Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
How does a leader prevent the police or military from turning against them - and what does society lose as a result?
The leader prevents coup or disobedience by placing loyal people in key positions, giving the services special privileges, often changing the commanders and making parallel units that control each other. Thus, no service has complete control over force and information, so it is more difficult for it to turn against the authorities on its own.
The price, however, is passed on to the whole society. Officers and police executives thrive on political reliability, units hide data and compete, and professional training and cooperation become less important. The state can therefore be well protected from coup, but less able to protect citizens, lead complex operations or respond to a real security threat. The security of the leader and the security of the country are not the same.
Through various periods, the Serbian government has kept the army, police and services under separate commands, rotated the managers and limited the real parliamentary oversight. This reduces the risk of one security center becoming a political rival, but the society pays the price: duplication of jobs, hidden spending, mutual supervision and weaker accountability to the law and citizens.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Historical and contemporary studies of the security sector have seen an uneven democratization after 2000, as well as new political concentration and weak mechanisms of surveillance after 2012.
For a leader, it is safer when no service has enough autonomy and information to challenge him; for a democracy, it is safer when all services have clear competences and correspond to different, independent controls.
Partly, the control structure has been documented, but the intent to prevent a coup cannot be proven from every reorganization.
Specialization and more services also exist in democracies. Authoritarian risk occurs when overlap is combined with political appointments, secrecy and the absence of effective supervision.
A system that prevents a coup can be bad in war or protection of citizens. That is why the result depends on what threat the leader is protected against.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), „Coup-Proofing“, International Security 24(2): 131–165.
Quinlivan, J. T. (1999), "Coup-Proofing", International Security 24(2): 131–165.
- Contribution to this answer
- Quinlivan shows how rulers prevent a coup by creating parallel forces, privileged units, personal and family ties and army surveillance systems. The price is often less professional and less efficient apparatus.
data from a large number of countries
De Bruin, E. (2020), How to Prevent Coups d’État, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- De Bruin shows that parallel armed organizations make it difficult for one force to pull off a coup, but fragmentation of command and resources may weaken the state’s ability to wage war or coordinate responses to other threats.
comparing several countries or cases
Talmadge, C. (2015), The Dictator’s Army, Cornell University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Talmadge shows how political control of personnel and command can make the army safer for the regime, but weaker on the battlefield. Loyalty and professional efficiency are therefore not always the same goal.
data from a large number of countries
Paine, J. (2022), „Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators“, American Political Science Review 116(4): 1425–1442.
- Contribution to this answer
- "Paine shows the dilemma of the leader: the military must be strong enough to defend the regime against its opponents, but not autonomous enough to bring down the dictator himself.
comparing several countries or cases
Greitens, S. C. (2016), Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Greitens shows that forced institutions are designed according to whether the leader is more afraid of rebellion or coup. The regime can therefore consciously choose a security apparatus that is more politically reliable even though it is more socially or militarily expensive.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Ejdus, Filip. 2010. Democratic Security Sector Governance in Serbia. PRIF Report No. 94. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. ISBN 978-3-942532-04-4.
- What the source records
- The report shows that formal reform after 2000 has progressed unevenly and that political influence, weak accountability and old networks remain important problems.
- Claim it supports
- It historically follows why formal civilian control of the security sector has not become fully effective.
- Source limitation
- The period ends before the SNS comes to power, so it is used for heritage and transition, not for assessing the current state of affairs.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Đokić, Katarina, Saša Đorđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić i Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
okić, Katarina, Saša orđević, Marija Ignjatijević, Jelena Pejić Nikić and Predrag Petrović. 2020. Security Sector Capture in Serbia An Early Study. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- The study links a greater number of cases of both primary and secondary sources to show patterns of political control, weakening surveillance and use of security institutions in the interest of the ruling structure.
- Claim it supports
- Shows contemporary overlap, political ties and weak parliamentary control.
- Source limitation
- Authors expressly present it as an early and sectoral study; it does not measure each institution or prove that each individual procedure is centrally ordered.
