic position of citizens.
Claim it supports
Supports a key test of selectivity: the institution ceases to protect equally when political affiliation and dependence change treatment and risk.
Source limitation
The survey is not a specific investigation of police actions.
Open source ↗
S07

Domestic think tank analysis of a protest cycle - Viewed full report, summary and description of events

Đorđević, Saša. 2020. Spontani protest i postupanje policije. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.

orđević, Saša. 2020. Spontaneous protest and police conduct. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.

What the source records
Document police force towards non-violent citizens and journalists with the violence of acts of protesters and injured police officers.
Claim it supports
Shows a selective and disproportionate application of force to be distinguished from a legitimate reaction to an actual attack.
Source limitation
One protest does not prove a permanent pattern without other cycles and investigations.
Open source ↗
S08

Domestic Center for Human Rights Analysis of Cases and Evidence - Viewed full report, documented chronology and listed items

Ilić, Vladica, Sanja Radivojević i Luka Mihajlović. 2021. Istrage slučajeva policijskog zlostavljanja na julskim građanskim protestima 2020. godine. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.

Ilić, Vladica, Sanja Radivojević and Luka Mihajlović. 2021. Investigations of cases of police abuse at July 2020 civil protests. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.

What the source records
Through reports and files, it shows unidentified police officers, missed evidence and checks related to the suspects’ units.
Claim it supports
Supports the second part of the form: when officials are protected by anonymity and weak investigation, the protection of the authorities may have less consequences than the protection of citizens’ rights.
Source limitation
The analysis is related to July 2020 and the submitted applications are not verdicts.
Open source ↗
S09

Official international contractual monitoring of human rights - Viewed full adopted document, especially points 2627 and 4043

United Nations Human Rights Committee. 2024. Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Serbia. CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, 3 May 2024.

What the source records
The UN Committee notes excessive force against peaceful protesters and journalists, without criminal or disciplinary responsibility and reparations.
Claim it supports
Independently confirms the combination of different treatment and lack of responsibility that is central to the politicization of the police.
Source limitation
The findings are a systemic concern, not a judgment for every police officer.
Open source ↗
S10

International Organization for Human Rights annual monitoring - Official Earth Report 2025/26

Amnesty International. 2026. The State of the World’s Human Rights 2025/26 — Serbia.

What the source records
In the 2025 protests, he noted excessive force, intimidation and attacks by police and supporters of the ruling party.
Claim it supports
Expands the pattern to a new period and helps to test whether critics are being protected as well as other citizens.
Source limitation
Annual monitoring does not prove the agreement of the authorities with each private attacker.
Open source ↗
S11

International Field Inspection Council of Europe - Full official report, method, findings and response from the Government

European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). 2024. Report to the Serbian Government on the Visit to Serbia from 21 to 30 March 2023. CPT/Inf (2024) 04.

What the source records
Field inspection finds repeated allegations of aggravated police abuse and weaknesses of investigations, with positive testimonies of acts of detainees.
Claim it supports
“It supports that the problem of accountability is not limited to political protests and allows for an important counter-check that action is not the same everywhere.
Source limitation
The focus is detention and suspect, so political selectivity is not directly measured.
Open source ↗
S12

Primary source finding of an independent state body - Full official report and section on police conduct

Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije. 2022. Redovan godišnji izveštaj Zaštitnika građana za 2021. godinu.

Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia. 2022. Regular Annual Report of the Protector of Citizens for 2021.

What the source records
The Protector has determined the violation of rights in a specific case and has documented that delays, recordings and identification marks affect liability.
Claim it supports
Gives primary evidence that illegality in the act has been established and that the documenting system can protect or expose the officer.
Source limitation
It does not confirm or conclude that the entire police force is primarily protecting the government.
Open source ↗
S13

Reviewed review paper domestic institutional analysis - Viewed full work, method, findings and bibliographic record

Mitrović, Sava, i Milica Škorić. 2022. „Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji: dometi i ograničenja demokratskog upravljanja policijom.” Politička revija 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7

Mitrović, Sava, and Milica Škorić. 2022. “Reform of the Security Sector in Serbia: Scopes and Limitations of Democratic Governance of Police.” Political Review 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7

What the source records
The review of the legal framework and practice records several cases of violations of rights, weak parliamentary oversight, limitations of independent bodies and shortcomings of internal control.
Claim it supports
Provides wider domestic evidence that unequal or illegal treatment becomes a systemic problem when control and transparency do not produce timely correction.
Source limitation
Synthesis does not encode every police intervention or measure the rate of politically selective conduct.
Open source ↗

ABOUT US AND OUR METHODOLOGY

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AUTLAS is a public knowledge platform about how authoritarian systems work. It turns research findings into clear answers to the questions people ask when trying to understand elections, media, institutions, public resources, pressure, and everyday life in an authoritarian system.

01

Based on academic research

The answers are based on relevant academic research on authoritarian systems, democratic backsliding, institutional capture, and the narrowing of civic rights and freedoms. AUTLAS connects findings from scholarly articles, books, and comparative studies and presents them in language accessible to the wider public.

02

Practice documented in Serbia

AVtokratija is the Serbia case study within AUTLAS. It uses reports, analyses, and data from civil society organizations, independent institutions, professional associations, investigative media, and other relevant sources. General findings and evidence from Serbia are presented separately.

03

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Each answer lists the sources used. Visitors can check which research, data, and reports underpin the conclusions. The authors of the research and the organizations that collected the data remain clearly credited.

04

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05

Focus on the system, not on blaming people

Authoritarian systems change the rules, narrow the range of choices, raise the cost of refusal, and create the impression that nothing can change. AUTLAS therefore analyzes rules, incentives, pressures, and institutional mechanisms - rather than blaming people trying to live and work within such a system.

06

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