Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
Why do those in power maintain several services that monitor citizens and one another?
The government makes more services because it does not want an organization to have all the power and all the confidential information in its hands. When the police, the military, intelligence services and special units have overlapping jobs, they can monitor the citizens, but also report to each other. The leader thus gets more data sources and reduces the possibility of one command peak becoming independent.
Still, the rivalry produces serious weaknesses: the services can exaggerate threats, hide failures, duplicate business or plant competitors in order to preserve their position and budget. The number of services does not prove anything. It is important who appoints their managers, to whom they report directly, whether their competencies are deliberately overlapping and whether the law can even check their work.
Serbia has police, BIA, military services and other authorities with different databases and powers. The problem is not only that they monitor citizens, but that through overlap and political coordination they can also monitor each other, thereby gaining more sources of information and easier to detect disloyalty. Without independent control, the same system that should prevent abuse can become a way to hide it.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
BCSP describes unclear links and weak parliamentary scrutiny, while Amnesty and SHARE document or legally analyze the use of digital tools by activists and journalists.
Multiple services allow the leader to compare reports and reduce dependence on one apparatus, but it makes it difficult for the citizen to find out who accessed his data and at whose order.
Yes to the mechanism of overlap and supervisory risk; not as evidence that each service is constantly used for political monitoring.
Legal security supervision may be necessary in criminal and counterintelligence work. The key difference is a court order, the exact purpose, access records and the possibility of independent control.
The number of services does not indicate who controls them. You need to know who orders them, who pays for them and who can speak directly to the leader.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows why regimes divide the coercive apparatus into multiple services and build special intelligence capacities: different institutions can track citizens, but also each other, reducing the risk of one organization becoming an independent threat.
data from a large number of countries
De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- De Bruin shows how parallel armed organizations reduce the possibility of one service monopolizing the force and carrying out a coup. Mutual competition increases the security of the leader, but can weaken coordination.
comparing several countries or cases
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.
- Contribution to this answer
- Quinlivan describes parallel forces and mutual monitoring as classic techniques of preventing coup. The regime thus supervises not only society but also its own apparatus of force.
review more research
Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Wintrobe explains why such mutual monitoring is attractive to the dictator: he never has complete information about the loyalty of his associates, so he builds systems that reduce the possibility of clandestine association against him.
data from a large number of countries
Timoneda, J. C., Escribà-Folch, A. i Chin, J. (2023), „The Rush to Personalize“, British Journal of Political Science 53(3): 878–901.
- Contribution to this answer
- Timoneda, Escrib-Folch and Chin study how failed coups can accelerate the personalization of power and changes in the leader’s attitude to the apparatus of force. The work is useful for the consequences of the fear of a coup, but it is more indirect for the question of multiple services that accompany each other.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- Describes the relations between police, services and defence and the difficulty to clearly establish political and institutional responsibility.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
International Organization for Human Rights Forensic Research - Verified 21.08.2026
Amnesty International. 2024. A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the Suppression of Civil Society in Serbia. London: Amnesty International.
- What the source records
- The report documents cases of unlocking phones and installing spyware during police or security conversations, as well as consequences for civil society.
- Claim it supports
- Forensic documents analyzed cases of digital surveillance towards activists and journalists.
- Source limitation
- Forensic findings are strong for the analyzed devices, but the number of cases is not a measure of distribution in the entire population; the authorities have disputed the allegations of illegal work.
Domestic NGOs legal analysis of digital surveillance - Verified 21.08.2026
SHARE Foundation. 2026. Digital Forensics Tools: Legal Framework Analysis — Serbia. Belgrade: SHARE Foundation.
SHARE Foundation. 2026. Digital Forensics Tools: Legal Framework Analysis Serbia. Belgrade: SHARE Foundation.
- What the source records
- The analysis concludes that Serbian law does not provide grounds for the use of digital forensic tools outside the criminal proceedings or without a court order.
- Claim it supports
- Establishes legal limits on the use of forensic tools and the need for a court order.
- Source limitation
- Legal analysis determines what is allowed, and it can not prove on its own who in each individual case ordered or conducted illegal surveillance.
University laboratory technical research - Verified 21.08.2026
Citizen Lab. 2021. Pegasus vs. Predator: Dissident’s Doubly-Infected iPhone Reveals Cytrox Mercenary Spyware. Toronto: Munk School, University of Toronto.
- What the source records
- Scans have listed Serbia among the likely users of Predator infrastructure, showing the international market of tools that give countries secret surveillance capabilities.
- Claim it supports
- Shows the international market of secret tools and indications of infrastructure associated with Serbia, with an important restriction of attribution.
- Source limitation
- The network infrastructure indicates a likely user, but it does not prove itself who used the tool in Serbia, against whom and with what legal basis.
Domestic think tank multisectoral research report - Review full report, methodology framework and chapters by sectors
Petrović, Predrag, i Jelena Pejić Nikić, ur. 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Petrović, Predrag, and Jelena Pejić Nikić, editor 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- Describes the parallel activities of civil and military services, the secret surveillance of critics and the transfer of information to political and media channels.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that multiple services produce data on both citizens and other organised actors, while unclear supervision increases the risk of abuse.
- Source limitation
- Many of the allegations come from case studies and do not give an overall surveillance rate.
Official international contractual monitoring of human rights - Viewed full adopted document, especially points 2627 and 4043
United Nations Human Rights Committee. 2024. Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Serbia. CCPR/C/SRB/CO/4, 3 May 2024.
- What the source records
- The UN Committee calls for clear legal guarantees, independent monitoring and investigations of data breaches throughout the surveillance regime, including online surveillance.
- Claim it supports
- Sets an immediate boundary between legitimate security work and a system in which data can be used without effective external control.
- Source limitation
- It does not identify all services or prove who ordered every surveillance.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed
European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.
- What the source records
- Record limited capacities of independent bodies and poor parliamentary oversight.
- Claim it supports
- Confirms that the number of services is not the main test; it is crucial that different controls have the resources and authority to check their work.
- Source limitation
- The Rule of Law report does not provide technical forensics of surveillance.
Primary source annual report of the independent state body - Viewed full official report and tables
Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka o ličnosti. 2026. Izveštaj o radu Poverenika za 2025. godinu.
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection. 2026. Report on the work of the Commissioner for 2025.
- What the source records
- Primary data shows a large volume of complaints about unavailable information and part of unexecuted decisions, with jurisdiction and data protection.
- Claim it supports
- Adds domestic institutional proof that the supervision of services also depends on whether an independent controller can obtain information and force the authorities to act.
- Source limitation
- The annual sum does not allocate all the subjects of the police and security services nor political motive.
Reviewed review paper domestic institutional analysis - Viewed full work, method, findings and bibliographic record
Mitrović, Sava, i Milica Škorić. 2022. „Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji: dometi i ograničenja demokratskog upravljanja policijom.” Politička revija 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7
Mitrović, Sava, and Milica Škorić. 2022. “Reform of the Security Sector in Serbia: Scopes and Limitations of Democratic Governance of Police.” Political Review 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7
- What the source records
- Finds insufficient parliamentary, independent and internal control and insufficient proactive transparency of the police.
- Claim it supports
- Supports the criterion that separates the legitimate specialization of multiple services from political risk: whether there is real, multiple and informed supervision of their work.
- Source limitation
- It does not contain digital forensics or measure the extent of secret surveillance of citizens.
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