Serbia: documented application of the same framework
Academic research base
When do the police or military refuse to suppress a protest, and when do they remain loyal to the government?
Police or the military usually remain with the government while they believe that the government is strong enough to reward and protect them, and that disobedience would be more dangerous than the execution of orders. They can refuse to suppress the protest when they estimate that the top is shared, that the number of citizens is too large, that violence will destroy the reputation and unity of the service or that after the change of government they could be held accountable.
It is also crucial whether there is a safe way to refuse an order together, and not as lonely individuals. A large protest can change these estimates, but the number of people in itself is not enough: the duration, organization, behavior of elders and signals from the political top are important. The decision of the services and the forces of the protest change each other, so there is rarely only one cause of the reversal.
Serbian experience shows both outcomes. In the 1990s, the police repeatedly beat the protesters and guarded Milosevic’s power, but in the final crisis of 2000, part of the apparatus refused to go to the end in repression or withdrew, while the army and key units estimated that the regime had lost its political future. On the contrary, during the protests of 2020 and 2025, there was no comparable major division in the apparatus of force, although the disputes were noted.
How the finding is separated in the matrix
Studies of the resistance and protests under Milosevic describe strategies towards the police and the weakening of obedience in 2000; modern monitoring notes that today’s apparatus has mostly remained under the command of the authorities.
“Services are more likely to reject repression when they see massive and disciplined mobilization, cracks in the elite, a likely shift in power, and the belief that they will not be collectively punished after the change.
Yes the historical contrast in Serbia shows well that the loyalty of the apparatus is not constant, but that the mass protest itself does not automatically produce defection.
“The sources differ in their assessment of who is correct and when they decided not to intervene in 2000. The fall of the regime had several causes, so the role of the police and the military must not be turned into the only explanation.
Rejection of the order is rare and changes along with the protest: a larger protest affects the services, and their behavior affects the number of people on the street. That is why there is usually no single cause.
Works supporting this answer, with their evidence type and an explanation of how they relate to the claim.
comparing several countries or cases
Barany, Z. (2016), How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Barany shows that the military in a crisis does not automatically respond in favor of the regime: it can defend the government, refuse to shoot or divide, depending on internal cohesion, relationship with the leader and assessment of the protests.
data from a large number of countries
Chenoweth, E. i Stephan, M. J. (2011), Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Chenoweth and Stephan show that the transitions of members of the security services and other pillars of the regime to the side of the nonviolent campaign are one of the key mechanisms of the success of mass resistance.
data from a large number of countries
Paine, J. (2022), „Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators“, American Political Science Review 116(4): 1425–1442.
- Contribution to this answer
- Paine shows that military disobedience can have two directions: the military can try to impeach the dictator or it can refuse to protect him. The organization of civil-military relations affects which risk is more likely.
comparing several countries or cases
Svolik, M. W. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Svolik explains the broader relationship between the leader and the coercive apparatus: the military is necessary for the survival of the regime, but at the same time it is one of the actors capable of endangering the leader. That is why its loyalty is never fully given.
data from a large number of countries
Beissinger, M. R. (2022), The Revolutionary City: Urbanization and the Global Transformation of Rebellion, Princeton University Press.
- Contribution to this answer
- Beissinger shows how mass urban revolts can quickly change the balance of forces and the perception of the sustainability of the regime. For a concrete decision by the military or the police to refuse repression, the work is broader, but it describes the political context in which defection becomes possible.
Sources supporting the Serbia example, with the claim they support and their limitations.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Binnendijk, Anika Locke, i Ivan Marović. 2006. “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004).” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39(3): 411–429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.06.003
Binnendijk, Anika Locke, and Ivan Marović. 2006. “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004).” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39(3): 411–429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.06.003
- What the source records
- The Serbian movement has combined personal contacts, public messages, discipline and increasing the political price of repression to encourage neutrality or defection of parts of the apparatus of force.
- Claim it supports
- Analyses the strategies used by the opposition movement in 2000 to try to reduce the readiness of the service for repression.
- Source limitation
- “The case study does not mean that the same tactic will work against every apparatus of force, nor that the fall of 2000 had only one cause.
Reviewed scientific work - Verified 21.08.2026
Vladisavljević, Nebojša. 2016. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Popular Protest: Evidence from Serbia under Milošević.” International Political Science Review 37(1): 36–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512114535450
Vladisavljević, Nebojša. 2016. “Competitive Authoritarianism and Popular Protest: Evidence from Serbia under Milošević.” International Political Science Review 37(1): 3650. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512114535450
- What the source records
- “The work shows that the protest can force concessions and open the regime crisis, but that different protest waves have different outcomes and only in 2000 there was a change of regime.