Domestic NGOs research report - Verified 21.08.2026
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, i Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
Pejić Nikić, Jelena, and Predrag Petrović. 2024. How to Unbind the State Capture in Serbia? Towards Security Institutions and Foreign Policy in the Service of Citizens. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. https://doi.org/10.55042/ZHSW9821
- What the source records
- The report concludes that the structures in the police, services, military and surveillance system help to maintain the captured state and that the change requires more than one person to be replaced.
- Claim it supports
- Monitor the adjustment of control networks in the security sector by 2024.
- Source limitation
- The work starts from the concept of the captured state and is aimed at security and recommendations for reform, so its framework should be read together with wider and methodologically different sources.
Domestic NGOs parliamentary monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
Otvoreni parlament. 2025. Godišnji izveštaj o radu XIV saziva Narodne skupštine, februar 2024 – april 2025. Beograd: CRTA.
Open Parliament. 2025. Annual Report on the work of the XIV Assembly of the National Assembly, February 2024 April 2025. Belgrade: CRTA.
- What the source records
- The report describes the Assembly under the dominant influence of the executive, with minimal use of oversight mechanisms, systematic ignoring of opposition initiatives and abuse of procedures.
- Claim it supports
- Document the weakness of parliament as one of the main external controllers of the services.
- Source limitation
- It includes one convocation and one institution, so it cannot explain the entire system itself or determine the motives of every MP and official.
Domestic think tank multisectoral research report - Review full report, methodology framework and chapters by sectors
Petrović, Predrag, i Jelena Pejić Nikić, ur. 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Petrović, Predrag, and Jelena Pejić Nikić, editor 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- Describes political appointments, rotations, informal management and oversight that do not effectively limit the top of the security sector.
- Claim it supports
- Supports that the division of commands and dependent managers can reduce the autonomy of the rival center, at the cost of professionalism and responsibility.
- Source limitation
- The purpose of preventing the coup has not been directly proven in every personnel change.
Domestic think tank historical and institutional analysis - View full report, author data, chronology and conclusion
Popović, Đorđe, Predrag Petrović, Gorana Odanović i Jelena Radoman. 2011. Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 1989–2009. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Popović, orđe, Predrag Petrović, Gorana Odanović and Jelena Radoman. 2011. Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 19892009. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- It historically follows the shift in weight between military, police and secret services and uneven civilian control after 2000.
- Claim it supports
- It shows how separate centers of power can protect the regime, but also leave the state with rivalry, old networks and unfinished responsibility.
- Source limitation
- The historical period does not prove the same chain of command today.
Official International Monitoring of the Rule of Law - Full official report reviewed
European Commission. 2025. 2025 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Serbia. SWD(2025) 931 final.
- What the source records
- Poor parliamentary oversight and limited practical impact of control institutions are recorded.
- Claim it supports
- Gives an external confirmation of the social price: without independent supervision loyalty to the top suppresses responsibility to the law and citizens.
- Source limitation
- It does not examine the military capabilities or risks of the coup as such.
Official international monitoring - Verified 21.08.2026
European Commission. 2025. Serbia 2025 Report. Commission Staff Working Document. Brussels: European Commission.
- What the source records
- Finds limited parliamentary oversight and strong political influence on institutional decision-making.
- Claim it supports
- It underscores that the security stability of the top is not the same as democratic control of the services.
- Source limitation
- A broad access report does not analyze each command and unit.
Reviewed review paper domestic institutional analysis - Viewed full work, method, findings and bibliographic record
Mitrović, Sava, i Milica Škorić. 2022. „Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji: dometi i ograničenja demokratskog upravljanja policijom.” Politička revija 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7
Mitrović, Sava, and Milica Škorić. 2022. “Reform of the Security Sector in Serbia: Scopes and Limitations of Democratic Governance of Police.” Political Review 73(3): 143–165. https://doi.org/10.22182/pr.7332022.7
- What the source records
- For two decades, police reform has been assessed through external and internal control, transparency, rights and representation.
- Claim it supports
- It shows the social cost of a politically dependent security structure: poor surveillance, insufficient transparency and the risk of internal control losing its purpose.
- Source limitation
- “The paper analyzes the police, not the entire military and intelligence system, nor the likelihood of a coup.
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