- Claim it supports
- Compare more protest waves under Milosevic and show that they had different outcomes.
- Source limitation
- Analyzing Serbia in the 1990s; the mechanisms are not automatically the same in today’s institutional, technological and international environment.
A documented study of nonviolent campaigning - Verified 21.08.2026
International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. 2011. Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998–2000). Washington, DC: ICNC.
- What the source records
- The case study shows that the success of 2000 came not only from protests, but from elections, more unified opposition, a wide social network, strikes and weakening the obedience of the apparatus of force.
- Claim it supports
- Reconstructs the link between elections, broad coalitions, strikes and weakening the obedience of the apparatus of force 2000.
- Source limitation
- ICNC promotes nonviolent action and the study is a didactic reconstruction of a successful case, so it carries the risk of subsequent simplification and selection of confirming events.
Domestic NGOs analysis of the political crisis - Verified 21.08.2026
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 2025. Political and Institutional Crisis in Serbia: Possible Scenarios. Belgrade: BCSP.
- What the source records
- The analysis describes mass mobilization and growing repression, but concludes that the size of the protests does not alone address the issue of organization, choice and division within the government.
- Claim it supports
- “Contemporary analysis shows why the major mobilisation of 2024-2025 has not yet produced a comparable institutional and security crack.
- Source limitation
- Scenario analysis is time-sensitive and does not predict the future; it is based on information available until November 2025.
Domestic think tank multisectoral research report - Review full report, methodology framework and chapters by sectors
Petrović, Predrag, i Jelena Pejić Nikić, ur. 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Petrović, Predrag, and Jelena Pejić Nikić, editor 2021. Security Sector in a Captured State: Act Two. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- “For 2020-2021, it describes the security services and police as an instrument for preserving power and suppressing protests.
- Claim it supports
- Gives a modern point of comparison: when the command and expectation of survival of the top are firm, the apparatus remains with the government despite mass dissatisfaction.
- Source limitation
- The report does not measure the secret preferences of every member of the service.
Domestic think tank historical and institutional analysis - View full report, author data, chronology and conclusion
Popović, Đorđe, Predrag Petrović, Gorana Odanović i Jelena Radoman. 2011. Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 1989–2009. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
Popović, orđe, Predrag Petrović, Gorana Odanović and Jelena Radoman. 2011. Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Serbia 19892009. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- “It historically describes the behavior of the military and police leadership before the fall of Milosevic and subsequent reform of the service.
- Claim it supports
- It most directly links elite divisions, outcome assessment and the decision of the apparatus not to carry out full repression at the breaking point in 2000.
- Source limitation
- Historic reconstruction does not mean that the same set of conditions will be repeated.
Domestic think tank analysis of a protest cycle - Viewed full report, summary and description of events
Đorđević, Saša. 2020. Spontani protest i postupanje policije. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.
orđević, Saša. 2020. Spontaneous protest and police conduct. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- What the source records
- “It shows that during the same protest cycle, the police were restrained, they used excessive force, while some of the protesters were violent.
- Claim it supports
- Confirms that the decision is not automatic: behavior changes with commands, tactics, type of threat and dynamics on the street.
- Source limitation
- It’s not about the collective rejection of orders or the military.
International Organization for Human Rights annual monitoring - Official Earth Report 2025/26
Amnesty International. 2026. The State of the World’s Human Rights 2025/26 — Serbia.
- What the source records
- For 2025, police in several cities have remained prepared to use force against mostly peaceful protests.
- Claim it supports
- Gives a counterexample to the automatic expectation that the size and duration of the mobilization itself leads to neutrality or defection of services.
- Source limitation
- Monitoring documents the conduct, but does not know the internal assessments of the commanders and officers.
Reviewed historical work domestic archival and documentary sources - Viewed full text, sources, abstract and bibliographic record
Dimitrijević, Bojan B. 2021. „Vojska Jugoslavije u događajima 5. oktobra 2000.” Istorija 20. veka 39(1): 175–196. https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.1.dim.175-196
Dimitrijević, Bojan B. 2021. "Army of Yugoslavia in the events of October 5, 2000" History of the 20th Century 39(1): 1756. https://doi.org/10.29362/ist20century.2021.1.dim.175-196
- What the source records
- On the basis of military documents, it reconstructs the preparations of the Yugoslav Army for a possible intervention and the decision not to use the forces against the mass rebellion on October 5, 2000.
- Claim it supports
- Directly confirms that mass, internal dissatisfaction and assessment of the outcome can change the calculation of the military peak and lead to non-execution of the repressive option.
- Source limitation
- “A historical case and incomplete documentation do not give a general rule or describe the decisions of the entire police force.
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